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1Thomas George Bunce
Causation, Realism, Determinism, and Probability in the Science and 
Philosophy of Max Born
Abstract
In this thesis I will examine the philosophy of the physicist Max Born (1882-1970). As
well as his scientific work, Born wrote on a number of philosophical topics: causation,
realism, determinism, and probability. They appear as an interest throughout his career,
but he particularly concentrates on them from the 1940s onwards. Born is a significant
figure in the development of quantum mechanics whose philosophical work has been
left largely unexamined. It is the aim of this thesis to elucidate and to critically examine
that work.
I  will  give  a  defence  of  presentist  historiography  in  the  history  and  philosophy  of
science and a (relatively) brief biography of Born. With regards to causation, the thesis
will argue that he holds that there exist principles regarding causal relations that have
guided the development of physics and have, in the modern formulation of the subject,
been confirmed as having an empirical status. I will argue that he is a selective realist,
initially  with  regards  to  invariant  properties  and,  later  on,  a  structural  realist.  With
regards to determinism, I will argue that Born has produced an argument, compatible
with modern philosophical definitions of determinism, that we were never entitled to
conclude  from the  success  of  classical  mechanics  that  the  world  was  deterministic.
Finally,  I  will  argue  that  Born  holds  an  objective  interpretation  of  probabilities  in
quantum mechanics which, due to his strong belief in the physical reality of quantum-
mechanical probabilities and his apparent disbelief in the superposition of the wave-
function, is most likely a long-run propensity theory.
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Introduction
In this  thesis  I  am going to explore the philosophy of quantum scientist  Max Born
(1882-1970). Born was instrumental in the development of the new quantum mechanics,
in particular giving the statistical interpretation of the wavefunction (1926a). He was the
head of the theoretical physics group at Göttingen from 1921-1933 and worked closely
with Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976) and Pascual Jordan (1902-1980) to develop matrix
mechanics. Although he was not jointly awarded the Nobel Prize in the 1930s for his
work with  Heisenberg,  he  was  awarded the  1954 prize  for  his  development  of  the
statistical interpretation of the wavefunction in 1926. 
As  well  as  his  scientific  work,  Born  wrote  on  a  number  of  philosophical  topics—
causation, realism, determinism, and probability. They appear as an interest throughout
his career, but he particularly concentrates on them from the 1940s onwards. Born is a
significant figure in the development of quantum mechanics whose philosophical work
has been left largely unexamined. It is the aim of this thesis to elucidate and to critically
examine that work. My general methodology is to first try to work out Born’s position
on a particular topic and then to examine modern philosophical positions, with the aim
of determining which, if any, is the best fit. The thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1—Historiographical  Prolegomenon. The  historiography  of  this  thesis  is
presentist in nature: I aim to use contemporary philosophy to elucidate and understand
Born’s  views.  This  is  a  methodology that  is  frequently  regarded as  problematic  by
historians of science. In this chapter, I will examine the potential problems that can (not
must) arise from presentist history and offer a defence of it. I will do this by examining
arguments concerning Whig history,  triumphalism,  and chronologically wide-ranging
historical surveys, as well as looking a case study in the history of alchemy and early
modern  chemistry.  I  will  also  examine  the  historiography  of  scientific  biography
through the lens of three biographies of Isaac Newton. 
6Chapter 2—The Born Identity. This chapter will give a (relatively) brief biography of
Born. Although the primary focus of this thesis is Born’s work, it is also worth giving an
overview of his life. This is both because he is not so well-known as other major figures
in the history of quantum mechanics—for example, there exists no academic biography
of him, only a popular one—and because it is worth examining his education and trying
to set his work in context. 
Chapter 3—Born on Causation. This chapter is a critical examination of Born’s book,
Natural  Philosophy of Cause and Chance  (1949a).  Originally delivered as the 1948
Waynflete  lectures  at  Magdalen  College,  Oxford,  it  deals  with  Born’s  views  on
causation in physics. Born argues that causal relations in physics ought to obey two
principles: contiguity, which ensures causal connection; and antecedence, which ensures
causal priority. He argues that these principles have both affected the development of
physics,  and have in  modern physics gained an empirical,  rather  than metaphysical,
status. In this chapter I will give a critical examination of his argument and then look at
what sort of philosophical status he means his principles to have. This will be aided by
looking at a ‘zoo’ of potential sort of principles. This zoo contains Kant’s synthetic a
priori principles, Chang’s principles of intelligibility, Meyrson’s Principles of Identity,
Watkins’ confirmable  and influential  metaphysics,  and Zahar’s  heuristically  superior
metaphysical  principles.  I  will  argue  that  they  are  best  regarded  as  combination  of
Zahar’s and Watkins’ positions. Finally, I will examine whether or not certain aspects of
modern physics—spooky action-at-a-distance and relativistic time-travel—might cause
problems for Born’s thesis and will conclude that they do not. 
Chapter 4—Born on Realism. This chapter will examine Born’s position with regards
to  scientific  realism.  Born engages  explicitly  with the topic  in  a  number of  papers,
arguing  against  positivism  and  for  a  position  termed  ‘invariant  realism’.  Invariant
realism argues that we should only be realist about such physical properties, along with
the entities which bear them, that are invariant under transformation. This position will
be examined and it will be argued that it meets the criteria—metaphysical, semantic,
epistemic and progressive—to be classed as variety of  selective realism.  I  will  also
examine a later paper of Born’s (1966) in which he advances a position that is much
more in line with epistemic, but not ontic, structural realism than his earlier work.
7Chapter  5—Born  on  Determinism.  This  chapter  will  examine  Born’s  paper  Is
Classical Mechanics In Fact Deterministic? (1955). In this paper, Born argues that we
did not have good reason to think that the success of classical mechanics implied that
the  world  was  deterministic,  and hence  there  is  far  less  reason to  worry  about  the
indeterminism of quantum mechanics. His argument rests on two claims: firstly that
there is a necessary non-zero error in all classical measurements which leads to classical
determinism being empirically indistinguishable from indeterminism, and secondly that
any  such  indistinguishable  claims  must  be  considered  to  be  physically  (but  not
necessarily semantically) meaningless. Born’s argument will be examined in detail. This
examination  will  be  aided  by  some  modern  work  on  chaotic  systems.  Finally,  a
reconstruction will be offered in terms of contemporary definitions of determinism. 
Chapter  6—Born on  Probability.  This  chapter  will  examine  Born’s  position  with
regards  to  the  interpretation  of  probability  in  physics  and,  in  particular,  quantum
mechanics. Although Born does discuss probability a number of times across his work,
he is not explicit about how he interprets it (although he is certainly aware that there
exists  a  debate about  the matter).  As such,  I  will  start  by giving an account  of the
standard  interpretations  of  probability—the  classical/logical  interpretation,  the
subjective interpretation, the frequency interpretation, and the propensity interpretation
—as well as looking at what positions on Born’s part would indicate that he holds one of
those  interpretations.   I  will  conclude  that  it  is  quite  obvious  that  Born  holds  an
objective  interpretation  of  probability,  but  in  order  to  say  which  (frequency  or
propensity) we need to look in detail at his work on quantum mechanics. Hence this will
be  followed by an  examination  of  On the  Quantum Mechanics  of  Collisions (Born
1926a). Via an argument of Cartwright’s (1987) concerning Born’s work on quantum
mechanics in the 1920s, supported by an examination an exchange of letters between
Born and Einstein on the subject of EPR correlations (Born 2005), I will conclude that it
is most likely that Born held a long-run propensity view of probability in physics. I will
finish by taking a detailed look at Cartwright’s (1987) claim that Born holds something
like a modal interpretation of quantum mechanics, concluding that his views are at least
related but that there is insufficient evidence to place him as being aligned with any of
the full-blown contemporary modal interpretations. 
8Chapter 1—Historiographical Prolegomenon
 1 Introduction. 
In this project I want to examine Max Born’s position on a number of philosophical
issues. These include his views on causation in physics—this involves looking at his
own work but also that of contemporary philosophers. I also want to look at how he
interpreted probabilities in quantum mechanics—this involves examining his writings
and comparing his position to those in the philosophical interpretation of probability.
I’m going to give an argument that Born was a scientific realist—this involves looking
at some contemporary philosophy. 
Questions like this can be extremely problematic. It might look like I’m engaging in
Whiggism and presentist history. I’m happy to admit that I am presentist, but I do not
think  that  presentism necessarily  involves  all  of  the many and varied sins  of  Whig
history—the assumption of the inevitability of the course of history; the assumption of
continual progress as that course is followed; the judging of historical actors by the
standards of the present; an unwillingness to understand the past on its own terms. 
I am a presentist in that I use contemporary philosophical ideas to in my examination of
Born. However, I do not want to force modern terms upon him, but rather to see where,
if anywhere, his ideas fit within a modern framework. It is also true that I am interested
in Born's work precisely because of its historical consequences—in effect my history is
motivated and informed by the present. On the other hand, I want to avoid a ‘Viking’
approach to the history of science, in which philosophers of science see history as a
toolbox  to  be  plundered  for  useful  examples,  as  French  (2014 50)  regards  analytic
9metaphysics to be (I say nothing on whether or not metaphysics is an appropriate target
for philosophical freebooters). 
In this chapter I am going to examine present-centred history and the problems that it
can  lead  to—Whiggism,  triumphalism,  the  assumption  of  the  continuity  and
transmission of ideas across history—and argue that none of these are unavoidable. I’m
going to discuss historiographical methodology and offer a defence of presentism within
historically focussed philosophy of science and integrated history and philosophy of
science.  Specifically,  I’m going to  argue that  although presentism,  construed as  the
study  of  the  past  with  reference  to  the  concepts  and  ideas  of  the  present,  can  be
problematic, it is not necessarily so. I do not want to argue that we ought to study the
past  in  this  way,  and will  happily  concede that  historians  of  science  may perfectly
legitimately find such studies uninteresting. But I do want to argue that philosophers of
science ought to be allowed to ask and answer questions in this way and that this can be
done in a rigorous and historiographically defensible way. 
I’m also going examine some elements of the debate between William R. Newman and
Ursula Klein regarding the influence of alchemy on the development of chemistry. This
debate is illustrative because both Newman and Klein make criticism of each other of
the kinds that are usually aimed at presentist history. 
This thesis is primarily a discussion of a single figure, and part of it is biographical in
nature.  Because  of  this,  I  will  discuss  particular  problems  arising  from  the
historiography of scientific biography, examining this  question through the lens of a
comparison of various biographies of Newton. 
Now, philosophers of science have in the past been criticised for the way they treat the
history of science.  In fact L.  Pearce Williams was so ticked off by Joseph Agassi’s
biography of Michael Faraday that he titled his review of it ‘Should Philosophers be
allowed to write History?’ (Williams 1975) - the answer is a rather loud NO. Williams’
complaint is not just about shoddy history, but also the tendency of philosophers to use
history to shore up their own views on the nature of science, and to run roughshod over
good historical practice in doing so.  We can also see this  in  a criticism that Hasok
Chang’s makes of Stathis Psillos: that in surveying the history of caloric whilst arguing
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for preservative realism, Psillos has only picked out those elements of the theory that act
as  obvious  of  modern  scientific  positions.  Chang  diagnoses  the  tendency  of
philosophers of science to do this as ‘precursoritis’ (Chang 2003 906) [Chang actually
writes that this is what Steven Brush would call it, but does not supply a reference].
So what  are  the  pitfalls  that  can  endanger  an  unwary  (or  uncaring)  philosopher  of
science?
 2 Problems for Presentism
 2.1 Whig History
Whig history was first defined by Herbert Butterfield in the 1930s in his monograph
The Whig Interpretation of History (Butterfield 1931). The term refers to the tendency
of the nineteenth century Whig party to write history as a sort of tale of the inevitable,
and morally correct, rise of Protestantism and Liberalism (Hall 1983). Butterfield writes
that the goal of the Whig historian is to produce ‘a story which is the ratification if not
the glorification of the present’ (Butterfield 1931 2). 
‘It is part and parcel of the Whig interpretation of history that it studies
the past with reference to the present; and though there may be a sense
in  which  this  is  unobjectionable  if  its  implications  are  carefully
considered, and there may be a sense in which it is inescapable, it has
often been an obstruction to historical  understanding because it  has
been taken to mean the study of  the past  with direct  and perpetual
reference to the present’ (Butterfield 1931 11)
And so Whig history is damned. As far as possible one must study the past on its own
terms, and only on its own terms. We must cast out our present-centred preconceptions
of the past, and seek not to impose our thoughts and methods upon it. Of course we
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should also draw attention to the second clause of the first sentence—that there is a
sense in which the study of the past with reference to the present can be unproblematic. 
There are of course problems with Whiggish history. Indeed it is almost tautologically
problematic—Whig history is almost defined as bad history. This does not mean that
one cannot do present-centred history, and it does not even mean that one cannot do
excellent present-centred history. Whig history is historiographically problematic when,
as Butterfield writes ‘it [is]taken to mean the study of the past with direct and perpetual
reference to the present’ (Butterfield 1931 11). The Whig historian is incapable of taking
the past on its own terms.
Within the history of science, Whiggism tends to manifest itself in the assumption that
past  science  leads,  linearly  and  progressively,  to  modern  science.  Revolutions  and
theory changes are ‘good’ if contemporary science accepts their results, and they are
‘bad’ if it does not. There is also a tendency to mythologise certain areas of and figures
in science, particularly in the aforementioned case of theory change. Parts of historical
science which are not precursors in modern science are often treated with contempt or
simply  ignored.  Again,  think  of  Chang’s  example  of  Psillos  ignoring those  parts  of
caloric theory that do not act as precursors to modern chemistry (Chang 2003 906). We
can illustrate this problem precisely by taking a look to a historical preamble to the
chapter on particle physics in Young and Freedman's 1600 page doorstop of a textbook,
University Physics:
The idea that the world is made of fundamental particles has a long history.
In  about  400  BC  the  Greek  philosophers  Democritus  and  Leucippus
suggested  that  matter  is  made  of  indivisible  particles  that  they  called
atoms...This idea lay dormant until about 1804, when the English scientist
John  Dalton  (1766-1844),  often  called  that  father  of  modern  chemistry,
discovered that many chemical formula could be explained if atoms of each
element  are  the  basic,  indivisible  building  blocks  of  matter. (Young  and
Freedman 2011 1465). 
This is a pretty wrong headed view for several reasons—firstly it utterly ignores the fact
that many, many people discussed atoms in the 2000 or so years between Democritus
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and Dalton, and, more pertinently to the precise point at hand, it links the atoms of
Democritus and the atoms of Dalton when really the two concepts share little. It is true
that the both sorts of atomism express the concept of bigger things being composed of
lots of smaller things but if this is the sense in which atomism is meant, then we really
ought to include (at least) the early-modern proponents of the mechanical philosophy in
this lineage. If it is not, then we ought to point that the atoms of Dalton are the bearers
of chemical properties and the atoms of Democritus are not (Chalmers 2014). There is a
definite teleological sense to this view of history: ‘the Whig historian knows the moral
of his  tale before he has sat  down to tell  it’ as Hall  puts it  (1983 46).  The precise
problem  is  one  of  misinterpretations  stemming  from  pathologically  searching  for
precursors—the only reason that Democritus is given as a precursor to Dalton is that it
has  been  assumed  that  a)  he  must  have  had precursors,  and b)  a  precursor  can  be
identified merely by the use of similar language and concepts. 
We can see a criticism of a Whiggish style of history in Pearce’s review of Agassi.
Williams writes that the picture of Faraday presented by is one of  ‘a slum kid with a
crippling cockney accent, struggling against bitter odds to “make it” in the high-toned
world of English science at the beginning of the nineteenth century’ (Williams 1975
246).  Williams  takes  Agassi’s  Faraday  to  be  a  man  who  struggled  for  recognition
because  of  snobbishness,  a  ‘rebel  confronted  by  the  orthodox  “conservative”
establishment’ (Williams 1975 249). He thinks this is wrong, or at least that there is
little evidence for it.  For one thing,  Faraday became part  of that establishment.  For
another,  Williams  thinks  that  Faraday’s  peers  struggled  to  accept  his  ideas  simply
because  his  work  was  difficult  to  understand  (Williams  1975  250).  Where’s  the
Whiggishness in Agassi’s account? It’s in the idea of (incorrectly) presenting Faraday as
a  hero  who struggled  against  orthodox snobs  to  have  his  (correct,  by  the  lights  of
modern  science)  ideas  accepted,  rather  than  as  a  successful  scientist  whose
contemporaries were slow to adopt his ideas because they were difficult to understand.
A consequence of the Whiggish narrative of progress can be to treat historical actors
involved in the development of successful theories as heroes and villains, depending on
their  positions  with  regards  to  those  theories.  I  think  we can  see  this  in  Williams’
criticisms of Agassi. 
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Nevertheless,  I  think  it  is  an error  to  conflate  Whiggism and presentism.  Whiggish
presentism would read something like this: the present is better than the past, we are
only interested in the past with respect to the present and “the past constitutes a linear
progressive lead-up to the present”. There is no reason why presentist historians would
be incapable of taking the past on its own terms. It is true that presentism studies the
past with respect to the present; it does not have to be true that it studies that past only
with  respect  the  present.  That  a  presentist  historian  might  be  interested  in  the
development of some science does not mean that they must start out by assuming that
that development is entirely linear and progressive. We might, as Oreskes (2013) argues,
be  interested  in  some  aspect  of  the  past  because  of  our  present  interests,  without
necessarily seeking to impose our present views on the past. Present-centred history can
and ought to ask such questions whilst letting the past speak for itself. 
 2.2 Triumphalism
A sin of a different nature is that of triumphalism, or the preferential  treatment and
scholarly neglect of successful scientific theories to the detriment of those that failed.
This can seem to be bound up in a Whiggish view of history—a theory which is not
currently  adopted  by  the  scientific  community  is  seen  as  a  poor  theory,  and  thus
unworthy of study. However, what really marks Whig history as Whig history is the
judging of past science by the standards of the present. It is certainly possible for a
successful theory to be 'worse' in a Whiggish sense than the competing theories that it
triumphed over. 
Equally, as Hasok Chang has pointed out one can be triumphalist without necessarily
being Whiggish. The example he gives for this is the standard historiography of the
chemical revolution at the end of the eighteenth century. In his paper  We have Never
Been Whiggish (About Phlogiston)  (Chang 2009a),  he argues that the celebration of
Lavoisier's theories over Priestley's can hardly be Whiggish as Lavoisier's work is just
as “wrong”, if not more so, when compared to modern science than Priestley's. The
focus on Lavoisier is mere triumphalism, rather than Whiggism. Lavoisier is celebrated
as the father of chemistry, but the central components of his work—the caloric theory of
heat  and  the  oxygen  theory  of  acidity—bear  no  closer  a  resemblance  to  modern
scientific theories that does phlogistonic chemistry (Chang 2009a 239-40). Chemistry
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itself  moved  on  fairly  quickly,  dropping  much  of  Lavoisier's  theory.  There  were
probably parallel developments from the theories of both Lavoisier and Priestley to later
chemical  theories.  Chang’s  point  is  that  Lavoisier  is  celebrated because his  theories
were victorious over his opponents’ at the time. This is not to say that Whiggism is not
triumphalist—it often is—but to point out that the two can come apart. 
Triumphalism is  problematic  because  it  tends  to  assume that  theories  that  were not
adopted  by  the  mainstream scientific  community  at  the  time  are  simply  not  worth
looking at.  This  not  only leads  to  the  neglect  of  what  may be very  interesting and
informative  historical  science,  but  also  reinforces  the  Whiggish  conception  of  the
history of science as one of linear and inevitable progress. The disregard for unadopted
theories smacks of the assumption that things could have gone no other way than they
did, implied by the view that the historical progression of science is inevitable. At the
very least, it could never challenge this view. 
Additionally, triumphalist history will just  miss things. Often before a new theory is
adopted and an old one displaced, there are a number of alternatives floated around
(Priestley's  chemistry,  alternative  periodic  tables  and  genetics,  transitional  ideas
between the 'old' and 'new' quantum mechanics, not to mention the old quantum theory
itself,  to  mention  but  a  few).  Simply  because  these  ideas  do  not  echo  down  the
(branching, chaotic and decidedly non-linear) corridors of history in the manner of their
more  successful  contemporaries  does  not  mean  that  they  were  not  significant  and
influential at the time. In fact studying and reconstructing non-adopted theories is surely
essential if one wishes to understand why other theories  were adopted. Thus a good
presentist  historian,  who wishes to  discern the path of development that  lead to the
modern sciences cannot afford to be a triumphalist.
 2.3 Presentism, Causation and Diachronic History
Simply  put,  presentism is  history  motivated  and  influenced  by  the  concerns  of  the
present. The presentist historian asks such questions as: how is it that we ended up here,
with the science (or whatever)  that we have today? One also can ask philosophical
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questions: how do the thoughts of historical figures fit with what is thought today? How
do their philosophical ideas stand up to rigorous inquiry? 
Why might this be a presentist history? Well, it may well be that the kind of person who
is interested in asking these questions (and by “person” I probably mean “philosopher of
science”)  is  also  going  to  want  to  use  the  philosophical  and scientific  tools  of  the
present to perform such an examination. This kind of stuff crops up in the history of
philosophy quite a lot. It also appears in HPS when someone asks questions about the
“philosophy” of a particular historical scientist  (whether Boyle,  Newton, Einstein or
Bohr).  Examples  of  this  might  be  Dugald  Murdoch’s  (1987)  book on Niels  Bohr’s
philosophy  of  physics  or  Arthur  Fine’s  examination  in  The Shaky  Game  (1986)  of
Einstein’s philosophical attitudes. It's also the kind of question that's going to arise when
looking  at  why  a  particular  theory  was  successful,  particularly  with  regards  to
understanding on what that success was contingent. The results of modern science and
mathematics, and methods and concepts of modern philosophy might well come into
play here. This is history informed by the present: it is presentist history. 
Certain methods and assumptions may appear characteristic of presentist history. Some
of these are the use of diachronic historical surveys and the assumption of a form of
historical causation. Diachronic histories are historically wide-ranging surveys of how
ideas or sets of ideas change over time. Any presentist history that asks how a particular
contemporary theory ended up how it is today is (again, unless it's looking at something
very recent) is going to engage in such a history. It has to do this because in virtue of
surveying  a  concept  across  its  history,  we  must  examine  that  concept  in  different
historical  periods.  We might  think of Alan Chalmers’  The Scientist’s  Atom and The
Philosopher’s  Stone:  How  Science  Succeeded  and  Philosophy  Failed  to  Gain
Knowledge of Atoms (2009),  a  history of atomism that ranges from antiquity to the
twentieth century, as an example of this.
By historical causation I mean the assumption that there is some chain of causation, in
principle identifiable by the historian, running through the history of an idea. It also
means assumption of the continuity of an idea itself through history, and not just in an
immediately antecedent sense. This is relevant to presentism for a couple of reasons.
Firstly the possibility of it is going to be a necessary assumption for histories which
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seek to explain the development of a theory or idea from the past to the present. If, for
example, we want to give an explanation of why we have the particular understanding
of the concept ‘species’ in terms of that concept’s development from Linnaeus onwards,
we will presumably have to assume that we are able to identify causal inferences across
history. If we don’t make this assumption, then it does not seem possible to answer the
‘why’ and the ‘how’ of the question. Secondly it's also an assumption in the selection of
an area of historical study motivated by that area’s later effects: by deciding to study,
say,  Newton  because  of  one’s  interest  in  contemporary  physics,  one  presumably
assumes that Newton is causally relevant to the history of physics. If one can't assume
historical causation (albeit of a very weak kind in the second example) then it doesn't
even make sense to do this. 
We can see here that there are two categories of presentist question emerging. Nick Tosh
(2003) makes a distinction between presentism in terms of the criteria historians  of
science use to select their areas of study, and presentism in terms of the methodology
used  in  those  investigations.  One  form  of  presentism  is  the  use  by  historians  of
categories not available to historical actors in order to pick out those actors (or their
work) as relevant objects of study for the history of science. Tosh subdivides this sort of
presentism into two types:  ‘selection by actor intentionality’ and ‘selection by later
effect’ (Tosh 2003 647). The former uses the aims or goals of some historical actor to
determine whether  they are  a  relevant  object  of  study;  the latter  the later  historical
consequences  of  some  theory.  In  general  we  might  refer  to  this  as  presentism  in
selection criteria. 
In  his  paper  Getting  the  Game  Right,  Andrew  Cunningham  (1988)  argues  against
drawing in to the history of science historical actors for whom the category 'science' (in
anything like the modern sense) was unavailable. This sort of anachronism, according to
Cunningham leads to problems: the ascription to those historical figures of motives and
practices associated with the modern sense of the word. Science, he argues, is a human
activity and, more importantly, it is an intentional human activity (Cunningham 1988
374).  He argues  that  it  is  therefore  an  error  to  ascribe  to  some historical  actor  the
intention of doing science if it is the case that the concept of ‘science’ was unavailable
to them: someone cannot intend to perform an activity if they have no idea what that
activity consists in (Cunningham 1988 378). 
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Cunningham also here argues against the assumption of the continuity and transmission
of ideas across history. Ideas for him are strongly linked to the people and the historical
context from which they arose (1988 388). Cunningham argues that it is an error to treat
the history of science as ‘the history of discrete “ideas”’ (1988 389). He thinks that
historical ideas are both heavily situated in their historical context, and that ideas only
exist in the minds that hold them. Cunningham thinks that it simply doesn't make sense
to  talk  about  the  transmission  of  an  idea  across  differing  historical  contexts.  For
Cunningham, the problematic sort of history of science is one which treats ideas about
science as existing in some objective manner outside of the minds of scientists. The
resulting histories  are  then tales  of  those ideas  as  they are discovered  by historical
scientists  (Cunningham 1988  387-8).  The  problem with  this  argument  is  that  is  is
question-begging with regards to one side of a philosophical debate that is not settled:
that  of  realism versus  anti-realism about  science.  More  that  that,  if  Cunningham’s
argument is the sort of thing that we are concerned about, then we also ought to worry
about linking ideas held by the same person at different times. People’s attitudes and
beliefs change over the course of their lives. If we are to take Cunningham seriously,
then it would seem we ought to also worry about the fact that it is far from clear what
sort of continuity of identity individuals have over time when we write history. This
seems rather absurd. We might legitimately worry that we can fail to understand some
particular concept as a historical did, and thus produce mistaken historical claims. That
worry is very different from stating that there is no objective fact of the matter outside
of the mind of a historical actor about what,  say,  an atom is,  and that therefore we
cannot therefore study the history of atomism across different thinkers. 
Tosh is sceptical of Cunningham's denial of historical causation, pointing out that the
assumption of even a very low level of historical causation allows us to select our area
of study based on its later effect. A historian of physics can study Newton because of the
later effects of his work. It certainly seems to be a reasonably minimal assumption that
Newton played some causal role in the development of physical theories. Tosh goes on
to point out that the selection criteria that we use to define our area of study ‘need not
affect  how the selected material  is  investigated’ (2003 656).  Cunningham is right to
point out that problems can arise from anachronistic use of categories, but this is merely
a difficulty, and not an insurmountable one. 
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But this issue of causation is also at play in doing diachronic historical surveys. And
Cunningham is not wrong in raising the issue here, though I am going to argue that he
takes  it  too  far.  I  think  we can  illustrate  this  point—how presentism with  a  strong
assumption  of  historical  causation  can  be  problematic—with  reference  to  the
aforementioned Young and Freedman (2011) view of the history of atomism, linking
Democritus with Dalton. Now the problem here is not quite the assumption of historical
causation itself, but the assumption that because there are similar ideas in different parts
of history then one  must be able to make some kind of historical connection between
them. Generally speaking, what we can say is this: it is problematic to assume that there
exist links between ideas in different periods of the history of science; and we should
require  historical  evidence  beyond two thinkers  both using  the  word ‘atom’ for  the
establishing of such causation. 
 2.4 Presentism Defended
So we have a number of potential problems that we might worry presentism will run
into: assumptions of historical inevitability, leading to supposed blind alleys in history
being ignored; ‘precursoritis’; the assumption of progress; low empirical standards for
establishment of historical causation; an unwillingness to take the past on its own terms.
We can see how presentism might seem to chime well with Butterfield’s description of
Whiggish history as ‘the study of the past with direct and perpetual reference to the
present’  (1931  11).  But  remember  that  Butterfield  also  points  that  this  can  be
unproblematic, provided that one is careful. 
Naomi Oreskes offers a defence of some forms of presentism in her paper Why I am a
Presentist (2013). She notes that most historians of science, although rarely stating it
outright,  consider  present-centred  history  to  be  problematic  (2013  595).  This,  she
argues, is due to a worry that if historians engage in presentism, then they may take a
Whiggish view of history,  or fail  to understand the past on its  own terms, and thus
drawing incorrect conclusions about history (2013 599). 
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Oreskes argues that it is a mistake to conflate all presentist histories though, and offers
some distinguishing classifications. Substantive Presentism is ‘the belief that the present
is the key to the past, in the literal sense that the past is substantively like the present’
(Oreskes 2013 600).  Methodological Presentism  is the thesis that past events are best
understood by studying present ones (Oreskes 2013 600). Oreskes offers the example of
studying the Arab Spring in order to understand the French revolution. She argues that
both of these sorts of presentism are problematic: there are good reasons to think that
the  past  was  not  substantively  like  the  present;  and,  whilst  we  might  think  that
comparing revolutions may well be interesting, it seems unlikely that we would come to
understand much about  the French revolution by studying the Arab spring (Oreskes
2013 600-601). 
Presentism is not problematic in every aspect though, Oreskes thinks. She asks ‘is it not
possible to acknowledge the concerns of the present and be motivated by them, without
succumbing to the view that history is a tale of triumph leading to the present?’ (2013
603). Her answer is that it is indeed possible. In fact, Oreskes argues that all historians
are to some extent motivated by the concerns of the present, be it out of a desire to
explore one’s own cultural history, a personal or social interest in a particular area, or
simply to increase one’s chances of getting tenure (2013 603). This is Oreskes’ third
type of presentism, Motivational Presentism. 
To deny or decry the existence of motivational presentism in the history of science is
something  that  Oreskes  thinks  is  both  mistaken  and  potentially  damaging  to  the
discipline (Oreskes 2013 604). To decry motivational presentism is mistaken because it
fails to acknowledge that it is inevitable, as discussed above. It can be damaging to the
discipline because to deny it is to deny historians the ability to argue that there is value
to us in the study of history, that the study of the past is of value to the present (Oreskes
2013 604). 
It might seem like this project is engaging in some problematic form of methodological
presentism, but I want to argue that it is not, or at least it is not my intention to do so.
My methodology is to try to understand what it is that Born’s views are with regards to
some particular philosophical debate, then to try and find which philosophical position
those views are best aligned with. The point here is that my starting point is what Born
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actually wrote, not contemporary philosophy. It’s true that I am interested in what Born
thought about, say, realism because I am interested in both the history of physics and
contemporary philosophy of science, but that is simply motivational presentism and so
unproblematic. 
I  can  think  of  two  potential  criticisms  of  this  position.  The  first  is  that  I  am still
engaging in a problematic form of presentism by even trying to ask questions about
Born’s  views  on  something  like  realism or  the  interpretation  of  probability  for  the
reason that those are contemporary categories which I am imposing on his thought. The
second is  that  whether  or  not  Born’s  views on realism are  aligned with,  say,  ontic
structural realism is not an interesting question in that it doesn’t tell us anything about
the historical Born because those categories were not available to him.
My reply to the first criticism is that none of the questions that I ask about Born in this
thesis  concern  categories  that  he  was  unaware  of.  Born  wrote  a  book  on  causal
principles in physics. He engages with critically with positivism and offers arguments
for how we can gain objective knowledge of an external world. He discusses classical
determinism several times. He is concerned himself with probabilistic physics and is
quite aware that there exists a debate concerning the interpretation of the probability
calculus. 
My reply to the second criticism is that using contemporary positions can help clarify to
us exactly what Born thinks. Even if this does not tell us about the pure historical Born,
from an HPS point of view it is still interesting in and of itself. I’m perfectly happy to
accept that some historians of science might not be interested in such questions. That
doesn’t mean that such questions ought not to be asked. 
Presentism might also be criticised because it is not capable of fully immersing itself in
the past and that historians should avoid the use of contemporary science when studying
the past (Kuhn 1970 3). We have to be careful when suggesting this sort of thing. For
one thing,  it is not, I think, entirely possible to completely immerse oneself in the past.
Historians today exist in the present. This is not something we can do anything about.
There  is  always  going some manner  in  which  even  the  most  careful  historian  will
interpret  the  thoughts  and  actions  of  historical  actors  in  terms  of  his  or  her
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contemporary intellectual frameworks. What is crucial is constantly bear this in mind
and not try to impose views or systems of thought onto past figures anachronistically. 
In any case, even if  one were to somehow forget all  one knew about contemporary
physics (a blow to the head, perhaps, which induces Hollywood-style amnesia) allowing
one  to  truly  understand  the  nature  of  Maxwell's  electromagnetic  theory,  then  how
precisely would one go about relearning it in manner which is not at all anachronistic?
Lecture notes from Cambridge at the time? But in what year, and from what teacher?
19th century scientific books and papers? Without any discussion and influence from
one's 19th century peers? There is no way, short of a time machine, to really and truly
immerse oneself in the past. Any attempt will really be a sham, and it runs the danger of
not realising that it is a sham. And it might turn into a boring one at that. Go too far
down this  path and one relegates the role  of the historian to  that  of a mere scribe,
cataloguing  the  events  of  the  past.  This  does  not  mean  that  there  is  no  point  to  a
historian learning to  solve problems in the manner  of  19th century physics  (c.f.  Jed
Buchwald). The point is to be careful. One can know as much about the area of study as
possible.  This  is  simply  good scholarship.  One must  also  be  wary of  from judging
historical figures against inappropriate criteria and constantly consider, and try to avoid,
anachronisms.
 3 An Example From Alchemy
In  Atoms and Alchemy  (2006),  William R Newman traces  a  lineage  of  atomic  and
corpuscular theories from the writings of medieval alchemists through to the mechanical
philosophy of  Robert  Boyle  via  early  seventeenth  century  alchemist/chymist  Daniel
Sennert..
 3.1 Newman 
Newman argues for a historiographical revision of the importance of alchemy for the
scientific revolution, claiming that, far from representing a break with some unscientific
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and mystical tradition, early modern 'science' owes much to the methodology and theory
of the medieval alchemists, particularly with respect to the development of corpuscular
and atomic theories Newman 2006 6-12). Although not precisely a presentist historian
(he is, after all, writing about the sixteenth century), the kind of diachronic survey he
undertakes is open to precisely the same historiographical criticisms as presentism is.
Alchemists, according to Newman, adopted the Scholastic interpretations of the atomic
theories of Democritus, and crucially applied these to the practice of their craft. This is
exemplified in the  Summa Perfectionis  of Geber, identified by Newman as probably
being the alias (derived from a Europeanisation of the name of Arabic alchemist Habbir
ibn Hayyam) of Italian monk Paul of Taranto (2006 35). In the  Summa Perfectionis,
pseudo-Geber (as Newman refers to him) links Aristotelianism to atomic theory, arguing
that metals are made up of Sulphur and Mercury particles in a very strong composition
(fortissima  compositio).  These  particles  are  in  turn  made  up  of  a  very  strong
composition of the four Aristotelian elements: Earth, Air, Fire and Water. Other metals
are formed due to excess unfixed particles of Sulphur and Mercury and can be reduced
to their noble components by removing these in a variety of processes. Thus Summa...
presents a system which is alchemical, in that it allows the transfiguration of metals, but
assumes that they have common building blocks which remain unchanged throughout
reactions (Newman 2006 27).
This  philosophy  interacts  with  alchemical  practice  in  that  it  provides  an  alternate
account for reversible reactions to that of the Thomists—the reversibility results from
the recovery of the original components, still present in the composition, rather than
their regeneration.
Geber's  crown is  passed  down to  Daniel  Sennert,  who adopted  a  similar  theory  of
matter,  arguing that  the recovery of materials  after  dissolution provides  evidence of
corpuscles as form of “building block” which persists through change. Sennert uses this
to defend the existence of substantial forms in the face of growing opposition to the idea
—it is these that survive reversible chemical reactions. Sennert's primary example of the
substantial forms thesis is an experiment in which silver is dissolved in Aqua Fortis
(nitric acid) and then recovered via the addition of salt of tarter (potassium carbonate)
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and heating. The silver corpuscles survive this process despite the destruction of the
solid form (Newman 2006 112).
Newman then proceeds to argue that these theories, and this experiment in particular,
were  inherited  by  Robert  Boyle,  significantly  influencing  the  development  of  his
mechanical philosophy. Although Boyle's anti-hylomorphism is evidently different from
Sennert's defence of substantial forms, Newman makes the case that Boyle borrowed
strongly from Sennert's experimental work. I'm not going to go into further detail about
this point but suffice it to say that Newman makes a convincing case involving identical
terminologies and experiments, and other sources which record that Boyle was reading
Sennert at the time he was writing his essay,  Of the Atomicall Philosophy  (Newman
2006 160). Boyle effectively takes Sennert's work and reinterprets the consequences of
his experiments to argue for his version of corpuscularism. Alloys and dissolutions of all
metals  can be reduced to their  original components.  Mechanical  reductionism relied
heavily on Sennert's experimental techniques.
 3.2 Ursula Klein 
Klein has  criticised Newman's  position on a number of  grounds,  some specific  and
others more general. She argues that Paul of Taranto’s use of the Aristotelian term 'mixt'
is indicative of a lack of corpuscularism (Klein 2007 249). Newman counters this by
arguing that Paul is simply using Aristotelian terms that have been redefined by him
(Newman 2009).
Klein  eschews  Newman's  interpretation,  that  of  knowledge  passed  down  by  the
medieval alchemists to the early modern chemists, in favour of a contextual approach.
Klein's version of the history of chemistry and atomism in the scientific revolution is
that these ideas and their development came not from philosophers and alchemists, but
from artisans  and  technicians  and,  in  particular,  the  writers  of  chemical  textbooks,
whose knowledge was largely practical (Klein and Lefevre 2007). Whilst there almost
certainly some truth in this assertion, I don't think that it  is necessary to completely
write out the influence of alchemy in the way Klein does. In fact her criticism of the fact
that Newman concentrates of texts rather than society/ culture as a whole, is strikingly
24
similar to Skinner's criticism of presentism and wide ranging historical surveys. Whilst
Newman  is  not  precisely  a  presentist  historian,  his  work  on  atomism  is
methodologically similar—he looks at a long period of time in an effort to ascertain the
origins of a particular theory. Skinner (1969) argues that it is extremely difficult, even
impossible to master a period of history spanning centuries. As Tosh describes Skinner's
(1969) argument 'Any historian attempting to reconstruct the genealogy of an idea will
be forced to rely on his own categories and his own concerns. His resultant history will
therefore be “a pack of tricks we play upon the dead”’(2003 651).
Both Klein's preference for a small-scale heavily and actor-focussed history, and her
criticism  of  Newman's  interpretation  of  terminology  as  over-enthusiastic  seem
remarkably in line with this view of history. Of course, as has been mentioned earlier, it
is not by any means in principle impossible to do history like this. It is difficult, and
requires  care  and  diligence,  but  that  is  all.  The  other  issue  at  play  here  is  that  of
historical causation. Historical causation is the thesis that causal links between events in
differing historical periods can be established by the historian. 
Newman even accuses Klein coming ‘perilously close’ to triumphalism (Newman 2007
249) with respect to disregard for the influence of alchemy. A triumphalist view, which
Newman thinks was held by scholars such as Hall and Butterfield (2007 212) would run
something like  this:  alchemy had largely  lost  the  scientific  battle  by the  eighteenth
century,  and much of eighteenth century chemical  knowledge was not  derived from
alchemy, so it is not worth studying. I don't for a minute think that this is a deliberate
oversight in Klein's part—she is certainly not Whiggish. The point here is that it is clear
that although neither Newman nor Klein are presentist  historians, the criticisms that
they level at the other are the criticisms that are made of present-centred history. This, I
think, suggests that the criticisms of presentist history are a) not unique to it (i.e. we
could not simply avoid bad history by not being presentist), and b) are not identical with
it (i.e. the problem with presentism is not precisely that it is present-centred but that that
present-centredness can lead to other problems). If we grant b), then I think, given what
else I have argued, we can reasonably make the claim that it is at least possible to avoid
those problems. 
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 4 The Historiography of Scientific Biography.
Once section of this project will be biographical in nature. There is a need to set the
work of the man in context; both in the context of the world around him and in the
context of his life. And besides, Born lead an interesting life. But there are two things
here: the life of the man, and the work of the man. The available biographies of Born try
to  do  one  or  the  other—Greenspan’s  (2005)  book  largely  covers  his  life,  and  is
somewhat  light  on the physics.  His Royal  Society biographical paper  (Kemmer and
Schlepp 1971) is separated along these lines: the first half covers his life, the second his
science.  Precisely  how  to  combine  the  two  is  something  of  a  historiographical
conundrum. Does one attempt, at one extreme, a full integration of science and life,
writing of the influences of the subjects non-academic experiences on his academia, and
vice-versa? Or does one, at the other, present the scientist as a Janus-figure, a two faced
god (with a two-volume biography): one, the scientist; the other, the man. Both of these
extremes can be problematic.
Helge  Kragh  notes  other  dangers  of  biography  in  the  history  of  science:  over-
identification with the subject and the tendency to ‘present the portrayed scientist as a
hero’ (Kragh 1987 168). The biography is a medium in which it is easy for the ‘mythical
history of science to flourish’ (Kragh 1987 168). It is only a short step from a biography
to a hagiography.
In  this  section  I  will  examine  three  biographies  of  Isaac  Newton  and  discuss  how
particular  methods  and  biases  used  in  reconstructing  his  life  can  both  distort
significantly not only the picture of the man that is presented but also later scholarship.
Due to Newton's iconic status in the history of science, writers wishing to promote a
particular  view of  science  or  scientific  ideology  can  utilise  Newton’s  authority  via
biography. Biographers can construct a picture of Newton in which it is implied that the
great  man  himself  would  have  agreed  with  whatever  positions  they  hold,  thus
apparently lending themselves a powerful ally. This approach characterises the first two
26
biographies I will  examine: David Brewster's (1855) mid-Victorian hagiography and
Louis Trenchard More's (1934) polemic against early 20th century physics. The third
biography, Frank E. Manuel's A Portrait of Isaac Newton (1968), is a different beast. It
is  not  a  portrait  that  casts  Newton  in  a  particular  light  in  order  to  support  the
biographer's particular agenda, but it is deeply entwined with the historiography it uses
—Eriksonian psychoanalysis—in a way which shapes the whole work.
In an essay on Brewster as a historian of science, J.R.R. Christie comments that ‘It was
he too who thoroughly dualised Newton, into scientist and alchemist, the rational and
the unintelligible’ (Christie 1984 56). Christie maintains that there has not been any
great advance on this concept: ‘Humpty Dumpty is not yet put back together again’
(Christie  1984  56).  Brewster,  in  his  biography  effectively  framed  the  questions  of
Newtonian  scholarship.  Most  books  about  Newton  at  least  mention  Brewster’s
Memoirs, even if only to criticise it. Probably every academic who has studied Newton
has  at  least  glanced  at  the  book.  Despite  its  obvious  flaws  it  is  still,  historically
speaking, one of the foundations of Newtonian biography. It is not inconceivable that
the systems of thought that Brewster used to model the man still ‘infect’, as Christie
puts it, the way we think about Newton,(Christie 1984 56). Certainly this criticism has
been levelled at Manuel: Hall refers, rather contemptuously, to Manuel’s Newton as ‘a
combination of computer and psychotic Peter Pan’ (Hall 1982 307)—a dualistic identity
if ever there was one. The chosen texts will be examined in the light of this concept of
duality, both attempting to elucidate how and why Brewster creates this duality and how
(if) the concept is continued in later biography.
A relatively  important  factor  in  early  Newtonian  biographies  appears  to  have  been
access  to  the  Portsmouth archives.  These  archives,  owned originally  by the  Earl  of
Portsmouth, contained massive amounts of Newtonian data: unpublished manuscripts,
letters, notes and books (Hall 1989 188-91). In order to gain a good picture of the man it
is probably necessary to examine these. If nothing else, most of the documents relating
to Newton’s  pursuit  of  alchemy and his unorthodox religious views were contained
here. Before they were auctioned off publicly in 1936, access to them was by request to
the Portsmouth family only. Whether for this reason or otherwise, it is not apparent that
many biographers of Newton before this point consulted them (Hall 1989 189). This is
perhaps  another  reason,  along  with  general  Whiggishness,  that  certain  aspects  of
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Newton’s  life  were  not  really  discussed  until  relatively  recently.  Anyone  who  had
consulted the archives had the resources at  their  disposal to paint a fairly  complete
picture of Newton. Any lack of discussion, therefore, of particular aspects of Newton by
such-equipped biographers cannot easily be explained as simple ignorance. At the very
least it  is shoddy scholarship and it  requires no great leap of faith to believe that it
represents a conscious decision to ignore certain sources.
 4.1 David Brewster and the ‘Memoirs of Isaac Newton’
The  writings  and  life  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton  abound  with  the  richest
counsel. Here the philosopher will learn the art of patient observation by
which alone he can acquire an immortal name; the moralist will trace
the lineaments of a character exhibiting all the symmetry of which our
imperfect nature is susceptible; and the Christian will contemplate with
delight  the High Priest  of  Science  quitting the study of  the  material
universe—the  scene  of  his  intellectual  triumphs,  to  investigate  with
humility and reverence the mysteries of his faith (Brewster 1855 3)
Such writes Sir David Brewster in his 1855 ‘Memoirs of Sir Isaac Newton’, a biography
which could be described, perhaps a little uncharitably, as two volumes of hyperbole,
sycophancy and inappropriate capitalisation. Perhaps it seems a little Whiggish to talk
like this but the modern perspective is not unique in passing this judgement: The Times
in its review of the ‘Memoirs’ was ‘forced to the conclusion that Sir David is a good
Christian and a bad biographer’ (The Times, 1855 9). The Times’ anonymous reviewer
certainly held the opinion that Brewster wrote from a perspective that was, at the very
least, somewhat biased. But Brewster is not interesting simply as an historian of science
writing a Whiggish hagiography. Brewster is interesting as a not insignificant figure in
nineteenth-century physics who clearly was in thrall to his image of Newton.
Brewster was not professionally separated from Newton’s domain, having worked in the
field of optics. His work survives in modern physics in the form of Brewster’s angle, the
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incident angle of light on a surface at which the reflection becomes linearly polarized.
He also made contributions to the theory of colours and absorption spectra and invented
the kaleidoscope. Although Brewster was perfectly prepared to refute Newton’s theory
of colours, he insisted, rather unfashionably, upon adhering to the corpuscular theory of
light (Shapiro 1993 330-54). It must be admitted that an admiration for Newton is not
the  only  reason  for  maintaining  a  belief  in  particulate  light.  There  were  still  some
scientific disputes over the nature of light in the 1850s, although by this point they were
running  down.  Brewster  also  had  methodological  qualms  about  light  waves—
particularly the assertion of the existence of the ether (Cantor 1984).
So why did Brewster feel the need to write a biography of Newton, and why did he
write it in the manner he did? Brewster, although respected as a scientist, receiving both
the Copley and Rumford medals from the Royal Society,  appears to have often felt
maligned at the way he was treated by society in general. He suffered from financial
worries throughout much of his life, supporting himself through his writing and editing
the Edinburgh Magazine. He even considered declining his knighthood when he heard
of the fees (up to £240) involved (Shapin 1984 19). He should have earned significant
sums of money from his invention of the kaleidoscope, but due to British patent laws he
received relatively little for his work. This added to his feelings of resentment at the
treatment of scientists and inventors in Victorian society.
Brewster’s involvement in setting up the British Association for the Advancement of
Science (BAAS) was an attempt to rectify these problems and pressure the government
into recognising science as a true profession (Morell 1984 25-29). However Brewster
rapidly became sidelined within the organisation and it became clear that the BAAS was
not fulfilling the role he had intended for it. Brewster eventually acquired a permanent
position at the University of St. Andrews as the principle of United College. Here he
attempted to enact significant reforms on the university system (Anderson 1984). His
biography  of  Newton,  written  during  his  years  of  disputes  over  the  reforms  and
published towards the end of his tenure as principle, must at least partly represent his
attempts to portray how science should be performed and rewarded, utilising Newton’s
authority to push his vision of society.
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Brewster enters into an extended analysis of Newton’s correspondence, particularly with
Locke, in order to demonstrate that Newton had been engaging in theology and analysis
of  scripture  throughout  his  life.  So,  having saved  Newton’s  reputation  as  a  serious
theologian, Brewster goes into a discussion of Newton’s theology, particularly his views
on revelation and scriptural  corruption.  Brewster  takes  pains to  emphasise the links
between the  scientific  investigation  of  nature  and the  investigation  of  scripture.  He
writes whilst criticising Voltaire’s portrayal of Newton—(the writings of Frenchmen on
his hero seem to particularly irk Brewster) ‘it has surprised us that other [in this context
other means non-sceptical] authors should have regarded the study of the Scriptures as
incompatible with scientific research’ (Brewster 1855 Vol II 355). He goes on to praise
England patriotically for its abundance of such thinkers (‘protestant’ thinkers, Brewster
specifies) before writing that ‘From the study of the material universe—the revelation of
God’s wisdom, to the study of his holy word—the revelation of his will, the transition is
neither difficult  nor startling’ (1855 Vol II 355). He then provides an extended (two
pages  long)  and  rather  flowery  metaphor  relating  astronomical  inquiry  to  the
interpretation of the book of revelation. But what he wants to say here is clear: that
science and Christianity are not only amiable partners, but natural ones. Science is the
revelation  of  god’s  wisdom—the  study of  nature  has  theological  value.  Equally  he
seems to suggest that the study of nature and the study of scripture are intellectually
similar activities. 
However, what he does not do here is directly link science with scripture. He writes of
how ‘the antiquity and authenticity of the books which compose the sacred canon …
have been demonstrated to all who are capable of appreciating the force of historical
evidence’ (Brewster 1855 Vol II 358). What he does not mention is scientific evidence.
In fact in his other writings, Brewster often condemns attempts to mix science with
scripture,  such as  the  catastrophist  geologies  which  attempted  to  explain  geological
features of the Earth as being caused by the Biblical flood. As Paul Baxter has pointed
out, Brewster, in his review of William Buckland’s Bridgewater treatise condemns the
intrusion  of  religion  into  scientific  matters,  and  takes  pride  in  the  Evangelical
movement’s defence of the independence of geology from scripture (Baxter 1984 48-
49).
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Science, Brewster thinks, can tell you about God by way of studying his creation, but it
can’t tell you about scripture, and scripture can’t tell you about science.
We can see that Newton’s Christianity and serious theological work are clearly of great
importance to Brewster and his program. Newton is held up as the ideal of the scientist
and the Christian. So how does Brewster deal with what others had suggested, and what
he must have realised when he examined the Portsmouth archives in detail: that Newton
was probably guilty of the Arian heresy, and denied the divinity of Christ? How did he
deal  with,  as  J.R.R Christie  imagined it  ‘the  mounting  horror  as  to  what  they  [the
manuscripts] revealed’? (Christie 1984 55). It seems that he tries to cover for Newton’s
potential  heresy,  whilst  being very careful  to  not explicitly  contradict  any historical
sources that might be later brought up, effectively covering for himself. The effect is
rather transparent.
He writes ‘Sir Isaac Newton has been regarded […] as antitrinitarian; but this opinion is
not warranted by anything which he has published’ (Brewster 1855 Vol II 337). In the
light of the unpublished manuscripts that Brewster had examined, the word ‘published’
becomes  significant  here.  A few pages  later  he  writes  with  reference  to  his  earlier
biography of Newton, written in 1830 before he had looked through the Portsmouth
archives, that ‘in the absence of all direct evidence I had no hesitation […] in coming to
the conclusion that he [Newton] was a believer in the trinity’ (Brewster 1855 Vol II
340). Again, Brewster refuses to discuss what he may have found in the archives. He
then goes on to write about how he thinks that one should not ‘burrow for heresy among
the obscurities of thought’ (Brewster 1855 Vol II 340). Effectively, he says that there is
no published material to suggest Newton was unorthodox, and if one won’t accept that,
then in any case it’s no one else’s business. 
There are minimal references to Trinitarian controversies when Brewster discusses his
archive findings, despite extended discourses on several manuscripts. All he is willing
to say with regards to this is that he has found a manuscript ‘which may throw some
light on the opinions of the author’ (Brewster 1855 vol 2 350). The manuscript is not
reproduced or discussed in the main text, instead being relegated to the appendix. Again
Brewster just refuses to discuss the issue. It is fairly clear that Brewster, from reading
the Portsmouth Archive material,  came to the conclusion that Newton held heretical
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views, but was unable to bring himself to sully his hero’s reputation in the public arena.
This is something that may go beyond mere Whiggishness. It is a blatant refusal to
discuss a controversial (to Brewster at least) area of Newton’s life based on personal
feelings. This desire to segregate elements of Newton’s personality from his identity as
a scientist also forms part of the ‘dualistic’ nature that Christie described.
This speaks, one suspects to more than a simple desire to protect the reputation of a
personal hero. It's about Brewster's personal religious convictions as well. Here he goes
to great pains to prove (as it were) that Newton was a devout Christian and that his
Theological works were deeply serious and not the products of a lunatic or a man in his
dotage. Indeed as I mentioned earlier, perceived aspersions of this kind cast on Newton's
character by the likes of Biot and Voltaire formed part of the initial impetus to write the
book (Christie 1984 54).
 4.1.1 The High Priest of Science—Newton as a Religious Figure
To have been the chosen sage summoned to the study of that
earth, these systems, and that universe,—the favoured lawgiver
to  worlds  unnumbered,  the  high  priest  in  the  temple  of
boundless space,—was a privilege that could be granted but to
one member of the human family;— and to have executed the
task  was  an  achievement  which  in  its  magnitude  can  be
measured only by the infinite in space, and
in the duration of its triumphs by the infinite in time. That Sage
—-that  Lawgiver—that  High-priest  was  Newton.  Let  us
endeavour to convey to the reader some idea of the revelations
which he made, and of the brilliant discoveries to which they
conducted his successors. (Brewster 1855 Vol I 279)
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This image of Newton as the ‘High-Priest’ of science is one that recurs throughout the
memoirs. In the light of Brewster’s views on science and religion I think it is fair to say
that this is not just a metaphor emphasizing Newton’s importance within the canon of
science—there is a real religious element to this picture. Brewster seems to genuinely
regard  science  as  a  vehicle  for  revelation—something  through  which  god  can  be
revealed, with Newton as one of the Elect. 
Later on in volume one, in a discussion of the development of celestial mechanics after
Newton’s  death,  Brewster  launches  into  an argument  from design based around the
stability of the solar system (1855 Vol I 312). This is not, I think, a hypocritical attempt
to marry science and scripture, but rather a rationalist argument for God that to be used
as  technique  to  convince  sceptics—something  that  would  fit  well  with  Brewster’s
evangelical leanings.
So how does all this fit in with Natural Theological trends amongst Brewster’s fellow
evangelists? It seems that there is a good fit, at least for some of Brewster’s ideas, with
Thomas Chalmers, the noted Scottish philosopher and evangelist preacher. Brewster and
Chalmers were old acquaintances. Indeed it may even be possible to credit Brewster for
Chalmers evangelical conversion, which occurred during the time that Chalmers was
writing  the  Edinburgh  encyclopaedia  article  on  Christianity  that  Brewster  had
commissioned him to do (McCosh 1874 395). Chalmers was even known, McCosh tells
us in The Scottish Philosophy, for bringing up Newton at inappropriate times (McCosh
1874 400).
We can also see this duality clearly when examining how Brewster deals with Newton’s
alchemical researches. His treatment is itself somewhat confused, probably reflecting
what  again  must  have  been  a  shocking  discovery:  that  the  great  Newton  devoted
massive  amounts  of  time  throughout  his  life  to  the  pursuit  of  horrible,  irrational
alchemy. Initially, he attempts to excuse Newton’s interest in the area by suggesting a
rational basis for it, explaining that the derivation of gold or silver from base ores and
the extraction of aluminium from clay must have seemed unbelievable. Thus ‘we need
not wonder that the most extravagant expectations were entertained of procuring from
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the basest materials the precious metals and the noblest gems’ (Brewster 1855 vol 2
372).  It  is  possible,  therefore,  that  Newton may have been misguided or lacking in
knowledge about the nature of minerals, but certainly he was not irrational.
It seems, in the end, that Brewster cannot really convince even himself of this. A few
pages later he writes ‘we cannot understand how a mind of such great power […] would
stoop to be even the copyist  of the most contemptible  alchemical poetry’ (Brewster
1855 Vol II 374-5). He attempts some further justification by arguing that everyone was
up to  it,  specifically  Boyle,  Locke  and Leibniz.  This  seems like  a  weak argument.
Brewster, one feels, simply could not overcome his revulsion at Newton’s alchemical
studies and refuses, once more, to deal with a controversial area. Brewster’s refusal to
treat Newton’s alchemy seriously is evidenced by the detailed analysis earlier in the
chapter  given of  a  chemistry  manuscript  (Brewster  1855 Vol  II  chapter  xxv)  found
within  the  same  collection  of  papers.  Brewster  will  not  characterise  the  alchemy,
choosing instead to compartmentalize it. He separates off what he considers to be an
irrational chunk of Newton’s personality from the rest of him, emphasising once more
the construction of the dualistic nature.
 4.2 Louis Trenchard More and ‘Isaac Newton: A Biography’
L.T. More was a physicist of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth- century, based
primarily at the University of Cincinnati. He became very concerned with what he felt
to be the metaphysical and profoundly unscientific nature of much of modern science,
especially the general theory of relativity. In 1915 he published a monograph entitled
‘The Limitations of Science’ (More 1915) in which he argued just that. Modern science,
he thought, had become too laden with unprovable hypotheses and should be concerned
with only what can be observed. Scientists had lost the ability to find ‘the distinction
between the creations of nature and the creations of their imagination’ (More 1915 17).
More wished to re-establish that distinction. He wished, as indicated by the prefacing
quotation, (More 1915, preface) that scientists would stop feigning so many hypotheses.
And who better to bring modern science back onto the right path than Mr Hypothesis
Non Fingo himself, the esteemed Sir Isaac Newton (with a little biographical aid from
More).
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More’s biography is not quite a hagiography written by a mid-Victorian who wishes to
present  Newton as  the perfect  man.  Indeed in  the preface,  More attacks  Brewster’s
biography for its lack of criticism (More 1934 vi). On the other hand, as Hall has noted
(Hall 1999 189), More’s work is not much of an improvement on Brewster’s: More’s
Newton is still the perfect scientist. The text is also full of explicit attacks on what More
disliked about contemporary science, revealing his purpose in writing it.
More presents his work with a strong positivist bent, as a reviewer (Perry 1917 205-6)
of  The Limitations of Science  (More 1915) notes. This is not unsurprising given his
opinions  and  context.  He  explicitly  disliked,  as  has  already  been  stated,  what  he
regarded as metaphysical claims. 
The Whig view of the history of science is still there: More still wants to demonstrate
that modern physics naturally descends from Newton, though his motives are different
from Brewster’s. He writes of Newton’s theories regarding the corpuscular nature of
light ‘This supposition of the mutual attraction of matter and light has been revived by
Professor Einstein in his theory of the gravitational field’ (More 1934 113). This link
between corpuscular light and general relativity is rather stretched. It is not reasonable
to claim anything more than a superficial resemblance between Newton’s corpuscles
and the photons of quantum theory—this might remind us of the problematic way that
Young and Friedman link the atoms of Democritus with those of Dalton (2011 1465).
Despite his deep dislike of the theory of relativity, it would be difficult for More to deny
the gravitational bending of light: by the time the book was written it was regarded as
well  confirmed  by  experiment.  However,  by  arguing  in  this  manner  that  Newton’s
theory of light is in a significant way a precursor to Einstein's, More could save the
observed  phenomena  (the  gravitational  bending  of  light)  whilst  at  the  same  time
implying that Einstein’s theories were at best derivative of Newton’s.
A common theme in More’s book is that Newton would have disliked modern science,
and  that  modern  science  is  anti-Newtonian  in  its  methodology.  He  complains  that
Newton ‘would have renounced science today altogether as most litigious and dogmatic
of task masters’ (More 1934 121). The essence of More’s argument is that Newton was
the creator of the ‘correct’ scientific method and contemporary science had lost its way.
He goes even further than this at points, suggesting that modern science is not only
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misguided, but is actually opposed to how things should be done. More thinks that the
Principia, which is one of ‘the two most stupendous creations of the scientific brain’, is
‘under attack […] by the relativists in physics’ (More 1934 332). But it gets worse! If
modern science proceeds along the dangerous course espoused by heretical thinkers like
Einstein then ‘it ultimately evaporates into scholasticism. And if it persists, it will cause
the  decadence  of  science  as  surely  as  the  medieval  scholasticism  preceded  the
decadence of religion’ (More 1934 333). Science itself will collapse, and knowledge
will return to the dark ages. And all because we didn’t listen to Newton! This is pretty
clear ideological leakage. An unsteady argument in any context, it  seems completely
inappropriate in a biography with any claims towards actually being a work of history.
 4.3 Frank E Manuel and ‘A Portrait of Isaac Newton’
Manuel (1910-2003) was, in contrast to Brewster and More, a professional historian.
What is of great importance here is that Manuel,  as a historian, explicitly considers
contemporary trends in historical thinking. Consider the context in which the book was
written. It was published in 1968 in the wake of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, and at a time when the use of psychoanalysis was popular. Manuel himself
writes in the preface that ‘on more than one occasion I steered my way between a Scylla
of historians of science and a Charybdis of psychoanalysts’ (Manuel 1968 ix). He freely
admits his reliance on theories of the unconscious, and acknowledges the debt he owes
to ‘psychoanalysts, psychologists, and sociologists’(Manuel 1968 ix). This approach has
certainly attracted criticism, particularly from Hall, who regards Manuel as falling into
‘the trap of psychoanalytic or any other ready-made analysis of personality’ (Hall 1982
306).  How,  specifically,  does  Manuel  utilise  psychoanalysis,  and  how  does  this
influence the portrait he paints of Newton? Is his use of psychoanalysis necessary for
his argument, or is it merely a theoretical language in which he chooses to frame his
writing?
The  use  of  psychoanalysis  in  Manuel’s  description  of  Newton’s  upbringing  and
childhood  is  obvious.  Newton  is  described  as  an  ‘ambivalent  neurotic’.  He  refers
directly to ‘Erikson’s schema’ (Manuel 1968 66):  the psychoanalyst’s categorization of
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the stages of the growth of the ego into the ‘eight ages of man’ (Erikson 1963 pp247-
74).  Manuel  characterizes  Newton’s  early  life  literally  in  Erikson’s  terminology:
Newton suffers from ‘mistrust, shame, doubt, guilt, and inferiority’ (Manuel 1968 66).
He also notes Newton’s ‘initiative’ and ‘industry’. 
When Manuel characterises Newton’s lack of self-esteem as having ‘its origins in an
infantile failure to be satiated at the breast’, there is a clear echo of Erikson’s first age.
Erikson writes ‘the first  demonstration of social  trust  in  the baby is  the ease of his
feeding’.  To  someone  working  within  this  ‘schema’  it  must  seem  obvious  that
something which interferes with breast feeding will result in damage to the ego. When
Manuel subsequently refers to the separation anxiety caused to Newton by his mother
leaving him, we can again see how Manuel’s analysis is framed by psychology, quite
possibly again Erikson’s. We see it again later on, when he comments that ‘[t]he fixation
upon his mother may have crippled Newton sexually’ (Manuel 1968 28).
The portion of the book describing Newton’s early life  is  the most  psychoanalysis-
heavy. It is referred back to in the closing pages of the biography, when Manuel writes,
of some of Newton’s reminiscences to John Conduitt, that in them he hears ‘the echo of
his first anguished puzzlement as an abandoned child bewildered about the meaning of
his  mother’s  appearances  and  disappearances’  (Manuel  1968  389).  This  again  is
reminiscent of Erikson’s first age. Manuel thinks that even as a dying man, Newton felt
that he had not really found ‘what he had been seeking’, still were ‘his great queries
unanswered’ (Manuel 1968 390). In this, there is an echo of Erikson’s final age, that of
Ego Integrity vs. Despair.
We can also see the old model of Newton as a dualistic personality in Manuel. In the
closing statement, he describes him as a Janus-figure. Newton was a man capable of
‘pure joys’ and great discoveries, but also of ‘destructive forces’ (Manuel 392) Manuel’s
dichotomy is not between rationality and irrationality, but between the healthy and the
pathological psyche, between, as he puts it, ‘the capacity for good and evil’ (Manuel
392).
The use of psychoanalysis raises questions more complex than the Whiggishness of
earlier history. Manuel's aim is to model the psyche of Newton, to describe him as a
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person. Psychoanalysis is his tool, the way he frames his investigation. He is perfectly
candid about this, admitting that if some of the theories he uses are incorrect, then some
of his arguments will fall down. It might well be informative to utilise psychology to
describe how and why Newton behaved as he did. Unless we are to reject psychological
insights as being unhistorical for whatever reason, then Manuel’s analysis should not be
rendered illegitimate simply because he used the prevailing psychological theory of the
time. In his disclaimer about his assumptions, Manuel is probably being overly modest
(or at least shielding himself from critics). The use of psychoanalysis does not run so
deep that his conclusions are inseparable from it.
 5 Conclusion
So, what insights or lessons can we draw from this? 
I think we can draw a number of strands of criticism of ‘poor’ present centred history of
science here. One is the assumption that there is a particular narrative to history prior to
the historian writing it. We can see this in Whiggish history. Another is the recruitment
of historical figures as supporters of one’s own views. This is evident in both Brewster’s
and More’s biographies of Newton, who respectively try to use Newton’s shadow to
argue for a particular relationship between science and Christianity, and to argue against
relativity and quantum mechanics. There are also the practical difficulties in producing
diachronic  histories—history  that  ranges  across  large  stretches  of  time—and  of
demonstrating  that  there  are  causal  links  of  influence  between  different  periods  of
history.  We worry  about  this  largely  because  it  is  very  difficult  to  do:  we have  to
immerse ourselves in a number of different contexts and try and trace links between
them. Some historians think that ideas are necessarily linked to the historical context in
which they arose. For this reason, they think that there is little point in attempting to
draw links  between  ideas  in  different  contexts.  This  is  part  of  Klein’s  criticism of
Newman. Finally, there is the worry that the presentist will not take the past on its own
terms: that the presentist is more interested in the present that the past and so shows
insufficient interest in the historical context and what the actors therein actually thought
they were doing. 
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I fully agree that all of the above can become problematic, although it is certainly not
clear that diachronic histories will necessarily be so. I do not think, however, that the
project that I propose is particularly susceptible to them. In essence, what I am trying to
do is to work out what Born’s thoughts were on a variety of philosophical positions and
see how (or not) those positions align with contemporary ones. I’m not trying to argue
that Born’s work on quantum mechanics was part of some inevitable arc of progress
(nor, incidentally, am I trying to argue that it wasn’t). I’m also not trying to trace a line
of thought across different periods of the history of science. Nor am I trying to corral
Born for support in, say, the scientific realism debate. I do not think that demonstrating
that Born held a particular philosophical position makes that position more plausible. 
Where I do engage in presentism, I do so because I think it clarifies Born’s position to
classify it as being aligned with some particular position in the space of contemporary
philosophy. I think that this finding what sort of position Born’s views are aligned with
is interesting enough in and of itself but it also adds to our understanding of what he
thought by allowing us to situate his positions in a wider philosophical context. For
example,  in Chapter  6:  Born on Probability,  I  will  argue that  he holds a propensity
interpretation of probability in quantum mechanics. This terminology wasn’t available
to Born when he wrote on probability, but I still think that it is clear that this is the
position that he holds It should also be noted that it doesn’t have to be part of some
argument that one should hold such a position. 
I will on occasion engage more critically with Born’s position (for example, asking how
he might respond to later developments in physics that he was not privy that may create
a problem for his arguments regarding causation in physics and trying to reconstruct an
argument of Born’s concerning determinism with the addition of chaos) because I think
that he is worth engaging with as a philosopher. To some extent this is also what the
presentist analysis aids us in doing. I also fully appreciate that such critical engagement
might tell us little about the historical Born. I do think that these sorts of questions are
interesting  to  philosophers  of  science and can be answered in  a  way that  takes  the
history of science seriously. Some historians of science may not be interested in the
answers, but so be it. 
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Chapter 2: The Born Identity
 1 Introduction
In this chapter I’m going to give a (relatively) brief biography of Born in order to both give
an account  of  his  life,  which  was  eventful  and interesting—he was  born  in  a  part  of
Germany that is no longer Germany, lived through two world wars, studied under a man
who is often considered to be the greatest mathematician of the 20th century, was at the
heart of the development of quantum mechanics in Göttingen. He fled his home country
for the UK when the Nazi Party came to power, where he became a naturalized citizen and
was made a member of the Royal Society, returned to Germany after winning the Nobel
Prize in the 1950s, and devoted much of his time to trying to prevent the nuclear armament
of the country of his birth, along with writing the philosophical works which are the main
focus of this thesis.  
The main sources that I am going to use are Born’s autobiography, My Life: Recollections
of a Nobel Laureate (Born 1978); his Royal Society obituary paper (Kemmer and Schlapp
1972); and science writer Nancy Thorndike Greenspan’s biography The End of the Certain
World: The Life and Science of Max Born (Greenspan 2005). 
The purpose of the chapter is to give an account of the details of his life, which are still not
that widely known and to give an overview of his scientific work. I’m not going to go into
detail on every aspect of his work—Born was extraordinarily prolific, publishing some 360
papers and books during his career (Kemmer and Schlapp 1971 52)—instead concentrating
on  his  education  and  work  on  quantum  mechanics.   I’m  not  going  to  try  and  draw
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psychological  lessons  from the  great  man’s  childhood,  nor  do  I  really  want  to  make
inferences about his scientific work based on his life outside of science.
 1.1 The Biographies
I’m first going to say a little about these three accounts of Born’s life, before moving on to
my own. Born’s autobiography (Born 1978), contains interesting detail on his education
and on his scientific work, but cuts short of a detailed discussion of his life after the end of
the second world war. We might interestingly note that Born died in January of 1970 and
so wonder at exactly when it was written. Gustav Born (Max Born’s son), writing in a
preface  and  postscript,  explains  that  the  book  was  originally  written  as  a  series  of
‘recollections’ for Born’s children and grandchildren. He relates that Born had started to
write  them in 1940 and continued working on them until  1946. The part  of  the book
written in this period gives an account of Born’s life from his childhood up until 1925. The
rest  of  the  book  was  written  after  1962,  when  Born  had  retired  and  moved  back  to
Germany. The ‘recollections’ were written in English—Born’s children and grandchildren
grew up in Britain, after he moved there in 1933.  Gustav relates that because it was not
written for a wide audience, the style might be somewhat idiosyncratic when compared to
an autobiography written for general publication,  and further notes that it  has received
some editing to make it more comprehensible to English-speaking readers. ‘Although my
father’s English was good, minor lapses of idiom have been anglicized’ (Born 1978 vii).
Although we get some interesting detail on Born’s activities, we don’t hear much about his
inner thoughts: Gustav writes in the postscript ‘These recollections give away little about
my father’s inner  life.  He was not  in the least  secretive in the ordinary sense,  but his
deepest feelings were hidden from everyone until he began to open up a little towards the
end of his life, mainly to his children’ (Born 1978 297). 
The  Biographical Memoirs (1972) paper was written by the nuclear physicist  Nicholas
Kemmer and solid state physicist Robert Schlapp. Both Kemmer and Schlapp spent time in
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Göttingen during the period that Born ran the department of physics there. It contains an
account of his life and a separate account of his work in physics, dealing with both his
early work on the dynamics of crystal lattices and his later work on quantum mechanics.
They also discuss the textbooks written by Born, several of which are still in publication
today. 
The End of  the  Certain  World  (2005)  was written  by Nancy Thorndike  Greenspan.  It
contains a detailed and heavily researched account of his life, but does not have a huge
amount  of  detail  on  his  actual  scientific  work  and  certainly  no  analysis  of  what  his
philosophical positions might have been. This is not to criticise it, but simply to state what
it is not -  a piece of intellectual history. Writing a review in Annals of Science, Robert J.
Deltete, describes it initially as ‘superb’ (Deltete 2009 p434), but goes on to note that it is
somewhat sparse on detail with regards to his scientific work, although there is nothing in
the book that is ‘precisely wrong’. Bernstein (2005) gives a much more stringent criticism
of the descriptions of physics in the book. Frankly, Bernstein is quite rude and so I don’t
want to quote him on Greenspan. Still, for this reason, I’m not going to draw on Greenspan
with regards to Born’s scientific work, but will use it for some details of his life. 
 2 Early Life
Max Born was born on 11 December 1882 in Breslau, Silesia, then part of East Prussia. It
is now the city of Wrocław in Poland. His parents were Jewish-Germans, Gustav Born, a
professor of embryology at the University of Breslau and Margarete Born, née Kaufmann,
the daughter of middle-class textile factory owners. Born does not give us the impression
the family were practising Jews: as there was no Jewish religious education at his school,
Gustav  had  Max  attend  Lutheran  religious  classes  instead,  ‘having  not  particular
preference  for  the  Jewish  religion,  but  none for  the  Christian  either’ (Born  1978 20).
Gustav had remained a Jew (as opposed to converting) ‘mainly from the standpoint of
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liberalism’ as he considered religious questions to be a purely private matter - ‘what was
good enough for his ancestors he thought was good enough for himself’ (Born 1978 20). 
Born tells us that when they met, his mother’s family did not easily accept his father, as he
was not a rich man, but rather a young lecturer with a small salary. However, when she
‘got her way’ the Kaufmann’s deemed it necessary to ‘fit the young couple up in a way
worthy of the wealth and importance of great merchants’ (Born 1978 4). The home Born
grew up in was a well-appointed apartment in a city-centre building owned by Born’s
maternal grandfather, next to the Royal Palace, that was full of ‘rather pompous’ Victorian-
style furniture (Born 1978 4). 
Margarete died from gall stones when Born was four years old, and he relates that he does
not think that he had ‘any direct recollection of her’ (Born 1978 6), knowing little of her
other than of her love for music (Born 1978 6). He had in his possession his mother’s
photo  album,  which  contained  pictures  of  a  number  of  famous  musicians—Sarasate,
Joachim, Brahms, Clara Schuman, Brahms, Max Bruch and a number of unnamed (by
Born, at  any rate) Wagnerian opera singers from Bayreuth.  Born’s grandparents would
frequently entertain and host musicians visiting Breslau to perform, and his mother ‘did
not waste this opportunity’ (1978 6). 
After  his  mother’s  death,  Born  and his  sister  were  mostly  taken care  by  the  family’s
servants. He does not remember much from this period, but writes of taking great pleasure
in watching drilling soldiers on the parade ground that the windows of their apartment
looked  out  on.  These  were  mostly  daily  drills,  but  there  were  on  occasion  rather
spectacular events, including times when the Emperor Wilhelm II visited the Royal Palace
next to their apartment building (Born 1978 7). 
He seems to have had a happy childhood despite the early death of his mother. He tells us
that he and his sister were rather spoilt by the Kaufmanns, his mother’s family, having
‘glorious’ birthday celebrations with ‘heaps  of toys  and sweets  from the grandparents,
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uncles and aunts’ (Born 1978 8). As a child, he also spent much time in his grandfather’s
house in Kleinberg, set in magnificent gardens, which he describes as ‘our little paradise’
(Born 1978 10). He also fondly recalls spending summers in the Kaufmann’s house in
Tannhausen, a village on what is now the Polish-Czech border that was home a textile
factory that they owned. 
Born’s  father  remarried  in  1890,  during  his  early  schooling.  He tells  that  Gustav  had
longed for some measure of financial independence from the Kaufmanns after Margarete’s
death. The Kaufmanns insisted that he maintain their somewhat aristocratic lifestyle, and
this compelled him to accept their financial assistance (Greenspan 2005 16). Although he
seems  to  have  been  a  well-regarded  scientist,  he  repeatedly  failed  to  get  higher  paid
positions. The higher profile jobs usually went, as Born explains, to someone who was not
Jewish (Born 1978 24). To this end, some friends of Gustav’s arranged a correspondence
between him and another  friend of  theirs,  Bertha Lipstein,  the daughter  of  a  Russian-
Jewish timber merchant who, despising the virulent anti-Semitism in Russia at the time,
had sent his children to be educated in Germany and Switzerland. The correspondence
eventually resulted in an engagement. Born seems to have liked his new stepmother—he
remarks that ‘kindness and honesty’ were her main features (Born 1978 25). 
Born  was  educated  in  a  traditional  German  manner.  He writes  ‘In  my youth  German
schools were mere places for learning, in an abstract and dull manner; there was hardly
any attempt at a general education’ (1978 29). The curriculum was humanistic in nature,
and centred around Latin—something that Born remembered little of after leaving school
(1978 30). He was not in general a particularly gifted scholar of languages. Mathematics
was  also  a  central  part  of  the  curriculum.  Born  was  not  particularly  interested  in  the
Euclidean-centred teaching that formed the first few years of his mathematical education—
he was, he thought, simply too young to properly appreciate and understand it at that time
(1978 31). However, he took interest in the analytic geometry taught in the higher forms—
it was, he thought, a powerful tool whose ability to reduce geometrical figures to algebra
appealed to him (1978 31). Born also learned some natural sciences, developing a deep
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interest in physics. This was noticed by his teacher, who invited him to help prepare the
lesson’s experiments.  He writes that ‘I  spent many a happy afternoon with him in the
physics  classroom connecting  and switching electric  circuits  or  adjusting  lenses  on an
optical bench’ (Born 1978 32). 
 3 University—Breslau, Heidelberg, Zurich and 
Göttingen
On July 6th of 1900, Born’s father passed away from a heart attack, at just forty-nine years
old (Greenspan 2005 20). The next year he started University, initially attending Breslau.
The  German  system  of  the  time  was  far  less  strict  that  the  British—there  were  no
examinations apart  from a final oral  exam for a doctorate,  which was the only degree
awarded apart from a state teaching certificate (Greenspan 2005 22). Students were free to
attend different universities over the course of their education. Born attended Breslau for
two years, taking the summer term in each of those in Heidelberg and Zurich, respectively,
before attending Göttingen, where he took his doctorate. 
For his first two semesters at Breslau, his courses consisted of astronomy, mathematics,
experimental physics, chemistry, zoology, general philosophy and logic (Born 1978 49).
Born found the experimental physics course to be initially dull. The lecturer was Victor
Emil Meyer (not the same person as the chemist Viktor Meyer), an ageing and ill man
whose  lectures  were  dull  and  whose  experimental  demonstrations  were  perennially
unsuccessful to the extent that students would attend his hydrodynamics experiments with
raincoats and umbrellas. Born found that he could not learn much from him beyond what
he had already done so from school and so ‘stayed away’ (Born 1978 51). Meyer retired
after Born’s first semester and was replaced by Ernst Neumann, a mathematician. Born did
not find him to be much of an improvement on Meyer—although Born had the impression
that  Neumann  took  great  care  over  his  course,  the  experiments  were  still  not  very
successful and so he still did not attend regularly (Born 1978 51). 
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He did not much enjoy his courses on zoology and chemistry either. Zoology contained too
many facts that had to be memorized and too little understanding of causal connections
between them for Born to maintain interest in it. He had a similar reaction to chemistry. He
writes ‘there was too much of the kind of stuff I could never digest: accumulations of
almost incoherent facts which had to be memorized—at least so it appeared to me’ (Born
1978p52). He did however regret not taking a course in laboratory chemistry, lacking the
time to do so—some of Born’s later work on lattice dynamics connected with chemistry
and he admits having to rely on the advice of friends and being somewhat uncomfortable
when being asked to lecture to chemists (Born 1978 52). 
He also found his philosophy course to be a disappointment—in fact he describes it as ‘the
greatest disappoint of all my courses’ (Born 1978 52). The course was taught by a Catholic
priest  (Born could  not  remember  his  name,  but  thought  it  was  Baumann)  and mostly
consisted of Aristotelian logic and metaphysics. Born found the Aristotelian syllogism to
be ‘the epitome of triviality’, a position that he never found cause to alter. Born did learn
some logic later on from studying mathematics and attending David Hilbert’s lectures on
the foundations of logic (Born 1978 52). 
Although his other courses were a disappointment, Born enjoyed the lectures he attended
on mathematics and on astronomy. In the four semesters he spent in Breslau he laid a
‘solid ground’ for his mathematical education (Born 1978 52). In the mathematics course,
Born was introduced to group theory and matrix calculus, something he would use when
developing matrix mechanics with Heisenberg and Jordan many years later in Göttingen,
Heisenberg being unaware of  the nature of  the strange commutation rules that  he had
produced. 
Born’s interest in mathematics was something of a turnaround from school, where he had
not enjoyed the subject. He explains his fascination by way of contrast with a book of
philosophy by Heymans that he and some of his fellow students had read. From this he had
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become acquainted with the paradoxes of infinity that occur with regards to discussion of
the attributes of God and became ‘seriously worried that the whole of metaphysics seemed
to be in an awful muddle’ (Born 1978 p 53). Not so with mathematics. What in philosophy
appeared to be ‘veiled in a mist of paradoxes’ (Born 1978 53) was presented in in a clear
and precise manner according to the occasion. This, for Born was an important discovery
‘that such words mean nothing unless applied in a definite system of ideas to a definite
problem where they can be made significant for that problem’ (Born 1978 p53). So the
precision of mathematics and its ability to render complex concepts graspable appealed to
Born. 
Astronomy, says Born, appealed to him in a different way. It was a practical science, about
‘careful handling of instruments, correct reading of scales, systematic elimination of errors
of observation and precise numerical calculations’ (1978 54);  it ‘gave one the feeling of
standing on solid ground’ (Born 1978 54). I would note here that Born, despite being a
theoretician, always had an interest in and a respect for the importance of experimental
physics throughout his career (See Experiment and Theory in Physics Born 1943). He was
so drawn by astronomy that he once considered making it his career, but soon realised
though that he did not have the inclination for it. The dream was ‘shattered by the horror of
computation’ (Born 1978 p55), as he puts it. Astronomy in the early 20th century required
the completion of vast amounts of calculation to predict planetary orbits, and Born knew
that he was no good at this kind of work. Looking back on these days, he reflected that had
he known that there was a different kind of astronomy, astrophysics, whose goal was the
study of the universe with all of the tools of modern physics, he might have elected to
follow that path. But he was not aware of it, and by the time he was introduced to it by
Schartzschild in Göttingen it was too late to change paths (Born 1978 55). 
Born spent the summer term of 1902 in Heidelberg, persuaded to attend a semester there
by his cousin Hans. He found the physics course there just as uninteresting as at Breslau,
but  enjoyed  the  mathematics  (Born  1978  65).  He  studied  differential  geometry,  and
determinants,  which gave him a good foundation for the matrix algebras he studied at
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Breslau in the following term (Born 1978 66). Of his time in Heidelberg, Born considers
the most important thing to be the start of his friendship with James Franck, whom he
would later appoint to the position of director of experimental physics at the institute in
Göttingen (Born 1978 68). 
Born spent  the  following winter  back in  Breslau  (1978 69),  before  deciding  to  spend
another summer term away, this time in Zurich. There, he studied more mathematics, in
particular a course on orthogonal functions that he considered to have been of great use in
his  career  as  a  physicist  (Born 1978 73).  Once again  he was repulsed  by the physics
courses—he attended a course given by an astronomer (Wolfer) but found it ‘so dull that I
soon gave up’ (Born 1978 73). 
After  wintering  back  in  Breslau  in  1902/3,  Born  decided  to  move  to  Göttingen.  The
reasons for  this  were partly  personal—he had few friends  of  his  own in Breslau  and,
although his sister lived there, he did not particularly enjoy the company of her ‘set’ (Born
1978 79).  There  were  also professional  reasons.  After  the  lectures  he had attended in
Zurich, those at Breslau had started to feel a little ‘stale’(1978 79), as he puts it. His friend
Otto  Toeplitz  (1881-1940),  later  of  Toeplitz  matrix  fame,  told  him  that  if  he  wanted
lectures of the standard that he had received in Zurich, then he must go to Göttingen (Born
1978  79-80).  His  stepmother  also  gave  Born  a  letter  of  introduction  to  Hermann
Minkowski  (1864-1909),  whom she  had  met  some years  before  at  dancing  lessons  in
Königsberg.  Born describes Hilbert  and Minkowski,  both professors of mathematics in
Göttingen at the time as ‘the Castor and Pollux of the mathematical world’ (Born 1978
p80). Born considered the faculty at Göttingen to be more progressive than most others in
Germany, having hired two Jewish professors—Minkowski and Schwartzschild. 
Born’s personal life in his first year in Göttingen did not make much of an impact on him,
but he writes that his ‘scientific life was inspiring and interesting from the beginning’
(Born 1978 81). He took courses in mathematics and in physics taught by David Hilbert
(1862-1943) and Woldemar Voigt (1850-1919). 
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In German university courses at the time the lecturer did not give out notes to the students.
Instead, they simply gave the lecture and one student carefully wrote up the lecture and
produced typewritten copies. In the first lecture of Hilbert’s that Born attended, Hilbert
asked the students present to give him a copy of their notes. In the second lecture, he
singled out Born’s as ‘far excelling all the others’ (Born 1978 p82) and asked him to take
on the task of writing up his  lectures.  This  was not  simply an exercise in  typing:  the
position gave Born close contact with Hilbert. Hilbert would read the summaries of the
lectures that Born had produced and discuss with him mistakes and improvements. Born
writes that this gave him the ‘opportunity of getting a glimpse into the workings of one of
the most powerful brains of that period’ (1978 82). 
Born was not only Hilbert’s scribe, but he also became his friend, both through the contact
he  had  with  him  via  lecture-writing  and  the  introduction  that  Born’s  stepmother  had
provided to Minkowski. Born was invited to dinner with Minkowski and his wife. There
he also me Constantin Carathéodory (1873-1950), whose formulation of thermodynamics
Born regarded as superior to that of Kelvin and of Clausius (See Born 1949a 38-9). After
dinner he was invited to join an excursion to a ruined castle. Carathéodory was to join
along  with  Hilbert  and  his  wife.  Upon  meeting  the  Hilberts  at  their  gate,  Hilbert
immediately ‘pounced’ on Born and launched into a discussion regarding a shorter way of
proving the theorem that was the topic of the last lecture (Born 1978 83). 
Born writes of Hilbert’s lectures that they were ‘always leading into new country’ (Born
1978 p83). In particular, he recalls a course on Hamilton-Jacobi methods and canonical
transformations (a method via which one changes the canonical coordinates but preserves
the form of Hamilton’s equations). He writes that the ideas he learned there were ‘the
greatest help in the development of the quantum mechanics of the atom’ (Born 1978 p83).
Here  he  presumably  refers  to  the  ideas  published  by  himself  and  Jordan  as  Zur
Quantumechanik in 1925 (Born and Jordan 1925) in which they derived the equation for a
version of the quantum canonical commutation relation:
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pq−qp= h
2π i
1
Where  1 is  the  unit  matrix.  This  equation,  Born  considered  to  be  his  most  important
contribution—at any, rate it is inscribed upon his tombstone. 
Born also attended courses by Hilbert on the logical foundation of mathematics and the
quadrature of the circle. Under Hilbert’s suggestion, Born started research on the latter
topic for a doctoral thesis—he focussed on attempting a proof of the transcendental roots
of the Bessel functions (wave functions with a decaying amplitude). However, he met with
no success in this endeavour. Frustrated and dismayed, he went to Hilbert and explained
that he was certain that he was ‘no true mathematician’ and that he ‘would never again
attempt  to  solve a  problem from the domain of  numbers  or  any other  branch of  pure
mathematics’ (1978 1978 84). Hilbert told Born not to worry and that similar things had
happened in his youth. This assuaged some of Born’s worries and he saw that there were
plenty of other problems to which he have fewer difficulties applying himself (Born 1978
84). 
Born  also  attended  mathematics  courses  by  Minkowski  on  the  geometry  of  lines  and
spheres and attempted to sit through a number of Klein’s courses, but always gave up half-
way through (Born 1978 85). Born found Klein’s treatment of physics uninteresting—the
problems he treated were rendered abstract. This was also down to Klein’s lecturing style,
which he contrasts with Hilbert’s: 
‘Hilbert was like a mountain guide who leads the straightest and best way to the
summit; Klein was more like a prince who wants to show his admirers the greatness
of  his  territory,  guiding  them  in  endless  winding  paths  through  apparently
impenetrable territory and halting at each little hilltop to give a survey over the area
covered’ (Born 1978 85). 
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Born wanted to reach the summit as quickly as possible, and so preferred Hilbert’s style,
although he notes that his tastes changed over years and he now prefers to read Klein over
Hilbert (Born 1978 85). In this period he additionally studied set theory in a course given
by Zermelo (Born 1978 86). 
  
Once again, Born did not enjoy his initial foray into physics at Göttingen. He writes of
Johannes Stark (1874-1957), the lecturer of the first physics course he attended there ‘what
Stark did seemed to me pure dogmatics. He did not demonstrate experiments but described
them in rather obscure terms and the results were formulated like articles of faith without
any attempt at explanation’ (Born 1978 86). Born notes that he came across Stark later on,
who  following  the  first  world  war  began  to  denounce  theoretical  physics  as  ‘Jewish’
science and eventually joined the Nazi Party (1978 86-7). 
But there were other physicists at Göttingen. Born attended Voigt’s lectures on optics. He
initially  had  considered  giving  them  up,  finding  the  number  of  calculations  involved
tedious, but was persuaded not to by a friend, Max von Laue (who would later win the
Nobel prize for his discovery of x-ray diffraction in crystals). Born came to enjoy Voigt’s
course and what he learned there would form the basis of his own optics text book (Born
1978 88). 
During  this  time  Born  became  acquainted  with  the  neo-Kantian  philosopher  Leonard
Nelson  (1882-1927), who tried to derive liberal political views from a priori principles.
Born  writes  that  at  this  time  he  was  ‘still  under  the  spell  of  Kant’ (1978  93).  His
mathematical studies had strengthened his position at at this point he held that there were
‘fundamental facts’ which were out of the reach of empirical proof but which could be
arrived at in an a priori manner. He found Nelson’s position that liberalism was the only
rational  political  stance to  be ‘a  shock’ (Born 1978 93).  Born’s  acquaintance (and his
father’s  old  friend)  Dr  Lachmann  and  Göttingen  mathematician  Erhard  Schmidt  both
seemed to have convictions as strong as Nelson’s but were a socialist and a conservative,
respectively.  He  found  this  ‘all  rather  bewildering’ (Born  1978  93)  and  it  made  him
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gradually reconsider his position on Kant. He writes ‘Kant’s teaching has a great attraction
for one who is inclined towards rationalism...But it did not work for me. However, it was a
slow process which made me acknowledge this failure and led me to a standpoint which
might be classified as a kind of empiricism’ (Born 1978 93). 
Born also attended some courses of Edmund Husserl’s (1859-1938), who was teaching at
Göttingen at the time. He attended a lecture course of Husserl’s near to the end of his
study, but writes that he ‘found them so dull he had to give up’ (Born 1978 95). He had
better luck with his seminar course, which dealt with philosophy of mathematics. Husserl
discussed  the  epistemological  validity  of  the  mathematical  axioms,  offering  a
phenomenological  solution.  According  to  Born,  this  solution  was  comprised  by  ‘the
conviction that  by a  proper  kind of  contemplation and reflection on the meaning of  a
notion you can approach the ‘phenomenon’ itself, obtaining in this way perfect evidence’
(Born 1978 96). 
He was, for a while, impressed by Husserl, but soon began to consider his position hollow.
He thinks of it as ‘a kind of a priorism, like that of Kant, but a mystical one’ (Born 1978
96). For all of his misgivings about Kant, Born appreciated his position, that ‘there are
principles  or  categories  of  thinking which  are the  conditions  of  actual  knowledge and
which you can discover by investigating the structure of this knowledge’ (Born 1978 96).
His thinks that this is actually not so different from what theoretical physics does, with the
primary difference being that physics does not claim that it’s ‘latest analysis is a final and
irremovable law, but just another step to a remote truth’. This is an interesting point in of
itself—it suggests that Born accepts a kind of increasing verisimilitude view of progress in
science.  But  he  thinks  that  to  try  to  find  immutable  truths  via  introspection  alone  is
‘irreconcilable’ with science (1978 96). 
I also want to next highlight a small confusion in Born’s Recollections. He writes:
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 As a matter of fact, the phenomenologists in Göttingen were a little group of
conceited fellows who did not appeal to me. One of them, Heidecker, tried for
some time to convert me to their creed, but in vain. I disliked not only his
philosophy, but also his personality.  He later became Husserl’s successor in
Freiburg  and  wrote  a  book  which  appears  to  me  the  summit  of  senseless
accumulation of words (Born 1978 p96)
We might think that this means that Born encountered Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) at
Göttingen  and  is  simply  misremembering  his  name.  After  all  it  was  Heidegger  who
succeeded Husserl at Freiburg. But Born’s Heidecker cannot be him. Heidegger was born
in 1889 which would have made him 14 or 15 at this point, far too young to be part of the
phenomenology group at  Göttingen when Born was there.   So I  think that Born must
simply be accidentally conflating two individuals with similar names. Still, it’s clear from
the passage that Born was not a fan of Heidegger’s philosophy. 
 4 Doctoral Thesis
Next I’m going to discuss Born’s doctoral thesis. He writes that ‘it was in my second year
in Göttingen (1905) that my scientific future was determined, not by my own deliberate
choice, but by a series of events in which I was involved’ (Born 1978 98). What happened
was this. In Born’s second year, two advanced seminars on mathematical physics were
held,  one  taught  by  Klein  and  Runge  on  elasticity  and  one  taught  by  Hilbert  and
Minkowski on electromagnetic theory. It was the latter that held Born’s attention. He was
fascinated by the failure of the various ether-detecting experiments which were discussed
in the seminar.  This  seminar  was also the starting point  for Minkowski's  work on the
electrodynamics of moving bodies and the transformations which became part of relativity
theory. This was what Born wanted to study and research. 
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He was however denied that opportunity, at that point at least, because of something that
happened in the elasticity seminar. For each seminar a problem was assigned and from a
the students a speaker and deputy speaker assigned to present and discuss solutions. Born
was assigned the role of deputy speaker, whose job was mostly to discuss the paper of the
main speaker  if  they were prevented from attending the seminar  (Born 1978 99).  The
problem for Born’s seminar concerned the stability of the elastic line. A week before the
seminar on the elastic line, the main speaker, a student called Arthur Haas,  came to Born
and informed him that he would be unable to present as he was overworked and ill (Born
wonders  if  in  fact  he was suffering  from ‘a kind  of  stage fright’,  something that  was
apparently not uncommon in students called to present before Klein). Born therefore had
to present the problem himself (Born 1978 99). 
Born attempted to examine the available  literature on the topic but found that he was
unable to get to grips with the details. However he did know that the problem was an
example  of  a  kind  that  he  had  attended  one  of  Hilbert’s  courses  on  and  had  well
understood. Applying these ideas, Born succeeded in giving the stability conditions for the
elastic  wire  for  a  general  case  and  showed  that  some  of  the  existing  solutions  were
examples  of  his  general  formulation.  Born  presented  his  results  at  the  seminar  and
expected that to be the end if it (Born 1978 99). 
However some weeks later, when at home for the Easter break, he received a letter from
Klein. Klein wrote that he had liked how Born had approached the problem in looking for
a  general  mathematical  solution  rather  than  examining  specific  examples.  He  had
suggested that the subject annual academic prize of the philosophy faculty for the year
1905/1906,  of  which the  mathematics  department  was a  part,  be  ‘The Stability  of  the
Elastic Line’ and expected that Born would compete (Greenspan 2005 31). The prize was
rather prestigious. The subject was allotted to each of the departments in turn, and so any
individual  department  could  compete  for  it  only  very  infrequently.  The  subjects  were
deliberately chosen so that at least some students would enter and so Klein selecting the
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elastic line as the subject represented him personally selecting Born as a competing student
(Born 1978 100). 
Born writes that he ‘ought to have felt honoured and pleased’  by this (Born 1978 100).
However,  he  was  not.  He  was  not  really  interested  in  the  problem,  preferring
electrodynamics. He wrote to Klein to this effect, telling him that he had no ‘deep interest’
in the problem and would rather not enter his work for the prize. When Born returned to
Göttingen for the term, he found that his reply had offended Klein greatly and it had made
an  enemy  of  him.  This,  Born  says,  could  be  the  end  of  a  mathematician’s  career  in
Germany (1978 100). 
Born, therefore, went to Klein to humble himself and apologise, offering to do as Klein
suggested and compete for the prize. But it did not work. He writes that Klein ‘treated me
like a naughty schoolboy’ 1978 100). Born asked Klein if he would accept his work on the
elastic line as a doctoral thesis. Klein refused, telling Born that he did not think he knew
enough geometry to pass the oral examination as Born had not attended Klein’s lectures on
the topic (Born 1978 100). 
All of this meant that Born would not be able to take his doctorate in pure mathematics,
but would instead have to take it in applied mathematics. For this he would be examined
by a mathematician and two scientists. For the examination, Born had to choose a second
scientific subject to go along with physics, and so he attended Schwartzschild’s course on
astronomy (Born 1978 101). 
I’d like to take a moment just to point out the astounding collection of talent at Göttingen
that Born studied under: Hilbert, Klein, Minkowski, Carathéodory, Zermello, Husserl and
Schwartzschild. 
Born’s progress on his thesis was slow (a shocking state of affairs…) but eventually he
was spurred into action by the belief that he would be unable to join the Mathematics
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Society,  of which many of his  friends were members, as he was convinced that Klein
would veto any application he made. However, he believed that if he won the academic
prize and got his doctorate Klein would be unable to deny him. Born notes that on later
reflection and knowledge of Klein’s character, he would not actually have prevented him
from joining (Born 1978 103). 
Born was not particularly interested in the precise problem at hand—how wires bend—but
he was interested in the type of problem it was—one of stability. He writes that these sort
of problems are the key to understanding not only natural and man-made structures but
also catastrophes within such systems. By ‘catastrophe’, Born means situations like the
sudden snapping of a wire during oscillation. Born was unable to solve the problem for a
thin wire and so simplified it by considering steel tape (like that used in a tape measure). In
this  he  could  study instability  in  a  plane.  He  was  able  to  obtain  practical  results  via
applying methods from pure mathematics to the problem and eventually ended up with a
series of predictions for the conditions under which catastrophes would occur. These he
tested experimentally and found them to be accurate, a process he found deeply satisfying
(Greenspan 2005 35). The
The work was duly handed, accompanied by a quote from Faust on the subject of the
inescapability of error (Greenspan 2005 35). Born won the prize for his work and took his
examination a few weeks, inn the summer of 1906, which went without incident and he
was passed magna cum laude (Born 1978 105).  
Born had acquired a taste for science from his experiments and wanted to learn more,
although he also desired to leave Göttingen. Before he was able to undertake any further
scientific work, he had to participate in compulsory military service, in which he served in
a Berlin cavalry regiment, the 2nd Dragoon Guards. Usually military service was a year
long, but Born was discharged in January 1907 after six months due to his weak lungs—he
was asthmatic (Born 1978 106-114). 
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After his discharge, Born returned to Breslau for a short time before heading to Cambridge
in March. He wanted to learn to speak English better and had been informed about English
experimental physics by his friend James Franck, who spoke of it admiringly (Born 1978
115).  To this  end,  he travelled  to  Cambridge.  There,  he  was enrolled  as  an  advanced
student at Gonville and Caius. Here, he undertook language lessons as well as attending
courses by JJ Thomson on experimental physics and Joseph Larmor on electricity and
magnetism.  Born  found  Larmor’s  lectures  incomprehensible  because  of  his  ‘strange
pronunciation’ which  Born  attributes  to  an  Irish  accent  (Born  1978  117).  He enjoyed
Thomson’s experiments, finding them ‘fascinating’ (1978 117) but the subject matter was a
little beyond him and so he took an elementary course in electricity. Born stayed in Britain
over the summer and did some sightseeing, visiting the cathedrals in Peterborough, York,
Lincoln and Durham (!), and then spending a few days in Edinburgh (Born 1978 120).  He
returned to Breslau in August 1907. 
 5 Habilation and Lectureships in Göttingen and 
Berlin. 
Born had made up his mind to leave mathematics and become a physicist (1978 121). This
process was slightly disrupted by a second call up for military service. Born had been
called for another medical examination by the German consulate whilst in England and
had unfortunately been taken as a malingerer by the officer he saw there (1978 119). He
served another month (October 1907) with the Cuirassier regiment before once again being
discharged on medical grounds, thanks to a friendly doctor (Greenspan 2005 40). 
Following the  disruption,  Born became a research  worker  in  the  physics  laboratory  at
Breslau. There he performed research on black-body radiation. He also started research on
relativity, after being asked by Reiche, the head of the physics school in Breslau if he had
come across some work by Albert Einstein (1879–1955). Born had not heard of it at that
point,  but  on  learning  that  it  concerned  the  fundamental  principles  of  optics  and
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electrodynamics he decided to study it with Reiche (1978 130). The topic quickly became
his chief interest. On becoming stuck on some particular problem, Born wrote a letter to
Minkowski in the summer of 1908 asking for his advice. Minkowski replied that he was
interested in the same problems and would Born like to return to Göttingen to collaborate
with him? (Born 1978 130-1). And so Born returned to Göttingen.
Sadly, a few weeks after Born’s arrival in Göttingen in December 1908, Minkowski fell ill
with appendicitis and passed away in January 1909 (Greenspan 2005 43). Born worked on
Minkowski’s posthumous papers as well as some ideas of his own concerning the self-
energy of the electron (the potential it feels due the interactions between it and the vacuum
field), a problem which, at least when he was writing the Recollections, he did not feel had
been solved properly (Born 1978 p133). 
Because of  these interests,  Born tried to  derive relativistic  equations  of  motion for  an
accelerating electron. This lead him to consider the problem of accelerating rigid bodies in
a relativistic system, on which he published a paper in Annalen der Physik in 1909. This
work also formed the basis of the thesis which earned him his Habilation in the summer of
1909 and thus qualified him as a lecturer in the German university system (Born 1978
137). 
Much of Born’s work in this period was focussed on the lattice structure of crystals and
was done in collaboration with Theodore von Kármán (1881-1963). Born explains that
their focus on this was due to some work being done in Göttingen by Erwin Madelung
(1881-1972) on lattice vibrations. Kármán considered Madelung’s handling of the problem
to  be  poor  (Born  1978  141)  and  suggested  to  Born  that  they  consider  it.  Their  first
collaboration  (Born  and  von  Kármán  1912)  introduced  a  number  of  the  fundamental
concepts of lattice dynamics: the association of the degrees of freedom of the crystal with
the normal modes of vibration of the whole body; the use of Fourier analysis; the periodic
boundary  condition  (Kemmer  and  Schlapp  1971  25).  Kemmer  and  Schlapp  note  that
Debye came to very similar conclusions at the same time, but his methods of approaching
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the problem were very different, preferring to use simplified models that made no pretence
of  physical  reality  (Kemmer  and  Schlapp  1971  26).  They  further  note  that  although
Debye’s work made a greater impact at the time of publication, it eventually became clear
that Born and von Kármán’s method was the deeper one and gives a more accurate picture
of specific heats at a wider range of temperatures (Kemmer and Schlapp 1971 26). 
In 1911 Albert  Michelson (1852-1931), one of the two collaborators on the famous of
Michelson-Morley  experiment,  came to  Göttingen  as  a  visiting  professor  and  became
friends with Born. This lead to Born receiving an invitation from Chicago, Michelson’s
home institution, to give a course of lectures there on relativity. So in the summer of 1912,
Born headed off the USA. There he gave his lecture course and worked with Michelson in
the laboratory photographing line spectra (Born 1978 148).
It was also in 1912 that Born and his eventual wife, Hedwig ‘Hedi’ Ehrenberg, met. Dinner
parties were often held by the Göttingen professors and the young lecturers were invited
along. It was at one of these that Born met Hedi, the daughter of a professor in the law
faculty (Greenspan 2005 57). Shortly afterwards, in May of that year, they announced their
engagement and were married in the summer of 1913. There was some dispute about the
venue. Hedi, whose father was a Jew who had converted before marriage, wished for Born
to do the same so that they could have a church wedding. Born did not wish to do this. A
compromise was made by holding the wedding in the (rather palatial) house of his sister
with a Lutheran priest performing the ceremony (Greenspan 2005 58). 
Born continued his work on crystal solids for the next few years and in 1914 was granted a
contract to write a monograph on the subject entitled Dynamik der Kristallgitter, half the
royalties for which he was forced to accept in books from the publisher. It was in May of
that year that his daughter Irene was born (Born 1978 159). 
In 1915 Born moved to Berlin to take a position as Professor Extra-Ordinarius, having
been recommended for the post by Max Planck. It was here that he struck up his friendship
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with Einstein (Born 1978 167), which would continue via correspondence (see the Born-
Einstein letters, Born 2005) for the rest of Einstein’s life. 
In June of 1915, Born joined the German Army, becoming part  of a unit  of scientists
headed by Max Wien who were working on wireless communications for aeroplanes. He
notes that he was also asked to join a unit under Fritz Haber working on gas warfare, but
he refused to have anything to do with it (Born 1978 168).  A few months after joining the
unit,  Born  once  again  fell  ill  due  to  asthma  after  drill-marching  in  poor  weather
(Greenspan 2005 71). He left the wireless group and instead joined a technical institution
within the military called the A.P.K. (Artillerie-Pfrufungs-Komission or Artillery Testing
Commission) to work on detecting the position of artillery by measuring from different
positions the arrival of the sound of a gun firing. It was here that he had his first exposure
to Gestalt  psychology,  a  theory with which he became somewhat  enamoured (see,  for
example, Born 1948 208), from two psychologists, Wertheimer and von Hornstobel who
had also joined the unit (Born 1978 173). In November of 1915, Hedi gave birth to the
Borns’ second child, Margarethe (Greenspan 2005 77). 
After  the  war,  Born  settled  back to  scientific  work  and began to  try  to  work out  the
chemical consequences of his theory of ionic crystals.  Born calculated the lattice energy
of such crystals from his theory, but found that there was no empirical data to check it
against. This brought Born once more into contact with Haber who informed him that no
one had ever calculated chemical energy before and that his attempts looked promising
(Born 1978 189). Born managed to use the ionization potentials of the molecules to predict
the heats of reaction for alkali halides (Kemmer and Schlapp 1972 30 and Born 1919).
Fritz Haber’s presentation of this would lead to what is known as the, the Born-Haber
cycle (Kemmer and Schlapp 1972 30).
In the winter on 1919, Born moved to Frankfurt to take up a position as a full professor
there.  In Frankfurt  he wrote that the department ‘was dominated by an idea of Stern’s
(Born  1978  195).  This  idea  was  to  investigate  the  physical  properties  of  atoms  and
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molecules in a gas using molecular rays. It was for this work that Stern won the Nobel
prize in 1946 (Stern 1946). Born took an interest in this and, along with Elisabeth Borman,
worked on an experiment to determine molecular collision cross-sections (Born 1978 195).
With Gerlach, Stern went on to perform the famous Stern-Gerlach experiments to measure
the magnetic moments of atoms and confirm some of the consequences of Sommerfeld’s
work  on  quantum  theory,  in  particular  quantisation  of  electron  orbits.  Despite  the
economic difficulties in Germany at the time, Stern was able to perform the experiments
due  to  a  donation  that  Born  managed  to  acquire  from  Henry  Goldman,  of  the  bank
Goldman-Sachs (Born 1978 197). 
 6 Back to Göttingen; Quantum Mechanics
In 1921, Born was offered a chair at Göttingen as head of the whole physics group, both
experimental  and  theoretical.  He  was  somewhat  uncomfortable  with  this,  considering
himself to be not be a sufficiently talented experimentalist to run the lab at Göttingen. He
resolved this difficulties by persuading the ministry of education to appoint his old friend
James Franck as professor extraordinarius in charge of the experimental group. Born hired
Wolfgang Pauli as his assistant when he arrived in Göttingen. When Pauli left in 1923 to
take up a professorship, Born hired Werner Heisenberg as his replacement. Kragh (1999
159) notes that Born had turned Göttingen. into a ‘world-centre’ of quantum theory. There
were also close links with the other centre in Germany, the department at Munich under
Sommerfeld—Pauli and Heisenberg were both former students of Sommerfeld’s (Kragh
1999 159). It was during the summer of 1921, a few months after Born had arrived in
Göttingen, that his son, Gustav, was born (Greenspan 2005 107). 
The focus of Born’s work during this time was the development of a quantum theory of the
electronic structure of atoms (Born 1978 214)  and in  particular  to what  extent  Bohr’s
theory of the atom could account for the facts. The first problem that Born and his team
tackled was whether or not Bohr’s work could be generalized from the s single-electron
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systems such as  a  hydrogen atom in which  it  worked well  to  a  multi-electron system
(1923). 
In a paper with Heisenberg (Born and Heisenberg 1924) he applied perturbation methods
(as  he  again  would  do  in  his  1926  collisions  paper),  developed  in  astronomy  to  the
problem and met with some limited success. He succeeded in producing qualitative results
which agreed with the ‘main properties’ of molecules but failed to accurately reproduce the
correct spectroscopic results. It was at this point widely accepted that there was something
not right with the Bohr-Sommerfeld formulation of quantum theory (Kragh 1999 159).
Born  writes  that  ‘we  became more  and  more  convinced  that  a  radical  change  of  the
foundations of physics was necessary, and thus a new type of mechanics, for which we
used the term quantum mechanics’ (Born 1978 p215).  
Born recalls that this term ‘quantum mechanics’ term first appeared his paper, Quantum
Mechanics/ Über Quantenmechanik,  (1924/2007) which he regards as an ‘essential’ step
towards the development of theory. In this paper he aimed to translate classical formulae
into their quantum analogues (Kragh 1999 159). It was known that vibrational frequencies,
corresponding  with  absorption  frequencies  for  radiation,  behaved  differently  from the
classical model.  Instead of being dependent on a single orbit,  they were dependent on
energy differences between stationary states and could only take precise values. This was
true for all physical quantities in the new field—they are dependent on transition quantities
between two stationary states. Kramers (1924) had succeeded in giving an account of the
optical properties of atoms purely in terms of these transition quantities. Born describes
this, somewhat dramatically, as ‘the first step from the bright realm of classical mechanics
into the still dark and unexplored world of the new quantum mechanics’ (Born 1978 p216).
Born writes that he made the next step by if one could find in a similar manner a theory for
the interaction between two electronic systems in terms of transition quantities. Indeed,
one could. The whole Göttingen group was involved in the discussion which lead to this
work. Due to his expertise in perturbation methods, Born was the natural person to carry
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out this step (Hendry 1984 59), which were used to carry out the re-interpretation of the
classical equations into quantum mechanics. 
Next  Born  and  Jordan  worked  on  developing  a  fully  quantum mechanical  version  of
Planck’s theory of radiation, which had used classical theories to model the interaction
between  light  and matter  (Born  1978  216).   Here  Born  and  Jordan  gave  a  quantized
analysis of classical multiply periodic systems (Kemmer and Schlapp 1972 33). 
Born  also  writes  that  they  were  ‘struck  by  the  fact  that  these  ‘transition  quantities’
appearing in our formulae always corresponded to squares of amplitudes of vibrations in
classical theory’ (Born 1978 216). He suggested In the daily meetings held by Heisenberg,
Jordan  and  himself,  he  suggested  the  idea  that  such  ‘transition  amplitudes’ could  be
formulated and might well be central to the theory. I suspect that Born’s point here is that
the idea of working out the transition amplitudes was at least partially his, and not purely
Heisenberg’s. 
During this time, Heisenberg worked on his own ideas whose purpose Born describes as
‘somewhat dark and mysterious’. This work culminated in a manuscript that he sent to
Born to look over  in July 1925. Born was fascinated upon reading it:  Heisenberg had
developed a calculus for transition amplitudes. 
He also offers a criticism of Heisenberg’s famous requirement (Heisenberg 1925/2007)
that quantum mechanics should eliminate classical quantities which cannot be observed
and that the theory should be built only from observable quantities. He writes ‘It has often
been interpreted as the requirement that all quantities should be eliminated which are not
directly observable. Yet I think that in this general and vague formulation the principle is
quite useless, even misleading. The question of which are the redundant quantities can
only be decided by the intuition of a genius like Heisenberg’ (Born 1978 217).
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 Given that in later work he praises this principle as used by Heisenberg and what he takes
to be a variation on it used by Einstein (although the autobiography was published in 1978,
this section was written during the second world war). I want to take a moment to think
about what Born means here. Firstly, we might take it as a note of caution. Born thinks that
it  is  difficult  to apply properly and needs to be accompanied by a  developed physical
intuition.  It  should  also  be  pointed  out  that  there  is  a  world  of  difference  between
something that is directly observable and something that is unobservable even in principle.
What I think that Born is getting at here is that it is a mistake to engage in the semantic
elimination from our theories of such quantities that are only measurable indirectly. We
might  still  apply  the  principle  in  order  to  argue  that  we  should  not  use  in  principle
unmeasurable quantities in our theories or even that we might still use them if it is useful
to do so without taking them to represent real facts about the world. 
After Heisenberg’s paper was sent off for publication, Born writes that he became fixated
upon  Heisenberg’s  symbolic  notation,  feeling  that  there  was  ‘something  fundamental
behind it,  the consummation of our endeavours of many years’ (Born 1978 217). After
puzzling over it for a few days, Born realised that the system Heisenberg had developed
was actually the matrix calculus that he had studied at university. He writes ‘I suddenly
saw light: Heisenberg’s symbolic multiplication was nothing but the matrix calculus, well
known to me since my student days’ (Born 1978 217). Hendry (1984 70) thinks it unlikely
that Born, having been educated as a mathematician that Born would have puzzled over
the matrix element of the paper, and suspects that he was more concerned with the physical
interpretations of the paper. 
It quickly became clear to Born that the matrix products for p and q, the momentum and
position operators, did not commute. He found that Heisenberg’s work gave values to only
the diagonal elements of the matrix  pq-qp. These were all equal to h/2πi. He convinced
himself  that  the  off-diagonal  elements  must  be  equal  to  zero,  and  thus  produced  the
commutation relation:
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pq−qp= h
2π i
1 (Born 1978 218)
The work of proving this was left to Jordan, whilst Born went on holiday to Switzerland
(Hendry 1984 71). The resulting paper, Zur Quantenmechanik was published in September
1925 (van der Waerden 2013 277). 
In  the  Autumn  of  1925,  Born,  Heisenberg  and  Jordan  collaborated  on  the  famous
‘dreimannerarbeit’,  which  was  published  in  the  spring  of  the  following  year  (Born,
Heisenberg and Jordan 2013). Born writes that his main contribution to the paper was ‘the
relation  of  our  theory  to  Hilbert’s  work  on  quadratic  forms  of  an  infinite  number  of
variables … Here the matrices are used as vectors (in a space of infinite dimensions, the
so-called Hilbert Space)’ (Born 1978 220). 
At the end of October Born travelled to America for a second time to give a series of
lectures at  MIT.  These concentrated on his work on crystal  dynamics and on the new
quantum  mechanics  that  had  just  been  developed  at  Göttingen.  These  lectures  were
collected and eventually published as Problems of Atomic Dynamics (Born 2004). Whilst
there, Born continued to work on quantum mechanics, collaborating with Norbert Wiener
on a paper which Born thought almost produced a version of wave mechanics prior to
Schrödinger. Wiener had recognised that matrices could be generalized as operators, which
were similarly non-commutative but had wider application (Hendry 1984 81). Although
Born had some qualms about the mathematical legitimacy of Wiener’s methods, he worked
with him to produce an operator calculus for quantum mechanics (Jammer 1966 221). As
to what they missed, Born writes ‘We used the differential operator D=d/dt and identified
it with  (2πi/h)W, where  W denotes the energy, but we failed to see that in the same way
d/dq represents  (2πi/h)p, where p is the momentum belonging to the coordinate  q’ (1978
226). Had they done this, Jammer (1966 223) (and Born) argue, they would have ended up
with an operator version of wave mechanics prior to Schrödinger. 
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 After finishing his MIT lectures, Born embarked on a lecture tour of the American west,
speaking at Pasadena and Berkeley. He met a number of young American physicists who
promised to visit Göttingen to study the new theories with the group that discovered them.
Indeed, when Born returned to Göttingen. there was indeed an influx of physicists eager to
learn quantum mechanics. Born held a private advanced seminar at his home. Those who
attended included EU Condon and Robert Oppenheimer from the USA as well as Friedrich
Hund,  Enrico Fermi,  Paul  Dirac,  Leon Rosenfeld,  Eugene Wigner,  John Von Neuman,
Vladimir Fock and Egil Hylleraas (Born 1978 225-27). 
In 1926, Born published his paper on collisions in quantum mechanics, utilising both wave
and matrix mechanics to give a statistical interpretation of the wavefunction (this paper is
discussed in some detail in Chapter 6). Born writes that he was ‘taken by surprise’ by the
appearance of Schrödinger’s wave mechanics papers, which he regarded as a theory of
‘fascinating power and elegance’ (Born 1978 229). Heisenberg seems to have been less
impressed by Schrödinger’s work, calling it ‘disgusting’ (Kragh 1999 166). The theory of
electron waves, developed by de Broglie was familiar to Born when Schrödinger’s papers
were published. He writes that ‘at that time it was clear that the proper interpretation of
quantum mechanics must be of a statistical type’ (Born 1978 p231). A number of attempts
were made to do this using matrix mechanics. Born writes that he hit upon the idea of
using aperiodic collision processes to solve the problem for, as he writes ‘incoming and
outgoing particles could be counted and regarded as empirical probability values’ (Born
1978 p232). 
When he read Schrödinger’s papers, he saw how to do this. He was also guided by an idea
of Einstein’s (or at least in 1961 when he wrote this part of the book, he recalls that he
was):  that  one  could  interpret  the  intensity  of  a  wave  as  representing  the  number  of
photons,  at  least  statistically.  Born  writes  that  these  ideas  ‘led  immediately  to  the
conjecture  that  the  intensity  of  the  de  Broglie  wave  i.e.  the  (absolute)  square  of
Schrödinger’s wave function must  be regarded as the probability density,  which is  the
probability of finding a particle in a unit of volume’  (Born 1978 232). Neither Heisenberg
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nor Pauli were happy with Born’s use of wave mechanics, with Heisenberg being angry at
Born’s use of classical concepts (Hendry 1984 93). 
After his initial 1926 paper on collisions, Born applied these ideas to deriving the adiabatic
principle (proposed by Ehrenfest) in quantum theory, collaborating with Fock (Born and
Fock 1928). He also spent some time working out a practical example of the collision
theory involving an alpha particle colliding with a helium atom (Born 1978 233). 
In the winter of 1928, Born suffered a breakdown and went to convalesce in a sanatorium
on Lake Konstanz, on the German-Swiss border. Unfortunately, the other patients were all
supporters of the Nazis and on opposing their  views, Born was ‘treated as an outcast’
(Born 1978 240). He went from Konstanz to the town of Königsfield in the Black Forest,
where he had a much better time (1978 240). He relates how upon walking past the church
in town one evening he heard a masterly performance of a Bach Fugue. Playing it turned to
be Albert Schweitzer, the famous theologian, philosopher, physician and organist. He and
Born became friends and spent much time walking and discussing humanistic matters,
which seems to have greatly aided in his convalescence (Born 1978 241). 
In the spring of 1929, Born returned to work in Göttingen. In the early 1930s, Born gave a
lecture series to an audience of students from all faculties as part of a university initiative
to counteract  the increasing specialization of the different  academic departments.  Born
presented his work from what he describes as a ‘general philosophical point of view’. He
regrets (as do I) that the notes from these talks have been lost as he ‘should like to see how
I presented the philosophy of science at that time’ (Born 1978 246). He also gave a series
of lectures in Berlin, published in 1933 as Moderne Physik, later translated into English as
Atomic Physics (Born 1935). 
In 1932, Born was elected Dean of the Faculty of Science for the year, the only time of his
life that he held a primarily administrative post (Born 1978 247). He did not enjoy it.
Germany’s  economic  woes  had  reached  their  height  and  Hitler’s  power  and  the
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corresponding anti-Semitism was growing. During this period, he managed to avoid the
sacking of all non-permanent members of staff as ordered by the government by getting
the senior staff to pool some of their wages to hire the junior members as assistants (Born
1978 248). Also during that year, Rutherford visited Göttingen. to receive an honorary
doctorate which Born, as dean of the faculty, conferred on him. A recording of the Born’s
address and Rutherford’s lecture was made by Robert Pohl, another Göttingen physicist
and later  published (It  can be heard here:  http://www.robinmarshall.eu/goettingen.html)
(Born 1978 249). 
 7 Leaving Germany; South Tyrol; Cambridge; and 
Edinburgh
On 30 January 1933, Hitler became chancellor of Germany. Born at this time began to
investigate ways of leaving Germany and Hedi, his wife visited friends in Switzerland to
ask their  advice.  This was unanimous: to get out of the country whilst they still  could
(Born 1978 251).  On the 25th of April a list of civil servants who were to be dismissed
from their positions was published. Amongst those was Born and other Jewish professors.
In May, Born and his family left Germany for the town of Selva in South Tyrol where they
had booked a holiday home, although they had no intention of returning home (Born 1978
253). 
Born’s salary was still being paid and so he had no immediate financial problems. In any
case, he was soon made a number of job offers for positions at Columbus Ohio, Paris,
Belgrade, Cambridge and Oxford. He accepted the Cambridge position, although it was
temporary,  travelling  there  at  the  end of  September  1933.  He writes  that  a  somewhat
unnerving situation greeted him there  - written on all of the hoardings were the words
‘The Man Born to be Hanged’. Of course, it soon turned out that this did not refer to Born
but rather was the title of a recently released film based on a crime novel. Born notes that
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he found a copy and rather enjoyed it  (Born 1978 265).  It  is  in this  spirit  that I have
included a number of puns in the thesis. 
Born gave a course of lectures on the non-linear electrodynamics that he had developed
whilst  in  Selva  (Born  1978  267).  He  also  continued  work  on  this,  trying  (ultimately
unsuccessfully) to work out a quantum field theory. He also studied some nuclear physics
himself, an area into which he had previously not looked (Born 1978 267). 
Much of his time was dedicated to trying to secure jobs for Jews in Germany who had lost
their positions employment elsewhere. He succeed in getting a number of scientists hired
by the Academy of Science in Lima and some more by its Colombian counterpart. He also
talks  sadly  of  failing  to  find  Alfred  Wittenberg,  a  well-known violinist  of  the  time,  a
position in the UK (Born 1978 269). 
In the autumn of 1935, Born travelled to Bangalore for six months at the invitation of C.V.
Raman, the Nobel Prize winning Indian physicist. Raman tried to arrange for Born to have
a permanent position there (his Cambridge position was nearly over) but did not succeed
due  the  rather  unpleasant  intervention  of  the  English  professor  of  engineering  at  the
university, Aston who told the faculty that a ‘second rate foreigner who was driven out of
his own country was not good enough for them’ (Born 1978 277). 
On returning to Cambridge in 1936, Born writes that he had an uncomfortable time of
things—it was not clear that his position would be extended and with all of his property
and most of his savings in Germany and so largely inaccessible, his financial situation was
precarious. In the summer of that year, he received a letter from Peter Kapitza offering him
a position in Moscow. Born was uncertain about moving to Russia, but considered the
offer as it was not certain that it would be possible for him to remain in England. In the
end,  Born was offered the Tait  Chair  of  Natural  Philosophy at  Edinburgh after  it  was
vacated by Charles Galton Darwin, an old friend of his, and accepted this in preference to
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the Moscow position—a move that he points out was fortuitous given the treatment of
foreign intellectuals in Stalin’s purges in the years to come (Born 1978 281). 
Born undertook some teaching at Edinburgh at a level that he considered rather low (Born
1978 282-3). He also had some research students. Amongst these were Klaus Fuchs, who
would later work on the Manhattan project and pass nuclear secrets to the USSR (Born
1978 284). A number of Chinese research students also studied under Born at Edinburgh,
including Kun Huang who collaborated with Born on a book concerning lattice dynamics
(Born and Huang 1954). He also worked with the American physicist Edward Corson and
Herbert S. Green. 
 8 Retirement From Edinburgh and Later Life; Nobel
Prize; Pugwash
Born’s  Recollections  does not cover his life from this point, but there are accounts of it
from his son, Gustav and the Biographical Memoirs paper as well as his correspondence
with Einstein. Having reached the age of 70, Born retired from his chair at Edinburgh in
1953 and moved back to Germany. This was several reasons, both personal and financial.
As Born had not worked in Britain for most of his life, his British pension was small and
not enough to live on. As part of restitution efforts after the war, he was entitled to his full
pension from Göttingen as well as restoration of his property, but this money could not at
that point be moved outside of Germany (Born 1978 296). Gustav also writes that Born
hoped to use his position as a prominent physicist to persuade Germany not to arm itself
with nuclear weapons. Born used the money he had to build a house in Bad Pyrmont, a spa
town in Lower Saxony that was not too far away from Göttingen (Kemmer and Schlapp
1971 23). Bad Pyrmont was also home of the headquarters of the Religious Society of
Friends in Germany—Hedi had become a Quaker whilst in Edinburgh (Born 2005 197). 
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Einstein seemed to find Born’s decision to move back to Germany mystifying even if it
was compelled by financial circumstances—he writes of Born’s return to the ‘land of the
mass-murderers of our kinsmen’ (Born 2005 195). Born replied that he probably would
have moved back even if he did not have to—his wife was homesick and the country
around Bad Pyrmont beautiful (Born 2005 200). Born did not really agree with Einstein’s
characterisation of the German people. He certainly shared that opinion when the horrors
of the concentration camps became known, but revised it upon learning of the situation of
Germany post-war (Born 2005 195). He wrote in reply to Einstein ‘[the German Quakers
have  their  headquarters  in  Pyrmont.  They  are  no  ‘mass-murderers’,  and  many  of  our
friends there suffered far worse things under the Nazis that you or I. One should be chary
sic  of  applying  epithets  of  this  sort.  The  Americans  have  demonstrated  in  Dresden,
Hiroshima and Nagasaki that in sheer speed of extermination they surpass even the Nazis’
(Born 2005 200). 
In the commentary on the letter, Born writes that he stands by this position and can see
little difference between Hiroshima and Nagasaki: ‘the usual reasoning is the following:
the former case is one of warfare, the latter of cold-blooded slaughter. But the plain truth is
that the people involved are in both instances non-participants, defenceless old people,
women and children, whose annihilation is supposed to achieve some political or military
objective’ (Born 2005 201). I mention this to make clear the strength of Born’s opposition
to nuclear weapons and their use. It is not that he thinks that such mass warfare targeting
civilian populations is somehow worse that the Holocaust, it is that he thinks both equally
monstrous. 
Born castigated those scientists who worked on weapons of war and their application. He
writes of Frederick Lindemann (1886-1957) , a physicist who Born had known in Berlin
and  who  became  an  advisor  to  Churchill  and  advocated  the  bombing  of  civilian
populations ‘Lindemann did base things and opened the gates of hell for other men of his
type, men efficient and clever, but not profound and wise, who later became leaders in
science and its applications to politics and war’ (Born 1978 262). 
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In 1954 he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics, sharing that year’s award equally with
Walter Boethe. Born was given the prize for ‘for his fundamental research in quantum
mechanics, especially for his statistical interpretation of the wavefunction’ (Nobel Prize
Committee 1954). One might ask why Born was not awarded the prize in 1933 along with
Heisenberg  [Heisenberg was awarded the 1932 Nobel prize in 1933 after the prize was
reserved for  a  year  as  the  committee  felt  that  none of  the  1932 nominations  met  the
appropriate standards (Nobelprize.org 2014)], Schrödinger and Dirac,  instead having to
wait 28 years. This certainly seems to have affected Born at the time. In the commentary
on  a  letter  from Einstein  complementing  him on  winning  the  Nobel  (the  date  is  not
supplied for the letter but Born replied in November, so it is presumably at some point in
the year before this) Born writes ‘The fact that I did not receive the Nobel prize in 1932
together with Heisenberg hurt me very much at the time’ (Born 2005). 
His own supposition was that opposition to the statistical interpretation from significant
physicists of the time—he names Einstein, de Broglie, Schrödinger and Planck—led the
Nobel committee to avoid awarding him the prize until his interpretation had become more
widely accepted. There may be something to this, although Born cannot be quite right, as
the  committee’s  records  state  that  de  Broglie  nominated  Born  for  the  Nobel  in  1946
(Nobelprize.org 2014). There simply is not available information to determine if this was
indeed the case. He stated another reason in his reply to Einstein (he was not so rude as to
write to Einstein and say that it was his fault that he had to wait so long for a Nobel), that
‘the intention  was to  honour something which has  no immediate  practical  application,
something purely theoretical’ (Born 2005 225). He notes that Linus Pauling ‘a man known
for his upright political conduct and his rejection of the misuse of scientific discoveries’
also received the Nobel Prize for chemistry at the same time. He goes on to say that ‘This
could be chance,  but it  does appear to have been done on purpose, and that would be
gratifying’ (Born 2005 p225). What Born refers to here is opposition to nuclear weaponry
and the use of physics to develop weapons of war in general. He refers later in the letter to
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an  article  he  written  opposing  the  building  of  more  atom  bombs.  As  with  his  other
supposition, it is possible that the prize committee decided to award the Nobel to Born
because of his anti-nuclear position, but we cannot know. 
Born’s  anti-nuclear  stance  should  be  mentioned  here.  He  was  one  of  the  original
signatories  on  the  Einstein-Russell  manifesto  (see
https://pugwash.org/1955/07/09/statement-manifesto/),  the  founding  charter  of  the
Pugwash Conference. We can see his attitude in the introduction to Natural Philosophy of
Cause and Chance, where he writes ‘It is true that many scientists are not philosophically
minded and have hitherto shown much skill and ingenuity but little wisdom. I need hardly
to enlarge on this subject. The practical applications of science have given us the means of
a fuller and richer life, but also the means of destruction and devastation on a vast scale’
(Born 1948 2). I think that it is clear that Born is referring to the development of the atom
bomb here, as well as earlier uses of science to wage war such as the use of poison gas.
Much of  his  retirement  was dedicated  to  this  sort  of  writing,  along with some of  the
philosophical work that this thesis discusses. 
He passed away on the 5th of January 1970, survived by his widow Hedi, two daughters
and a son. 
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Chapter 3: Born on Causation
 1 Introduction
It is an oft-argued claim that there is no genuine causation in physics (see, for example
Russell (1912/1989) and more recently Norton (2003)) and that philosophers are mistaken
in claiming that there exist causal principles in the discipline. Russell writes in  On the
Notion of  a  Cause  that ‘we found first  that  the  law of  causality,  as  usually  stated  by
philosophers, is false, and is not employed in science’ (1912 26). Norton in Causation as
Folk Science tells  us that  ‘At a fundamental level,  there are no causes and effects in
science  and  no  overarching  principle  of  causality’,  although  it  is  the  case  that   ‘in
appropriately restricted domains our science tells us that the world behaves just as if it
conformed to some sort of folk theory of causation’ (2003 21). The relevance of this point
is not limited to the philosophy of science, or even metaphysics: it  is, for example, of
considerable importance in the mental causation debate. Crudely put, if causation is absent
from physics on a basic level, then there is one less reason to worry about how mental
causes  could  have  physical  effects.  This  of  course  does  not  end  that  debate—even  if
causation is absent from fundamental physics, it could still be an emergent feature of the
world.
Against this background it seems interesting to examine the of Born’s thoughts as someone
deeply involved in the development of quantum mechanics who believed that ‘scientific
work will always be the search for the causal interdependence of phenomena’ (1949a 18).
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This  chapter  will  examine  Born’s  thoughts  on  causation  and  the  role  that  his  causal
principles, contiguity (causal connection) and antecedence (causal priority), are meant to
play in theory construction and development. This will be done by examining firstly the
definitions he gives and secondly his treatment of the status of the principles in the history
of physics.  I will  then examine a ‘zoo’ of options for the status of these principles in
physics: Kantian synthetic a priori principles; Hasok Chang’s discussions of ontological
principles  and  intelligibility  (2001,  2009);  Eli  Zahar’s  discussion  of  metaphysical
principles in Einstein’s work (1973), Emil Meyerson’s principles of identity (Zahar 1989);
and John Watkins confirmable and influential metaphysics (1958).
 2 Born's Causal Principles
There are,  Born notes, two distinct ways in which causality is used and understood in
ordinary language. The first is as a timeless relation of dependence—a causal law, if you
will. This notion is expressed via statements such as ‘Wars are caused by the economic
conditions’ and ‘Chemical reactions are caused by the affinity of molecules’ (Born 1949a
5).
The second is a relation of dependence between specific events, fixed in time and space.
This is expressed by statements like ‘The American war of secession was caused by the
economic condition of the slave states’ and ‘The destruction of Hiroshima was caused by
the explosion of an atomic bomb’ (Born 1949a 5).
According to Born, both of these are meaningful uses of the term causation: each expresses
a different sense of the notion.  What is  shared between them—what makes them both
expressions of the notion of causation -  is dependence. What, for Born, is dependence?
How can it  be  established?  The notion  is  clear,  he thinks,  in  mathematics  where  it  is
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equivalent  to  the  word  ‘function’ (Born  1949a  6).  But  this  is  not  what  Born  thinks
dependence in causality refers to—it should refer to dependence between concrete objects:
‘real things in nature’ (1949a 6).  What this means, Born acknowledges, is not a simple
matter.
Science,  Born thinks,  uses  repeated experimentation and observation as a  criterion for
establishing relations of dependence. Of course, as he points out, one can never perform
enough observations/experiments to establish such a relation with certainty and so one
must employ inductive principles. The justification for their use is ultimately, Born thinks,
that they work.  There is no way of proving induction. Born says ‘…there is no logical
argument for doing so; it is a question of faith. In this sense I am willing to call induction a
metaphysical principle, namely something beyond physics’ (1949a 7). On the other hand,
the application of the principle works—‘science has worked out a code, or rule of craft, for
its  application.  This  code  has  been  entirely  successful,  and  I  think  that  is  the  only
justification for it’ (1949a 7). Born does not think that this is in any way good grounds for
rejecting the use of induction in science—’I do not hesitate to call a man foolish if he
rejects the teachings of experience because no logical proof is forthcoming’ (Born 1949a
7).
Born stresses that even if the causal character of a relation between events is neglected,
there  may  still  exist  some  predictable  regularity.  Born  uses  the  example  of  a  train
timetable—one can use it  to  accurately predict  the time of  arrival  of  a  train,  but one
cannot say that the arrival of the train was caused by the timetable. Thus ‘the law of the
timetable is deterministic’ (although in the present day train times appear to be modelled
more on notions of quantum indeterminacy, in 1949 such concepts had yet to be applied to
the transport  system, which remained rigidly Newtonian in  character).  It  allows us to
make predictions, but gives no sense of why those predictions might be correct. Therefore,
Born says  ‘...one should not identify causality with determinism’ (Born 1949a 8). That
there exist rules which allow one to predict from one event A the occurrence of another
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event B does not entail that there exists a causal relationship between them. At the very
least, predictability by itself is not enough to do the job.
Born goes on to give his definitions of determinism, causality, antecedence and contiguity,
which I shall state below in full:
Determinism postulates that events at different times are connected by laws in such a
way that predictions of unknown situations (past or future) can be made.
By this formulation religious predestination is excluded since it assumes that the book
of destiny is only open to God.
Causality postulates that there are laws by which the occurrence of an entity B of a
certain class depends on the occurrence of an entity A of another class, where the word
‘entity’ means  any physical  object,  phenomenon,  situation or  event.  A is  called  the
cause, B the effect.
If  causality  refers  to  single  events,  the  following  attributes  of  causality  must  be
considered:
Antecedence postulates that the cause must be prior to, or at least simultaneous with,
the effect.
Contiguity postulates that cause and effect must be in spatial contact or connected by a
chain of intermediate things in contact. (Born 1949a 9)
The definition of causation itself is a relatively minimal one—there is causality in just the
case that there exist laws by which some event, entity or phenomenon is dependent on
another.  This,  Born seems to think is  the essence of causation—‘a timeless relation of
dependence’ (1949a 6). Born has already said that he thinks the concept of causation is
applied in a second way, as a relation between two events fixed in space and time. It is to
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relations between such specific events that the principles of antecedence and contiguity are
meant to apply.
So we can see that for Born causation is a kind of law-like physical dependence. It gets
more specific when we examine individual instances of causation—in these cases, those
instances  must  obey  certain  principles  in  order  to  be  causal.  These  principles  seem
intended to provide a way to constrain individual instances of causal processes—it’s only
laws that act at the level of timeless and spaceless laws of dependence. The definitions
seem to have some common-sense basis. Born writes that ‘it is always presumed that cause
precedes effect; I propose to call this the principle of antecedence. Further, it is generally
regarded as  repugnant  to  assume a thing to  cause an effect  at  a  place where it  is  not
present,  or  to  which  it  cannot  be  linked  by  other  things;  I  call  this  the  principle  of
contiguity.’ (Born 1949a 8). Antecedence ensures that cause is always temporally prior to
effect—effectively blocking backwards causation from counting as causation. Contiguity,
by ensuring spacial connection between causal relata, blocks action-at-a-distance and—
presumably—ensures locality of causal relations.
 3 The  Causal  Principles  in  the  Development  of
Physics
Now I want to take a look at some specifics regarding how Born deals with his principles
of contiguity and antecedence in the history of science.
 3.1 Contiguity
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Born starts his discussion of the contiguity principle by writing:
Although I maintain that neither causality itself nor its attributes, which I called the
principles of antecedence and contiguity, are metaphysical, and that only the inference
by induction transcends experience, there is no doubt that these ideas have a strong
power over  the human mind,   and we have evidence that  they have influenced the
development of classical physics. Much effort has been made to reconcile Newton’s
laws with these postulates. (Born 1949a 17)
Born goes on to give a brief overview of the history of contiguity and antecedence in
physics. Contiguity, he writes, is linked to introduction of contact forces and forces within
bodies,  then  with  forces  within  the  electromagnetic  ether  and  fields  of  force.  The
application  of  the  contiguity  principle  lead  to  Newton’s  theory  being  superseded  by
Einstein’s. Respect of the antecedence principle is bound up with time-irreversibility in the
equations  of  the  theories  of  physics.  The  first  example  of  this,  for  Born,  comes  in
thermodynamics. He tells us that the ‘reconciliation’ (Born 1949a 17) of it with Newtonian
mechanics led to statistical physics. Statistical physics is also bound up in the development
of atomic theory. Atoms are first hypothetical and the search for them and the investigation
of  their  properties  first  confirms  their  existence  and  then  discovers  that  there  are  no
Newtonian particles at all. In the final accounting, quantum theory preserves antecedence
and contiguity to what Born considers to be ‘a considerable degree’ (Born 1949a 18).
So we can see in this already a couple of indications as to what status these principles are
meant  to  have.  Firstly  there  is  Born’s  assertion  that  they  are  not  metaphysical  (by
‘metaphysical’,  Born  simply  means  ‘something  beyond  physics’ (Born  1949a  7).  He
doesn’t say any more in the introduction, but does elaborate a little in an appendix. Here he
notes that although he does not like what he terms the ‘speculative philosophy’ associated
with the term, which ‘pretends that there is definite goal to be reached and often claims to
have reached it’ (Born 1949a 209) there do exist metaphysical problems which he thinks
81
‘cannot be disposed of by declaring them meaningless, or by calling the other names, like
“epistemology”’ (1949a 209). These problems are those that are, as he says previously are
‘beyond physics’ and furthermore ‘demand an act of faith’ (1949a 209).
The implication here seems fairly clear: that Born’s causal principles do, in some sense,
belong to the realm of physics; that we not require an act of faith to accept them, I.e. they
have some kind of empirical status. However it is not clear that this can simply explain the
guiding role that they have had on physics. We couldn’t have discovered them prior to the
successes of relativity and quantum theory, yet they still  have some influence over our
minds, Born says (1949a 17).
Born discusses starts his discussion of contiguity and antecedence by looking at their status
in Newton’s theory of mechanics. According to Born (and I think correctly), Newton’s
theory also fails  to satisfy the principle  of contiguity.  He writes ‘Newton’s forces,  the
quantitative expressions for causes of motion, are supposed to act through empty space, so
that cause and effect are simultaneous whatever the distance’ (Born 1949a 16). Not only is
there no demand for contiguous causal contact in Newton’s theory of gravitation, there
seems explicitly to be no causal contact whatsoever. But it is important that this does make
Newton’s dynamics an unacceptable or unintelligible theory. Born notes that ‘In spite of
these difficulties, Newton’s dynamics has served many generations of physicists and is
useful,  even  indispensable,  to-day’ (Born  1949a  16).  It’s  acknowledged  that  the  pre-
Newtonian  theory  of  Cartesian  cosmology  does  provide  a  contiguous  description  of
celestial mechanics, but this on its own does not make it a preferable theory (1949a 16).
It’s  also  suggested  that  Newtonians  had  good  reason  not  to  worry  about  the  lack  of
contiguity  in  the  theory:  ‘the  language  of  facts  led  unambiguously  to  his  [Newton’s]
results’  (1949a  16).  It  was  only  when  ‘new  facts’  about  the  finite  velocity  of  the
propagation of forces were discovered that physicists were able to deal with the notion of
contiguity in gravity in the general theory of relativity.
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Born  goes  on  to  discuss  why  the  violation  of  the  contiguity  principle  by  Newtonian
mechanics was accepted and then later rejected. Born notes that ‘it suffices to remember
that the power of analytical mechanics to describe and predict accurately the observations
led many to the conviction that it was the final formulation of the ultimate laws of nature’
(Born 1949a 18). The implication here is clear: the success of the Newtonian programme
was sufficient to alleviate conceptual worries regarding it. But, Born thinks, the situation
did change, and this was due to the development of terrestrial, rather than just celestial,
mechanics.
 3.1.1 Contact Forces 
Born argues that contiguity had its first proper introduction into classical physics via the
investigation of elastic solids and the continuum mechanics of Augustin-Louis Cauchy. He
notes that Cauchy initially tried to model solids as aggregates of particles, acting on one
another in a non-contiguous manner. However, he writes that ‘in the physical application
all traces of them were obliterated by averaging’ (1949a 19). He doesn’t elaborate on this
point, but presumably he means something like that individual particles actually do no
work  in  the  model.  Born  thinks  that  this  suggested  to  Cauchy  another  approach—
modelling matter as a mathematical continuum. He notes that although this might ‘from
our modern standpoint’ seem like a step backwards (moving away from a discontinuous,
atomistic model of matter to a continuous one), this approach is not only more contiguous
but also forms the basis of field models of the electromagnetic forces.
In Newton’s formulation not only is there no concept of a field though which a force can
propagate, forces which act on bodies do not propagate through them contiguously. A force
acts on one end of a body, and then instantaneously through it at the other end. In Cauchy’s
system it is assumed that all the properties of the matter composing the body or bodies in
question are distributed continuously in the space that they occupy.  The density, ρ, of the
body is therefore a function of space. The quantity of mass which passes through unit
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surface area in unit of time is the current of mass. Assuming the conservation of mass leads
(via a more complex derivation given by Born in an appendix (Born 1949a 134) to the
famous continuity equation:
(1) ρ˙+divu=0                           (Born 1949a 20)
In order to calculate the forces acting on such a continuum, one considers the forces acting
upon a volume element We regard the substance as being separated into many elements
each separated by a surface through which each element exerts a force upon that adjacent
to it. This force is represented by the stress tensor T,
(1.1) T=(T xx T xy T xxT yx T yy T yzT zx T zy T zz)              (Born 1949a p20)
we then get:
(1.2)                    ρ˙ d vdt
=divT                              (Born 1949a 20)
where div T is a vector with the components:
(divT )x=
∂T xx
∂ x
+
∂T xy
∂ x
+
∂T xz
∂ x
, ... , (Born 1949a p21) 
and d/dt the operator
d
dt
= ∂
∂ t
+vx ∂∂ x
+v y ∂∂ y
+v z ∂∂ z
,  (Born 1949a p21)
Born writes that these equations, (1) and (1.2) ‘are the new equations of motion which
satisfy the postulate of contiguity’ (Born 1949a p21).  They satisfy contiguity because they
provide  a  physical  model  for  how  forces  propagate  through  a  continuous  medium,
something which is simply absent from previous formulations of mechanics.
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 3.1.2 Electromagnetic Fields 
Born then discusses the notion of contiguity in electromagnetism, although not in quite so
much formal detail as he does with contact forces.  Early formulations of electromagnetic
laws such as Coulomb’s violate contiguity in the same way as Newton’s law of gravitation.
Born’s  narrative—explicitly—is  one  of  scientists  working  against  a  Newtonian
background to gradually and empirically develop a contiguous physics.  He writes that
Faraday tried to understand ‘electric and magnetic phenomena with the help of contact
forces’ (Born 1949a 23). He used concepts from the theories of elastic bodies, derived
from Cauchy’s continuum mechanics. He writes though that there were’ considerable and
somewhat strange modifications’ (which he does not specify) that ‘made it difficult for his
learned contemporaries to accept his ideas and to discard the well-established Newtonian
fashion of description’ (Born, 1949a, 23). Faraday’s preference for explanations in terms of
contact forces was, Born claims, due to physical intuition rather than mathematics.
The  next  step  was  James  Clerk  Maxwell’s  work  which,  according  to  Born  ‘made  it
impossible  to  accept  forces  acting  instantaneously  over  finite  distances’ (1949a  24).
Maxwell did this by using a field model to show that EM forces propagate with finite
velocity.  Born concludes with the following ‘I only wish to stress that the use of contact
forces and field equations, I.e. the establishment of contiguity, in electromagnetism was
the result of a long struggle against preconceptions of a Newtonian origin. This confirms
my view that the question of contiguity is not a metaphysical one, but an empirical one’
(Born 1949a 25).  Why would Born think that this  confirms contiguity as an empirical
principle, rather than as a metaphysical one? Because it grew out of good physical theories
that  were  more  accurate  than  their  predecessors,  not  out  of  non-physical  background
metaphysical assumptions. Now it is of course by no means apparent that Born is correct
in this surmise—we could equally posit that the move towards contiguous explanation was
due to the influence of some metaphysical research program that encouraged the search for
such explanations.
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 3.1.3 Relativity
Born finishes the section on contiguity with a discussion of its status in the theory of
relativity.  Born  notes  that  at  the  start  of  his  career  Newton’s  mechanics  with  its
instantaneous non-contiguous action-at-a-distance existed ‘more or less peacefully, side by
side’ (Born 1949a 26) with the contiguous theories of Cauchy’s mechanics and Maxwell’s
EM theory. The problem was how to reconcile Newtonian gravitation with contiguity. The
solution was the general theory of relativity. He gives a brief overview of the nature and
development of relativity theory before turning to the ‘philosophical problem’ (Born 1949a
29)  at  hand,  making  two  relevant  points.  The  first  is  that  relativity  makes  physical
geometry (‘the geometric aspect of the behaviour of actual bodies’ (1949a p29) subject to
the cause-effect relation. The second is that it obeys contiguity.
Not only are Cauchy’s continuum mechanics and Maxwell’s  EM theory more accurate
versions of earlier theories, in that they provide better models and mathematically more
precise results, but they also respect the principle of contiguity. For Born, these two things
are  linked.  He  writes  that,  referring  to  the  introduction  of  contact  forces  throughout
materials ‘much effort has been made to reconcile Newton’s laws with these postulates [of
contiguity and antecedence]’ (1949a 17). The question here is precisely why Born thinks
that this means that his principles are ‘empirical’. Born doesn’t really elaborate here, but I
think that we might speculate in the following way: the introduction of contiguity into
theories is desirable for two reasons. Firstly, those theories without contiguous descriptions
of forces conceptually lack something—causal descriptions of individual events. Secondly
it is the case that the contiguous theories that, in reconciling the principle with Newtonian
physics, we are pushed to search for are better or more accurate theories than those within
that paradigm that did not respect contiguity. This I think is the lesson that Born means us
to learn from Cauchy’s development of continuum mechanics and it is, I think, what Born
means when he calls the contiguity principle ‘empirical’. It must be noted however, that
this would imply that the contiguity principle is something like a universal law drawn from
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an induction over the history of physics—for every physical relation that expresses some
functional  relationship between two quantities  there exists  a  contiguous explanation or
description of that relation. It is not at all clear that such a principle falls purely within the
realm of the empirical,  despite Born’s claims that it  does.  On something Zahar’s view
(Zahar 1973, see also later discussion in section 4 of this chapter), a heuristic principle that
guided us to search for a contiguous theory would be grounded in some metaphysical
principle that if x influences y then something must propagate between them.
 3.2 Antecedence
Born next examines the place of his principle of antecedence, that cause should come prior
to, or be at least simultaneous with, effect in physics.
 3.2.1 Antecedence in Newtonian Mechanics
In Newtonian mechanics the relationship between the motion of a body at one time and its
motion at a later time is symmetrical. Newton’s theory in fact goes even further than this—
the whole state of a system at one time is symmetrically related to the whole state of the
system at another.  Newton writes in Scholium One of the Principia ‘Absolute, true, and
mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to
anything external’ (Newton 1689). Born notes that despite this apparent description of time
as  a  uniform  flow,  nothing  of  the  kind  can  be  drawn  from the  actual  mechanics  of
Newton’s physics. Time is merely an independent variable—to substitute t for -t makes no
difference to the equations. Thus we cannot claim that it follows from the physics that the
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earlier state of the system must specify the later state of the system. One can claim with as
much physical justification that the later state specifies the earlier.
This all implies something about what sorts of conditions must be fulfilled in order for
Born to  consider  his  postulates  respected.  Nowhere  does  Newton actually  suggest  the
possibility of backwards causation or of any physical significance to the time-symmetry of
his mechanics, but it is not enough that for Born that his postulates are not actively broken.
They must be actively fulfilled in such a way that the theory makes it impossible for any
kind of causal reversal to take place. It also seems to be the case that absolute time itself is
not  enough to satisfy the postulate.  This is  because Newton does  not  actually  use the
absolute time do any empirical work—removing it from Newtonian physics would make
no difference to the formalism of the theory. For Born, it is not enough for a theory to
simply independently stipulate some principle that bans backwards causation or enforces
time-asymmetry.  This is key for understanding what it means for Born to think that some
theory  does  respect  the  principle  of  antecedence  —there  must  be  some aspect  of  the
formalism of the theory that prevents the symmetric transformation of t into -t, i.e. it is the
equations or the definition of the variable that must do the work of respecting antecedence.
It’s worth noting that Newtonian mechanics does seem to contain metaphysical principles
that allow some intelligible notion of causation—the description of time in Scholium 1
Absolute,  true,  and mathematical  time,  of  itself,  and from its  own
nature,  flows equably without relation to anything external,  and by
another name is called duration: relative, apparent, and common time,
is  some  sensible  and  external  (whether  accurate  or  unequable)
measure of duration by the means of motion, which is commonly used
instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year. (Newton
1726)
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The flow of time here seems to ensure causal  direction,  satisfying Born’s antecedence
principle. The notion of flow implies direction, and if time can only flow in one direction
we have  good  reason  to  reject  the  –t  solutions  that  make  it  impossible  to  determine
whether event A depends on event B or event B on A. Indeed this bears something of a
resemblance to Chang’s definition for an ontological principle.  However it still does not
satisfy Born. Why? Well, Born says of Newton ‘Whatever he says about the notion of time
(in Principia, Scholium I) as a uniform flow, the use he makes of it contains nothing of a
flow in one direction’ (Born 1949a P16). So it takes more than statements of principle to
satisfy Born. We cannot simply assume principles of causation, problematic though their
lack might be. They have to come from the physics; theories have to be constructed in such
a way that  relations  in  them cannot  violate  them. They cannot  simply be added in as
additional constraints.
One other way to understand what Born requires here is via Bas van Fraassen’s arguments
about absolute space in Newtonian mechanics (van Fraassen 1980 57). Van Fraassen points
out that Newton’s theory is empirically adequate (I.e. it saves all of the phenomena) for
any value of constant motion of say, the sun, through absolute space so long as the values
of all relative motions (i.e. that of bodies with respect to one another—what we might call
Galilean  relativity)  are  preserved.  Hence  all  versions  of  Newtonian  mechanics  with
differing  values  of  the  (collective  and  isomorphic)  motion  of  bodies  with  respect  to
absolute  space  are  empirically  equivalent  (van  Fraassen  1980  46).  Furthermore,  and
because of this, we can also consistently believe that all of those versions are false, even
though they are all empirically adequate, if we believe that their falsity consists in the
common component that goes  beyond the phenomena—in this case, absolute space (Van
Fraassen 1980 47).
Now Born is not talking about absolute space and he is not really discussing empirical
adequacy  or  equivalence,  but  the  relevant  point  is  this—we can  easily  see  that  some
theories have excess content that is irrelevant to the job of saving the phenomena. Absolute
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time, for Born, seems to fall into this category—whether or not we state that time flows
absolute  like  a  river,  the  dynamics  given  by  the  mathematical  models  of  Newtonian
mechanics will be time-symmetric. Similarly to absolute space, Newtonian mechanics plus
absolute time is empirically equivalent to Newtonian mechanics without absolute time. In
order for a theory to respect antecedence, at least some of the working parts of a theory—
its dynamics—must be time-asymmetric.
 3.2.2 Antecedence in Thermodynamics
Born  argues  that  antecedence  is  fulfilled  by  the  development  of  thermodynamics  and
statistical  physics.  He writes:  ‘We now have to discuss the experiences which make it
possible to distinguish in an objective empirical way between past and future or, in our
terminology, to establish the principle of antecedence in the chain of cause and effect.
These experiences are connected with the production and transfer of heat’ (Born 1949a
31).
Born initially discusses the differential equations for the flow of caloric through bodies. He
notes that this was treated with mostly the same methods used for describing the flow of
liquids. However caloric fluids are considered to have negligible inertia (Born 1949a 31).
From the continuity equation
we can derive the expression:
c [∂T ]
[∂ t ]
=κΔT ,
Where c is the specific heat, κ is the coefficient of conductivity, T is the temperature and t
the time. (Born 1949a p31).
This  is  distinct  from  liquid  flow  by  being  a  first-order,  rather  than  second-order,
differential equation in time. From the perspective of antecedence, the importance of this
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equation is  that  one cannot  substitute  t  for –t.  Born illustrates  this  by considering the
solution for the temperature distribution in a thin wire along the x-direction:
T−T0=
C
√t
e−(cx
2 /4κt )
The equation tells us that an initially high temperature at  x=0 will gradually spread and
level out over time. It is clear that one is unable to substitute t for -t without the equation
becoming unphysical (I.e. there is a solution but it describes an exponentially increasing
imaginary temperature along the x direction). This, Born says, is ‘an obviously irreversible
phenomenon’ (Born 1949a 32).
Born then discusses the development of thermodynamics proper. The crucial development
for the antecedence principle is the second law of thermodynamics. Born notes that the
second law is derived from models of thermal machines which transform work into heat
and heat into work or move heat from one place to another. (Born 1949a 38). It was known
from engineering, and particularly the operations of steam engines, that certain tasks are
impossible to perform, namely the complete transformation of heat to work and, in the
absence of additional work, the movement of heat from a colder area to hotter one. It is
from these concepts that the second law was originally derived.
Born gives a derivation with a different method to that used by Kelvin and Clausius—that
of Caratheodory—which he regards as ‘much more satisfactory’ (Born 1949a 38) because
whereas  Kelvin’s  and  Clausius’ derivations  follow  from  a  wide  range  of  impossible
processes, Caratheodory’s method follows from the idea that one can derive the second
law from a single such process. Born notes that we know from James Joule’s work that
there are such processes. If we take an adiabatically enclosed system and input work to
transform it from one equilibrium state to another we do not get back our work simply by
reversing the process. This is the case no matter how close the two states are. Thus Born
concludes that ‘there exist adiabatically inaccessible states in the vicinity of a given state’
(1949a 39). So, for any state of an adiabatically enclosed system there exists at least one
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state than is inaccessible. It is from this principle that Caratheodory derives the second law
of thermodynamics. Born goes through the full derivation, which I will not reproduce here,
but we end up with the following:
dQ=TdS
Where Q is the heat, T the absolute temperature is defined as
T (ϑ)=Ce∫ g(θ)d (ϑ)
and S the entropy, defined as
S (ϕ)= 1
C∫Φ(ϕ)d ϕ
Where C is fixed by defining T1-T2 for two states of some substance (100o for water if T1 is
the boiling point and T2 the freezing point) (Born 1949a 42).
For  dynamical  processes  that  are  not  simply  sequences  of  equilibrium states  we must
consider transitions from an initial state V10, V20, S0 to a final one V1, V2 , S, where V is the
volume  and  S  the  entropy.  We  can  affect  such  a  transition  in  two  ways:  firstly  by
adiabatically and quasi-statically varying the volume with the entropy remaining constant
or secondly by changing the state adiabatically but with constant volume, which changes
the entropy.
In order to prevent a violation of Caratheodory’s principle, we must ensure that not every
value for the entropy can be reached from every other (I.e. that we cannot get to every S
from every S0). We do this in the following way: For each process we say that either S ≥ S0
or S ≤ S0. The sign is defined by the choice of constant C and must remain the same for all
initial states due to continuity. If C is such that T is positive, then the entropy can never
decrease.
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The development of thermodynamics proper leads, via the concept of entropy, to a truly
irreversible system of physics, thus satisfying the principle of antecedence. But, as Born
notes,  ‘this  gain  is  paid  for  by  the  loss  of  description  which  ordinary  dynamics  of
continuous media supplies’ (Born 1949a 44). Why? Most of thermodynamics is concerned
with equilibrium processes. Born explains that we can give some dynamical descriptions
of irreversible processes, but these descriptions merely give us the increase in entropy or
the decrease in the free energy of the system. So we have a system of mechanics which
obeys the principle of antecedence, but cannot give detailed descriptions of the systems it
describes.
Born then gives a detailed description of the development of statistical mechanics and the
introduction of irreversible processes via probabilistic treatments of systems, which again I
will  pass over.   He returns to the topic of irreversibility  when discussing Boltzmann’s
equation:
df (1)
dt
=
δ f (1)
δ t
−[H , f (1)]=C (1)
where f(1) is the probability density for a particular particle, H the Hamiltonian, and C(1)
the collision integral given by:
C(1)=∬( f ' (1) f ' (2)−f (1) f (2))|ξ1−ξ2|d bd ξ2
The collision integral represents the dropping of the assumption that the motions of the
molecules in a gas are independent from one another and models the change a particle
crossing some volume of space whilst that motion is interrupted by collisions with other
molecules. In Born’s formulation f(1) and f(2) refer to two particles before collision; f ’(1)
and f’(2) after collision; ξ1 and ξ2 their velocities; and db the collision cross-section.
Born writes ‘Does the equation (6.23) [the collision integral] really indicate an irreversible
approach from any initial state to a homogeneous equilibrium? This is in fact the case, and
a very strange result indeed: the metamorphosis of reversible mechanics into irreversible
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mechanics with the help of probability’ (Born 1949a 57). I.e., is it the case that we have
derived some time irreversible process via the introduction of probabilistic considerations
in into the kinetic theory of gases?
Born discusses how such a result arises: the collision integral results from averaging over
the behaviour of all of the other molecules in the system. Born thinks that we are forced to
give  this  averaging  because  of  our  ignorance  of  what  is  precisely  going  on  in  a
microscopic  system.  He  writes  that  ‘mixing  mechanical  knowledge  with  ignorance  of
detail leads to irreversibility’ (Born 1949a 59). Is this justified, though? Born thinks that it
is. He comments that one of the results of Einstein’s work on Brownian motion is there is a
limit in the accuracy that measuring equipment can reach, due to random motion in the
molecules of the equipment itself. He writes ‘There is a limit on observability given by the
laws of nature themselves’ (Born 1949a 64). Of course, as Born points out, one can always
reduce the temperature of the system in order to increase the accuracy of one’s equipment
—as you do so, the magnitude of the Brownian motion will decrease. Of course, as he says
‘later developments in physics proved this rule in physics also to be ineffective’ (1949a
64). Born does not tell us precisely what he means here, but presumably he refers to the
zero-point energy that is present even at absolute zero.
Born concludes his discussion of classical physics with a chapter entitled  Chance and
Antecedence.  He  starts  by  asking  what  it  is  that  we  can  learn  from  the  preceding
discussion. It is that ‘the introduction of chance and probability into the laws of motion
removes the reversibility inherent in them; or, in other words, it leads to a conception of
time which has a definite direction and satisfies the principle of antecedence in the cause-
effect  relation’ (Born  1949a  71).  Born  is  not  alone  in  arguing  that  there  exists  some
thermodynamic arrow of time—Reichenbach (1953), Grünbaum (1973) and Albert (2000)
are  some  examples  of  others  who  do.  Unfortunately,  Born  does  not  elaborate  on  his
argument and so we are forced to do a little reconstruction of our own in order to look at
what his position might actually be.
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Something to note here is that if we take Born’s statement about the direction of time at
face value, the irreversibility of thermodynamic processes leads us to an irreversibility not
just in the particular cause-effect relations described by those theories, but also in time
itself.   This  might  imply  that  we  would  only  need  one  fundamental  time-asymmetric
physical  process  in  order  to  ensure  that  all  processes  (if  we  presume  that  physics  is
consistent) are actually time-asymmetric regardless of formalism, as we have managed to
derive  some  kind  of  thermodynamic  arrow  of  time.  It’s  not  clear  precisely  what
metaphysical view of time Born has. The above statement is all we have to go on with
regards to that. However, two claims of his might help us here. The first is his assertion
that his principles of causation are empirical. The second is his assertion that Newton’s
stipulation  that  regardless  of  dynamics  time has  some direction,  does  not  in  fact  give
temporal ordering of causal relata in physics.  Born’s view might therefore be that time is
not separate from the processes that take place in it—i.e. all that we have to go on when
considering  the  direction  of  time  is  how the  time  variable  behaves  in  the  theories  of
physics
However it is not clear from this that Born is actually proposing a true reduction of the
direction of time to the direction of the increase of entropy (of the sort discussed in Sklar
1985 305-326), especially as he does not seem to discuss time elsewhere in his work. The
alternative to this view is that Born is merely talking about the ‘conception’ of the time
variable in thermodynamics and kinetic theory only, and not more generally. So in that
sense,  we  can  reconstruct  what  he  says  as  being  something  like  ‘the  introduction  of
probability into the laws of motion in kinetic theory leads to a time irreversibility in them,
and hence a view of time within thermodynamics that is irreversible and hence satisfies the
principle of contiguity’.
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As I have said, Born does not repeat this reasoning or indeed discuss the direction of time
elsewhere, instead discussing the ordering of causal relata. I think therefore, that we are
unable to come to any firm conclusion regarding precisely what he means here.
Born himself moves swiftly on to giving a formal derivation of that time asymmetry. He
starts by defining the entropy, S, as follows:
S=−k
∫ f log( f )dp dq
∫ f dp dq
Where  f  is a distribution function,  f1 in the kinetic theory of gases referring to a single
molecule and  fN  in statistical mechanics, where it refers to a distribution in 2-N phase
space.
For a gas we can use Boltzmann’s collision integral to show that:
dS
dt
⩾0
i.e., S, the entropy of the system, always increases. This irreversibility is not, Born argues,
in  contradiction  to  to  the  reversibility  of  mechanics.  This  is  because  the  distribution
function for colliding molecules satisfies:
δ f
δt
=[H , f ]+C
The  reversible  model  for  non-interacting  particles  does  not  contain  the  probabilistic
collision integral. Thus this irreversibility is ‘a consequence of the explicit introduction of
ignorance into the fundamental laws’ (Born 1949a 72).
Born notes that these ‘considerations’ hold for any system (1949a 72). He tells that if we
solve the entropy equation for a system of closed particles, we obtain  dS/dt = 0, i.e. for
such  a  closed  system,  entropy  is  constant.  This  irreversibility,  he  says,  ‘can  only  be
understood by exempting part of the system from causality.’ What does this abandonment
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of causality involve? It involves dropping the requirements that the system in question be
closed ‘or that the positions and velocities of all particles are under control’—i.e. fully
determined—by introducing a single particle not under control to the system. We then
obtain the result that entropy is either ‘constant or increasing’ (1949a 72).  It might seem a
little odd that Born describes this specifically as an abandonment of causality, rather than
of  determinism  or  the  epistemic  possibility  of  complete  information.  For  Born,
determinism and causality are not bound up—they are separate concepts—so it  cannot
simply be a matter of the system merely not being modelled deterministically.
 
But think back to Born’s definition of causality: ‘there are laws by which the occurrence of
an entity  B of a certain class depends on the occurrence of an entity A of another class’
(1949a 9). In what sense are we abandoning a nomological description of the system?
There is a sense in which allowing an open system leads not only to that system being
indeterministic, but also to it being anomalous. This is because one cannot give fully law-
like descriptions of open systems because of the possibility of intrusions from outside of
the system that cannot be accounted for by any internal description. Why do we say that
not all of the particles are ‘under control’ rather than merely saying that we cannot predict
their  positions?  Because  the  individual  particles  are  still  supposed  to  behave
deterministically and so in order to say that we cannot know their state, then we need to
exempt them from the nomological description of the system. As Born goes on to say later
in the book, we achieve irreversibility in kinetic theory via ‘a deliberate act of averaging, a
kind of fraud or falsification from the standpoint of determinism’ (1949a 110). The general
point to be made here is this: because classical mechanics is at its core supposed to be
deterministic,  the achievement  of  time asymmetry  via  the introduction of  probabilistic
methods must be the result of a kind of fudge.
Born  says  this:  ‘You  must  violate  mechanics  in  order  to  obtain  a  result  in  obvious
contradiction to it’ (Born 1949a p72). We violate by dropping the demand that the state of
each and every  particle  can  always be determined.  Born acknowledges  that  we might
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regard this simply as being necessary for the pragmatic reasons that we cannot actually
gain complete information about a system and that, even if we could, we would be unable
to perform the calculations necessary to determine the behaviour of the system. The world
would really be reversible and ‘thermodynamics only a trick for obtaining probable, not
certain,  results’ (Born  1949a  72-3).  Born  disagrees  with  this  position.  He  notes  that
although one might need to agree with it if one did believe that it was ‘in principle’ (1949a
73) possible to determine the position and velocity of all particles in a system, but he does
not  think  that  such  a  belief  could  actually  be  maintained.  Brownian  motion  sets  a
fundamental limit to the accuracy of our measuring equipment and so we would require ‘a
spirit who can do things we could not even do with infinitely improved technical means’
(Born 1949a 72). Further to this, he thinks that ‘the idea of a completely closed system is
almost fantastic’.
So we can see that the actual epistemic situation in which we find ourselves is important to
Born. The crucial point is this (and it is examined in much more detail in Chapter 5—Born
on Determinism): the actual epistemic situation that we find ourselves in is constrained by
the laws of nature. We have just seen that Born does not think that it is in fact in principle
possible to determine all of the positions and velocities of all of the particles in a system
due to Brownian motion and I think that we can take him at face value here. Statistical
mechanics, in treating the world statistically, was on the right track. Of course, if we insist
on maintaining determinism, then there must be some sort of trick or fudge going on here.
However and as we shall examine shortly, there is no need for such fudges in quantum
mechanics.
 3.2.3 Antecedence in Quantum Mechanics
Born  finishes  his  overview  of  antecedence  in  physics  with  a  discussion  of  quantum
mechanics  and,  in  particular,  the  statistical  interpretation  of  it.  Following  a  detailed
derivation, Born discusses the nature of an indeterministic physics. It should be noted that
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for  Born,  the theory  really  is  indeterministic—he disagrees  strongly with Einstein and
Planck, who argued otherwise (Born 1955 164). He is also happy with this notion, and
does  not  think  that  we  ought  to  concerned  by  it.  He  writes  ‘can  our  desire  of
understanding, our wish to explain things, be satisfied by a theory which is frankly and
shamelessly statistical and indeterministic? Can we be content with accepting chance, not
cause, as the supreme law of the physical world?’ (Born 1949a 101).
His answers to these questions are affirmative, and as follows: With regards to the second,
he argues that it  is not causation that has been thrown out by quantum mechanics, but
merely  determinism.  Relations  of  physical  dependence  still  exist  (which  is  how Born
defines causality), but those relations are not deterministic and hold between ‘probabilities
of elementary events, not those single events themselves’ (1949a 102). Determinism is
something that has, for historical reasons, been bound up with causation. It is not causation
itself (Born 1949a 102). On the notion of relations holding between probabilities of events,
there is more in Chapter 6 concerning Born’s views on probability. On the notion that
someday physics will return to determinism, Born says that although it would be foolish to
argue that this could never happen, it does not seem likely. He writes ‘scanning the history
of physics in the way we have done we see fluctuations and vacillations, but hardly a
reversion to a more primitive concept’ (Born 1949a p109). ‘Primitive’ here might simply
mean something like ‘prior’ or ‘old’ but it would certainly fit with the overall argument of
Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance if it means something like ‘less sophisticated’ or
‘less  comprehensive’.  The  narrative  that  Born  presents  is  one  of  physics  gradually
abandoning action-at-a-distance and determinism as it starts to respect the principles of
contiguity and antecedence. In this way, indeterministic and statistical physics, which has
not  only  led  us  to  more  accurate  theories  but  also  given  us  theories  that  respect
antecedence,  would  be  a  conceptual  advance  on  the  more  ‘primitive’  concept  of
determinism.  Born  also  cites  Von  Neumann’s  proof  that  a  hidden  variable  (i.e.
deterministic)  interpretation  could  not  reproduce  the  predictions  of  an  indeterministic
interpretation as further evidence that a return to determinism is unlikely (1949a 109). We
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should note here that it is of course the case that John Bell later showed Von Neumann’s
proof was fallacious (Bell 1964), although Born would not have been aware whilst writing
Natural Philosophy… in 1949. 
Born  acknowledges  that  the  behaviour  of  the  wave  function  violates  the  antecedence
principle—  ‘there  is  no  distinction  between  past  and  future  for  the  spreading  of  the
probability density’— although it does fulfil contiguity (1948 103). He suspects, though
that this is not the final state of the theory: ‘one has the feeling that these vestiges of
classical causality are provisional and will be replaced in a future theory by something
more satisfactory’ (1948 103).   He writes  that  ‘we have the  paradoxical  situation  that
observable events obey laws of chance, but that the probability for these events spreads
according to laws which are in all essential features of causal laws’ (1949a 103).
We do,  however,  find that  other  parts  of  quantum theory  respect  antecedence,  namely
quantum statistical mechanics, and that it does so in a more principled way than classical
statistical  mechanics.  Born  writes  of  the  classical  theory’s  reconciliation  of  the
indeterminism  of  the  behaviour  of  bulk  systems  with  the  supposedly  deterministic
behaviour of the individual components of those systems:
This was achieved by proclaiming a distinction between the true laws which are strictly
deterministic and reversible but of no use to us poor mortals with our restricted means
of observation and experimentation, and the apparent laws which are the result of our
ignorance and obtained by a deliberate act of averaging, a kind of fraud or falsification
from the standpoint of determinism (Born 1949a 110).
Why would this be a fraud? Born, as we have seen earlier does not really think that it is—
it’s simply the epistemic situation we find ourselves in and so we do not have good reason
to insist on determinism. If, however, one is a determinist, then the whole situation starts to
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look a little strange: We have an inconsistency between the description of the behaviour of
particles on a microscopic level as deterministic and time-symmetric, and the description
of macroscopic collections of those particles as indeterministic and time-irreversible. For
Born, if we are determinists then the irreversibility of the system, and indeed the law that
tells us that entropy always increases, seems to have purely epistemic origins—they come
directly from the fact that we don’t know everything about the system. 
However, we need have no such worries about quantum mechanics. It is already statistical
and uncertain. Born writes ‘Quantum theory can appear with a cleaner conscience. It has
no deterministic bias and is statistical throughout. It has accepted partial ignorance on a
lower level and need not doctor the final laws’ (1949a 110). There is no total information
regarding the system, and so there is no conflict between indeterminism on a macroscopic
level  and determinism on the  microscopic level.  Quantum kinetic  theory  is  thus  time-
irreversible on a fundamental level and thus properly respects the principle of antecedence.
 4 What is Born after?
In order to account for the status of Born’s principles we need to account for the following
aspects of them. Firstly, they have an origin that is pre-empirical, or at least predates the
systematic  investigation  of  nature.  Remember  that  Born  considers  his  definition  of
causation itself to be metaphysical (1949a 124). It’s attributes—contiguity and antecedence
—also seem to have some non-empirical origin. Before defining them, he tells us that it is
‘always assumed that cause precedes effect’ and that for something to cause an effect in an
area of space where it  is not located is considered ‘repugnant’ (i.e. nonsensical)  (Born
1949a 8).
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Secondly those attributes, at least in the present day, are not simply metaphysical in that
they are ‘consequences of the actual empirical laws’ (Born 1949a 124). What Born means
by this is presumably the following: modern physics, which gives us our most accurate
descriptions of nature gives a fully contiguous description of causal relations. In the same
manner, modern physics is fundamentally statistical, and statistical descriptions are time-
asymmetric (remember that although Born acknowledges that parts of quantum mechanics
are still deterministic, he doesn’t think that this situation will continue). Thus we can say
that nature as described by modern physics is contiguous and does ensure time-ordering of
causal relations. Hence we can say that the principles of contiguity and antecedence follow
from the empirical laws. Now, this seems to present an obvious problem—what about the
aspects  of  modern  physics  that  appear  to  not  only  fail  to  respect  these  principles  but
explicitly  violate  them? These  aspects  are  the  so  called  spooky-action-at-a-distance  in
quantum mechanics  and  the  manner  that  general  relativity  apparently  allows  for  time
travel. I will address this problem in a later section, but will hold off from answering it for
now beyond saying that there are reasons to think that this isn’t too much of a problem for
Born’s position.
Thirdly, it  is heavily implied that, in the form of Born’s principles, they have played a
guiding role in theory construction and selection in physics by encouraging scientists to
seek out explanations that respect them—he writes that ‘although I maintain that neither
causality  itself  nor  its  attributes,  which  I  call  contiguity  and  antecedence,  are
metaphysical...there is no doubt that these ideas have a strong power over the human mind,
and we have  evidence  enough that  they  have  influenced the  development  of  classical
physics. Much effort has been made to reconcile Newton’s laws with these postulates’
(Born 1949a 17).
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 4.1 Principles in Physics: A Zoo
What I want to do in this section is to explore exactly what sort of things Born’s principles
are. Suppose that Born is in fact correct about his principles (I note that I am not in fact
arguing that he he is). What would their epistemic and metaphysical status be and what
their relationship to physics? In this section I aim to describe a zoo of potential options for
principles in physics—what sort of metaphysical and empirical status they could have and
what sort of guiding role (if any) they could play in the development of physics. I will also
set out what would distinguish them from one another—what sort of characteristics would
mark out a set of principles as belonging to some particular metaphysical and heuristic
class.
The options that I want to discuss are as follows  - Kantian analogies of experience or laws
derived  directly  from  them,  purely  psychological  a  priori  principles,  influential  but
inconclusively  confirmable  metaphysical  systems,  heuristics  with  deep  metaphysical
backing, empirically discoverable physical laws, and pragmatist ontological principles.
I also want to note that there are at least two sorts of role that Born’s principle might play.
1) They can serve as principles that define what it is for a relation to be a causal relation. 2)
They serve a role in the development of the sciences. It might well be the case that these
two are explained by different options. It should not be assumed at the outset that Born’s
treatment of his principles is completely coherent—these two roles might well come apart
 4.1.1 Kantian Synthetic A Priori Principles
One possibility for the status of Born’s principles is that they are meant to play the same
role as Kant’s analogies of experience or are rules derived from them—in either case they
are a priori and necessary. We can examine how this might work by looking first at the
Critique of Pure Reason and in particular the Analogies of Experience. Kant writes: ‘The
general principle of the analogies is this: All appearances are, as regards their existence,
subject a priori to rules determining their relation to one another in time’ (Kant 1982 208).
103
The second analogy is described as the ‘Principle of Succession in Time, in accordance
with the Law of Causality’ (Kant 1982 218) and it is this that is of particular relevance to
the  discussion  of  Born.  Kant  writes  that  we  when  we  perceive  two  appearances  as
following one another, we are connecting two perceptions in time via a synthetic faculty of
imagination. Imagination could place two such states in one of two orders, with either state
coming first or second. There is, therefore, no empirical way to determine their objective
relation in time—we are only aware that such imaginative faculties place one perception
prior to the other and not that one state  really  precedes the other. In order to have some
determine ordering in time, there must be some necessary connection between two such
states  such that  one  must  precede  the  other.  Thus,  Kant  argues,  we must  appeal  to  a
concept drawn from understanding, not from perception: the relation of cause and effect
(Kant 1982 219). 
Kant goes on to argue that it is only possible to experience an event via the assumption of
necessary ordering of its parts—otherwise we would merely experience a succession of
appearances. As this assumption is part of the grounds of experience itself it is therefore a
priori.  We do not need Newtonian absolute time to order events temporally in a Kantian
framework. Indeed, such an explanation is rejected. Kant writes ‘For time is not viewed as
that  wherein  experience  immediately  determines  position  for  every  existence.  Such
determination is not possible inasmuch as absolute time is not an object of perception with
which appearances could be confronted’ (Kant 1982 236).
If Born’s rules of Contiguity and Antecedence are synthetic a priori, how would we expect
Born’s overview of these principles in the history of science to go? Well we would, as
above, expect a rejection of Newtonian Absolute Space and Time as an explanation for the
ordering of events (spatially or temporally). These concepts cannot explain such ordering
and they are not needed to do so—the analogues of experience do so. Furthermore, we
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wouldn’t need any physical concepts of time and space to explain such ordering and would
reject such explanations as belonging to the noumenal. Additionally, such principles would
not be compatible with any physical theory that postulated non-contiguous action-at-a-
distance  or  anti-antecedent  causal  ordering  in  time—these  theories  would  be  simply
unintelligible. If Born’s principles are meant to have Kantian status in physics then we
could not, for example, have a good theory that did not respect them. 
There are two options here for Born’s principles. They might themselves be synthetic a
priori principles, without which we would be unable to reason physically, or they might be
deducible from the synthetic a priori in the manner that Kant thinks Newton’s laws of
motion are. I think that it is quite clear that Born’s principles are not synthetic a priori. This
is apparent from his treatment of Newtonian mechanics. Born’s criticisms of Newton are
that  gravitational  forces  act  non-contiguously  and  that  the  description  of  time  in  the
scholium doesn’t make the formalism of the theory time-asymmetric. As we’ve seen, this
doesn’t indicate that he thinks Newtonian physics to be poor science or nonsensical. If
contiguity and antecedence were Kantian principles, then this could not be the case—any
theory  that  did  not  respect  them  would  simply  be  nonsensical.  Born  does  reject  the
Newtonian  solution  to  temporal  ordering,  but  he  does  not  do  so  because  a  priori
considerations do the job instead. His reason seems to be that, as far as the description of
connections  between events  go,  Newton’s  solution  is  something like  an idle  wheel.  It
should  also  be  pointed  out  that  they  are  not  entirely  a  priori  principles  in  any  case.
Although in his introduction Born seems to indicate something like a common sense basis
for the principles, which might be taken as an a priori justification of sorts, he concludes
that ‘all specifications of this dependence [causal] in regard to space and time (contiguity,
antecedence) … seem to me not fundamental, but consequences of the actual empirical
laws’ (1949a 124). This is again unlike Kant—Born argues that the principles follow from
the actual, empirical laws of physics, not from a priori rules. It might of course be the case
that we have managed to derive a priori rules from an examination of nature—i.e. that they
stand alone once we have found them, although the route we have followed to find them is
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empirical—but there does not seem to be anything in Born’s writings to indicate that he
thinks that this is the case.
We might also remind ourselves that Born does not consider himself to be a Kantian. In his
autobiography (of which this part was written in the 1940s) he writes ‘Kant’s teaching has
a great attraction for one who is inclined towards rationalism...But it did not work for me.
However, it was a slow process which made me acknowledge this failure and led me to a
standpoint which might be classified as a kind of empiricism’ (Born 1978 93).
So  we  have  three  good  reasons  to  say  that  the  Born’s  principles  of  contiguity  and
antecedence are not synthetic a priori. Firstly, they don’t regulate theories in the same way:
Born thinks that theories can be intelligible and useful without respecting his principles.
Secondly,  Born’s  principles  are  at  least  partially  empirical  in  nature.  Thirdly,  Born
explicitly rejects Kantian philosophy in favour of an empiricist position.
 4.1.2 Chang's Ontological Principles
In  two  papers,  Taking  Realism  Beyond  Foot-Stamping (Chang  2001)  and  Ontological
Principles and the Intelligibility of Epistemic Activities (Chang 2009b), Chang describes
what he terms ‘Ontological Principles’ at play in science. He illustrates these via way of
some historical examples, the primary one being Leibniz’s rejection of Descartes’ laws of
collision. Chang quotes Descartes’ second rule of motion:
If [some body] B were somewhat larger than [some body] C, and if
they met each other at the same speed, then C would be the only one
to rebound in the direction from which it came, and henceforth they
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would continue their movement in the same direction; B having more
force than C, the former would not be forced to rebound by the latter
(Descartes 1644/1988 10-11)
Leibniz rejected this rule, considering the limiting case in which the size of B approaches
C,  finally  becoming  identical  with  it.  In  this  circumstance,  as  B’s  mass  decreases  it
continues to move in the same trajectory and at the same speed its mass becomes identical
with  C’s.  Exactly  at  this  point  it  rebounds.  Leibniz  argues  that  this  case  violates  the
principle of continuity—a continuous change (the size of the ball) leads to a discontinuous
one (the direction of motion after collision when the sizes of the balls becomes the same).
The point here that Chang wishes to make is this: Leibniz rejects this law not on empirical
grounds  (although  its  falsity  can  easily  be  demonstrated  by  experiment),  but  on
metaphysical ones. For Leibniz, a theory that violated the law of continuity was simply
nonsensical and to be rejected as such. Chang argues that this is an example of ‘an eminent
philosopher-scientist  using  the  lack of  intelligibility  as  a  cogent  reason for  rejecting  a
major piece of theory’ (Chang 2009b 66).
Now, this example is not meant to be a proper example of an ontological principle. Chang
rather regards the example of Leibniz as a ‘ladder to be kicked away’ - something that
helps to get up somewhere, but not needed once you’ve climbed onto something else (2001
8). He argues that principle of continuity is not really an ontological principle; rather it is
an ontological opinion. This is because its denial is, contra Leibniz, intelligible (2009b 68).
Indeed, in the face of modern physics, it  seems to be false—think of the photoelectric
effect where a continuous change in frequency leads to a discontinuous change in photon
emission or any continuous mathematical function with a maximum and a minimum. It
might be a strange world in which the principle of continuity is not in play, but it is not a
nonsensical one. Indeed as Chang points out, the world of quantum mechanics might well
be one in which the principle of continuity is not fulfilled. Intelligibility in many cases
seems to  be  contingent  on  the  prevailing  thoughts  of  the  day.  Think,  Chang  says,  of
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Einstein’s denial of non-deterministic quantum mechanics or those adherents to Cartesian
mechanics who insisted that the action at a distance in Newtonian mechanics made that
theory unintelligible (2009b 67).
So if the principle of continuity is not an example of a genuine ontological principle, then
what would count as one? Chang argues that one such a genuine principle might be what
he terms the principle of single value, that a physical quantity can have no more than one
value in a given instance (2009b 68).  Why might this have the status of a principle rather
than an opinion? It does not seem to be an epistemic generalization—we cannot go round
checking its truth. Indeed, Chang notes, a report of a counterexample would simply seem
nonsensical. Nor is it a logical truth—he notes that we can conceive of things that have
several  values  such  as  the  names  of  persons  and  the  multivalued  functions  found  in
mathematics (n.b. multivalued functions are not technically functions) (2009b 69).
We might think that it is odd that it is not a logical truth, after all if x = 2 and x = 5, then 2
= 5, which is a falsehood. However, in order for this to be a logical falsehood, we must
first assume that it  is false that 2 = 5. We must make this assumption because there is
nothing in the rules or structures of first-order logic that tells us that two numbers cannot
be identical to one another. We might know that ‘2 = 5’ is false, but logic does not, and we
only know that it is false because of the semantic content external to logic that is attached
to Arabic numerical symbols. Arithmetic is a stronger system than first-order logic. If we
want  to  make 2  = 5 a  logical  falsehood,  then  first-order  logic  must  be  enriched with
something like Peano arithmetic.  After all, there are plenty arguments of similar structure
would  not  generate  a  falsehood.  Think of  the  following:  Clark  Kent  = Superman and
Superman = Kal El. Hence Clark Kent = Kal El. This is not a falsehood. The point is this:
we must  assume that temperatures are things like real numbers which can only take a
single value, and are not things like names, which can take multiple values, i.e., we must
assume  the  principle  of  single  value. We  might  also  point  out  that,  because  of  the
imprecision  of  natural  language,  translation  from  it  into  a  formal  language  is  often
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something of an art. In this sense, I do not think that it is unambiguously clear that that to
say that some object has temperature A at time T and also has temperature B at time T
implies that A = B. After all, if we were to say that Robin has a triagonal planar molecule
at time T and also that Robin has an Octahedral molecule at time T, we would not take this
to imply that a triagonal planar-shaped molecule = an Octahedral molecule.
On the other hand, we might feel that the principle is in some way necessary.  The closest
thing to this might be the nature of Kantian synthetic a priori principles, although Chang
maintains that they are distinct from those of the ontological variety (2009b 69). For one
thing,  there  are  exceptions  to  the  principle  of  single  value  (names  and  multivalued
functions). There cannot be such exceptions to universal principles.
So where does this necessity come from? From the requirements of testing, says Chang.
Ontological  principles  are  paired  with  particular  epistemic  activities:  without  the
assumption  of  a  particular  ontological  principle,  certain  epistemic  activities  cannot  be
performed (2009b 69). If we wish to test, say, a prediction that a liquid will be at a certain
temperature at a certain time then, without the principle of single value, it would not be
possible for any experiment to refute our theory. If we predict that the liquid will be 15 o C
and measure it to be 20oC, then without this principle we must accept the possibility that
the temperature is both 20oC and 15oC. It is only the principle of single value that excludes
such a result.
There is, Chang says, a connection between ontological principles and epistemic activities
—for a type of epistemic activity (in the above example, testing by overdetermination)
there is a corresponding ontological principle (the principle of single value). Chang gives a
list of further examples, which I will not go into here (2009b 71). But the point is this—an
ontological principle is necessary because without it the epistemic activity paired with it
cannot be performed.
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So how are Born’s principles similar to Chang’s and how are they different? They are
similar in that they are both at least partially non-empirical—neither Born’s nor Chang’s
principles can be tested in any simple way, although of course Born does think that his
principles have at least some empirical status. They are also both logically contingent (i.e.
violations  are  not  logical  falsehoods)—non-contiguous  or  non-attendance  relations  are
logically  possible.  They  differ  in  that  Chang’s  principles  are  presupposed  by  certain
epistemic activities, for example the principle of single values by measurement, whereas
Born’s are not. We can see this from Born’s treatment of Newtonian mechanics. Assuming
a principle giving direction in time is not enough to fulfil the principle of antecedence. For
a theory to respect Born’s principles, it is the working parts of a theory that must guarantee
that  there  is  no  violation—simply  assuming  some  ad  hoc  addition  or  metaphysical
background principle is not enough to fulfil the requirements of contiguity or antecedence.
This is crucial to understanding Born—it is and can only be the working parts and formal
structure of a theory that can fulfil  his principles. However, violations do not render a
theory unintelligible—despite  the fact  that  Newton’s  laws violates  his  principles,  Born
does not think that they are unintelligible. Rather they are an important and useful part of
science.
The question then arises: why respect the principles at all? There is a clear historical thesis
in Born’s work—that theories which respect his principles are more accurate and that they
are more accurate for the same reason that they respect the principles. Born argues that
Continuum mechanics  provides  a  more  accurate  model  of  the  behaviour  of  solids  by
treating them as contiguous bodies. By treating the behaviour of particles as fundamentally
non-deterministic,  quantum  kinetic  theory  provides  more  accurate  treatment  of  their
behaviour and makes the theory properly antecedent.
Here is where I part ways with Chang, and come back to Born. As I have said, I do not
think  that  Born’s  principles  of  causation  meet  the  standards  for  Changian  ontological
110
principles—for one thing it is hard to see what  necessary connection they have with a
particular epistemic practice. But, as I have also said, I do think that Chang’s work might
help us understand what Born’s principles are supposed to do. It goes something like this:
Born’s principles make causation intelligible.  They are necessary for identifying causal
relations between events.  If  violations  of them are allowed by a theory,  then it  is  not
possible to use that theory to search for causes, something that for Born is the ultimate goal
of  physics.  It  is  not  possible  to  use  such theories  to  search  for  causes  because  if  the
principles are violated then it is not possible to distinguish between cause and effect. We
can still find correlations and maybe even relations, but not ones that are understandable as
being causal. A theory that allows such violations may well be a good theory, and may well
be intelligible. Newtonian physics, despite the action-at-a-distance that violates contiguity
and despite the time-symmetric character of the equations which describe the motion of
bodies, is not unintelligible. We can understand perfectly well what bodies are supposed to
do and indeed we can test this. What is unintelligible, at least for Born, is the notion of
causation in such a system. We can perfectly happily provide descriptions of the behaviour
of such systems. What we cannot do is provide causal explanations of such behaviour.
 4.1.3 Meyerson’s Principles of Identity (via way of Eli Zahar)
Ellie Zahar, in Einstein’s Revolution: A Study in Heuristic (1989), argues that the principles
of  identity  of  philosopher  (and  chemist)  Emil  Meyerson  (1859-1933)  can  be  used  to
explain the roles that both mathematics and various metaphysical principles have played in
the development of physics.
Meyerson claims that our attempts to explain the world all originate in an inherent mental
tendency to deny the diversity and divisibility of the world; we wish to categorise diverse
and different entities and phenomena as being the same. It is a priori, being an inherent
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mental tendency, although, as Zahar notes (1989 41), which particular parts of reality are
explicable via the principle can only be determined a posteriori.
The principle gives rise to two types of explanation—legal and causal. When we explain
events legally, we explain in them in terms of laws that apply universally, regardless of
when  and  where  some  they  take  place.  Zahar  uses  the  example  of  gravitation—the
movement of  the moon,  the falling of  a  stone and the passenger  thrown forward in  a
decelerating vehicle  are  all  instantiations  of  the same law (Zahar  1989 41).  Meyerson
argues that there is evolutionary benefit to possessing an a priori inclination to explain in
such a way—it allows us to predict future events (Zahar 1989 41).
The causal principle explains in terms of conservation of substance over time—there are
certain sorts  of things whose total  quantity does not  change over  time. It  is  from this
principle that Meyerson thinks conservation laws arise. The mind, he says, hypostasizes
certain  processes  by  imbuing  them  them  with  substance,  the  total  quantity  of  which
remains constant over time. From here we get principles such as the conservation of mass.
Meyerson also thinks that we can explain conservation of momentum in a similar way—by
multiplying velocity with mass to define inertia, Descartes turned a ratio into something
more concrete—a thing whose total quantity persists over time.
Zahar  argues  that  we  can  also  understand  the  geometrisation  of  nature  in  relativistic
physics via this principle (1989 43). The attempts by physicists to construct a geometry
that underlies all physical phenomena is an attempt to dissolve the diversity of phenomena,
to reduce the number of primitives that are needed to explain them and to render the world
more homogeneous. Einstein, for example explained both gravitation and inertia in the
same geometric terms.  Zahar notes that we can read general relativity’s field equation:
 Rmn−1/2gmnR=−kTmn
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in two ways. Left to right, it tells us that energy defines geometry. It can, however,  also be
read from right to left as saying the geometry of space defines its energy content. Einstein,
Zahar argues, preferred the latter interpretation—that geometry defines energy.
So what would Born’s principles of causation look like if they were to play a similar role
to Meyerson’s? Firstly they would be a priori and so not discoverable, but always in place.
We would have to have some kind of innate psychological tendency to search for causal
explanations  of  a  certain  kind—those  in  which  cause  and  effect  are  contiguous  and
temporally  ordered.  We would not  be  forced  to  explain  all  relations  in  such a  way—
Meyerson’s principles are purely mental, after all, and so the world may simply not match
up to them in a way which makes such a project possible. In fact the search would be for
the  respects in which nature respects  contiguity and antecedence.  We would,  however,
attempt this search as we develop new tools which might make such explanations possible.
I  don’t  think  that  Born’s  principles  really  operate  in  these  terms.  There’s  nothing  to
indicate that antecedence and contiguity are rooted in inherent psychological traits. Given
that (as already mentioned) Born intends that the principles have some kind of empirical
status, even if he thinks that they have their origin in some psychological tendency, they
would not  be fully  captured by that  status.  This  is  not  to  say that  there are  not  some
similarities  in  the  way  that  Meyerson’s  and  Born’s  principles  operate—neither  are
necessary in any way and both seem to guide theory choice—but what similar aspects they
have do not seem to be those that are at the core of Meyerson’s project.
 4.1.4 Influential Metaphysics
In his 1958 paper,  Confirmable and Influential Metaphysics, J.W.N. Watkins describes a
conception of metaphysics called which provides an explanation of how some particular
system of metaphysics might have some influence on science (in a manner differentiable
113
from some other  system of  metaphysics)  with  respect  to  such  aspects  of  a  theory  as
methodology, theory construction and theory choice.
Consider, Watkins says, a belief that a castle is haunted. Such a belief is confirmable—
perhaps by distant howls or the clanking of chains—although perhaps never conclusively
so. We should note that this is a very weak notion of confirmation—it simply consists in
the observing of events that are consistent with the belief. It is not, however, refutable.
There  is  no  amount  of  empirical  investigation  that  could  disconfirm  the  presence  of
otherworldly spirits in the castle. We might compare this with Popper’s characterisation of
Freudian and Adlerian psychoanalysis in Conjectures and Refutations  (1962)—everything
that happens in the castle is compatible with the belief that it is haunted and nothing will
disconfirm that belief. Belief in hauntings will also have an impact upon one’s scientific
methodology,  affecting  what  types  of  explanations  are  sought  for  certain  phenomena.
Lastly,  Watkins  notes,  such  beliefs  will  also  affect  one’s  actions—one  might  not  stay
overnight in the castle, or might always carry a flask of holy water whilst there.
Such metaphysical systems—those which are (inconclusively) confirmable, irrefutable and
influential—are  what  Watkins  refers  to  as  Haunted  Universe  Doctrines.  Watkins
alternatively categorises these as all and some doctrines—that is to say, they contain both
universal  and  existential  quantifiers.  These  are  statements  of  the  type
Ɐx y(P(x)→(Q(y) R(x, y)): “∃ ∧ for all things of a certain kind, there exists some thing that
will have a particular effect on them”. Such statements are not conclusively verifiable—the
universal quantification makes that impossible, barring an infinite number of observations.
Moreover there are no empirical tests  that can rule out the existence of the individual
whose  existence  the  statement  implies.  So  such  statements  are  both  unfalsifiable  and
unverifiable (conclusively, at least).
Watkins  offers  a  four-level  categorisation  of  statements  by  their  level  of  ‘empirical
decidability’ (Watkins 1958 345). Level one-statements are of the kind ‘there exists some
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object in some time and some place. These statements are both falsifiable and verifiable.
Level  two-statements  are  universal  statements  of  the  kind  Ɐx(P(x)→Q(x)):‘all  metals
expand if heated’ (Watkins 1958 345), for example. These statements are falsifiable but not
verifiable.  Level  three-statements  are  of  the  kind  ∃x(P(x)∧Q(x))—‘there  exists  some
metal  which  expands  when  heated’.  Such  statements  are  verifiable  but  not  falsifiable.
Level four statements are Watkins’ ‘haunted universe doctrines’.
Watkins  gives  a  number  of  examples  of  such  level  four-statements:  determinism,
mechanism,  a-priori  conservation  doctrines,  field  theories  and  metaphysical  ideas
connected  with  psychology.  Whilst  such  doctrines  are  not  empirical  (being  neither
falsifiable not confirmable, except in a loose sense), Watkins argues that they can perform
a regulative role in scientific thinking and methodology.  This, he says, is evident from the
historical record—metaphysical doctrines regarding conservation laws, determinism, and
the simplicity of nature have played influential roles in the development of new scientific
theories.
One could, Watkins says, argue that such doctrines are not really descriptions of the world.
Rather, insofar as they have some effect upon the functioning of science, they are merely
methodological prescriptions disguised as descriptions (Watkins 1958 355). In this manner,
Watkins says, the metaphysical doctrine of determinism would really be something like an
instruction  to  always  search  for  natural  laws,  rather  than  the  thesis  that  the  world  is
fundamentally and completely governed by such laws. Although this might be an accurate
description of the way in which haunted universe doctrines have an affect upon scientific
methodology, Watkins does not think that they can be completely characterised in this way.
There  is,  he  says,  a  logical  gap  between  the  two—it  is  quite  possible  to  follow  a
methodological prescription but reject the truth of the metaphysical doctrine behind it.
If Born’s principles of causation were to be haunted universe doctrines then how would
they work? The metaphysical doctrine in question would be something like “for any event
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(or whatever) B that depends upon event A there exists some contiguous, time-ordered
process linking them”. Such a belief would be weakly confirmable and unfalsifiable.  It’s
certainly unfalsifiable. Indeed, Born does not seem to consider the existence of Newtonian
mechanics—a successful theory that does not respect his principles—to be a falsifying
instance  of  contiguity and antecedence.  It’s  presumed that  there does  exist  some such
contiguous process which will be found at a later date. We can see this fairly explicitly
when in Born’s discussion of quantum mechanics when he tells us that he suspects that
some time-asymmetric  theory  will  replace  time-symmetric  wavefunctions  (1949a 103).
Whilst it might well be the case that any confirmation of these principles is of the weak
variety, I suspect that Born intends their ‘empirical’ nature to be a little stronger.
Watkins’ notion  of  confirmability  is  extremely  weak,  being  as  it  is  of  the  Popperian
variety:  all  that  confirmation  really  means  is  something  like  “consistent  with”  or
“explainable in terms of in some ad hoc manner”. Remember, Watkins talks of the haunted
castle theory being confirmed by the clanking of chains in the night, and refers to the
Freudian who produces much confirming evidence for his wish-fulfilment theory of action
(Watkins 1958 354). Furthermore, although Watkins recognises that such principles can
play some role in the development of theories (maybe even a positive one), he does not
think that they are part of science. For Watkins, they exist in a ‘no man’s land’ that lies
between analytic  and empirical  statements  (1959 359).  He doesn’t  think  that  even the
entailment of such principles by physical laws implies any kind of ‘high probability’ that
they are true (1959 364). This doesn’t seem quite consistent with Born’s intentions. Born
wants to say that in the final accounting of modern physics (or at least 1940s physics) the
principles of contiguity and antecedence ‘follow from’ the empirical laws.
 I think that Born would not regard theories which are confirmed only in the loose sense
that Watkins means as being theories that ‘follow from the empirical laws’. Firstly, as we
can see from Born’s rejection of the causal character of Newton’s mechanics, ‘consistent
with’ is not enough. Born rejects the idea that Newtonian physics respects antecedence via
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absolute time because absolute time does not do any work in the theory—it is entirely
separable  from its  dynamics  and  empirical  content.  The point  is  that  absolute  time  is
empirically  irrelevant  to  the  theory—think  of  the  earlier  discussion  of  van  Fraassen’s
(1980) treatment of absolute space—and so Born does not regard it as confirmed by the
theory’s success. We might say that, on the model of confirmability that Watkins uses,
absolute space and time are confirmed by the success of the theory. It’s trivially true that
Newtonian mechanics is consistent with the temporal ordering of causal relata. We must
remember,  though,   that  Born  does  not think  that  Newtonian  mechanics  respects
antecedence,  and  we  can  reasonably  claim  that  he  clearly  does  not  think  that  mere
consistency acts as confirmation. I also think that ‘follows from’ is indicative of something
stronger  that  than  Popperian  confirmability—by this,  Born  means  that  the  theories  of
modern  physics,  which  are  themselves  confirmed to  high degree  (remember,  Born’s  a
realist, as will be discussed in Chapter Four) are in fact contiguous and (at least to some
extent) time ordered.
Still, Born’s principles do seem to be intended to influence physics in a similar  manner  to
Watkins’ doctrines—they give an impetus to search for certain kinds of explanation, in this
case, causal theories that are contiguous and give time-asymmetric descriptions of events.
 4.1.5 Zahar on Metaphysical Principles and Heuristic Superiority
In  his  paper  Why  did  Einstein’s  Programme  Supersede  Lorentz’s?,  Elie  Zahar  (1973)
argues that it was not the case that Einstein’s theory was accepted because Lorentz’s theory
was refuted, nor because Lorentz’s theory was ad hoc and Einstein’s was not. Rather, the
success of Einstein’s programme over Lorentz’s was due to several heuristics employed by
Einstein which led to his research programme being more fruitful.  This has some relation
to  Lakatos’s concept of negative and positive heuristics within research programmes. A
negative heuristic is what directs solutions to problems for the programme away from its
117
hard  core.  Positive  heuristics  guide  theory  production  in  the  research  programme
(Musgrave  and  Pigden  2016).  Zahar  further  argues  that  the  heuristics  employed  by
Einstein  were  both  metaphysically  and  methodologically  heavyweight;  that  is  they
correspond to beliefs that Einstein held about how the world really is and they played an
active role  in  the development  of  the theory of  relativity  (1973 224).  Unlike Chang’s
ontological  principles,  they are not assumed simply for reasons of pragmatism. In this
section  I  will  discuss  Zahar’s  views  on  Einstein’s  heuristics  and  on  the  place  of
metaphysics within science in general, and will then go on to compare and contrast them
with Born’s views on the role that causal principles play in science.
Einstein’s two heuristics are given by Zahar as follows: ‘(I) Theories have to fulfil the so-
called  internal  requirements  of  coherence.  Science  should  present  us  with  a  coherent,
unified, harmonious, simple, organically compact picture of the world.’ (Zahar 1973 224).
This  functions  both  as  metaphysical  principle  and  as  a  heuristic  device  for  theory
construction. Why? Because it tells us that simple theories are to be preferred to complex
ones and that simple theories are preferable because the world itself is simple. As Zahar
puts it ‘ Simplicity or coherence…are an index of verisimilitude’ (1973 224).
The  second  heuristic  is:  (II)  There  are  no  accidents  in  nature  and  hence  observed
symmetries  should  be  taken  to  reflect  real  symmetries  in  nature.  This  generates  the
heuristic  rule:  ‘replace  any  theory  which  does  not  explain  symmetrical  observational
situations as the manifestations of deeper symmetries—whether or not descriptions of all
known facts can be deduced from the theory.’ (Zahar 1973 225). What does this mean? It
means  that  a  good  theory  should  unify  the  explanation  of  observationally  identical
phenomena. We expect good theories to do this because we expect that such symmetries
are not coincidental—they reflect the ordering of the world. Zahar uses the example of the
treatment  of  gravitational  and inertial  mass  to  illustrate  this.  In  Newtonian  mechanics
inertial and gravitational mass, despite being empirically indistinguishable, are different
properties,  respectively  representing  a  body’s  resistance  to  acceleration  and  its
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susceptibility to a gravitational field.  No explanation, unifying or otherwise, is provided
by the theory for why these two sorts of mass should be identical for any given body.
Einstein’s theory of relativity, by contrast, treats all mass as inertial mass thus providing a
unified explanation of the observed symmetry (Zahar 1973 227).
Zahar goes on to argue that unification and simplicity principles played an essential role in
the development of the theory of relativity. For one thing, Zahar thinks, these principles
underpinned Einstein’s decision to extend the special theory of relativity to both mechanics
and electrodynamics. They contributed essentially to the heuristics which lead the theory
to become more fruitful than Lorentz’s ether theory and which attracted scientists such as
Planck to the programme.
The point that I wish to take from Zahar’s work is that methodologically useful heuristics
can  arise  from  metaphysical  beliefs.  These  beliefs  are  not  like  Chang’s  Ontological
Principles—they are not simply assumed out of necessity and held primarily for reasons of
pragmatism. Nor are they ‘disposable methodological instruments’ (Zahar 2007 227)—
mere fads which change with the passing seasons and reasons for use.
We should also note that Zahar does regard metaphysical principles in science as being
confirmable  in  some  sense  (2007  141).  Zahar  uses  a  Lakatosian  model  of  scientific
theories.  For  him,  such principles  form part  of  the  hard  core  of  a  particular  research
program and  can  be  confirmed  (in  an  indirect  way)  by  the  empirical  success  of  that
program. In this way, such principles have an identifiable role within science, something
that Zahar thinks that Popperian models fail to properly account for (2007 141-2). 
Again, Born’s principles bear at least some similarity to what Zahar describes here. Given
their apparent common-sense basis, we might see them as starting out as as (something
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like) metaphysical principles before developing into heuristics that Born at  least thinks
have a positive effect on theory production. In Born’s case the metaphysical beliefs that we
start out with would be that a) Causal relations exist as timeless laws of dependence; b)
cause must be prior to or simultaneous with effect; c) cause and effect must be spatially
connected or connected by intermediate chains of causes. This generates the following
heuristics  1)  Physics  should  search  for  causal  relations;  2)  Physics  should  search  for
descriptions  of  those  relations  that  are  time-asymmetric;  3)  Physics  should  search  for
descriptions of those relations that involve spatial connection between the relata. The main
difference  between  this  and  Watkins’ account  is  that  Zahar  doesn’t  suggest  that  the
metaphysical beliefs that generate the heuristics are confirmable in the way that Watkins
does. I do think that the process that heuristics are arrived at in Zahar’s account resembles
Born’s process. We start with what is explicitly a metaphysical belief that causation exists
(Born 1949a 124) and what are at least non-empirical beliefs about how causation applies
to individual cases (Born 1949a 8-9) and these lead us to search for causal explanations of
a particular type. Eventually, via the success of theories that respect those principles, we
find  some  measure  of  confirmation  for  them.  For  this  reason  in  particular,  Born’s
principles align more closely with Zahar’s account that Watkin’s. Watkins, being a good
Popperian,  has  little  truck  with  confirmability.  Zahar’s  Lakatosian  account  allows
confirmation of metaphysical principles that are part of the hard core to follow from the
empirical success of the overall program. 
 4.2 What is the Status of the Principles?
Of the above options, I think that Zahar’s framework most closely matches what Born
intends for his principles. I think that they are clearly not Kantian or pragmatic a priori
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principles.  I  think  that  it’s  not  entirely  clear  whether  or  not  the  principles  have  a
psychological or metaphysical origin. However, given that Born does discuss psychology
in terms of gestalts in Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance (1949a 209) but does not
connect this with causation (the discussion is about invariants of observation, of which
there is a detailed discussion in Chapter 4), I don’t think that we ought to infer that he
thinks his principles have a psychological origin in the way that Meyerson’s do. We might
simply say that they originate as non-empirical beliefs and leave it at that. So I think we
ought  not  to  regard  them as  Meyersonian  principles  either,  even  in  just  their  origin.
Although Born’s principles are not Changian, we might find that the notion of a principle
of intelligibility accounts for their non-empirical origin in that they account for what sorts
of relations are intelligible as being causal relations.
We might worry that Zahar’s position is not all that distinguishable from Watkins’, or is
perhaps simply a subcategory of it. Formally speaking, this would be correct – Zaharian
metaphysical principles are just as unfalsifiable as Watkinsonian ones and they seem to
have the same formal structure – for any observable symmetry, there will exist a unifying
explanation,  for  example.  It’s  clear  that  Born’s  principles  of  causation  are  not
straightforwardly empirical. Although he calls them ‘empirical’ in that he takes them to
follow from physical laws, it  is  clear that there is  some inductive leap to metaphysics
required,  just as the move from a regularity to law of nature does.  Are they not then
examples of Watkins’ level four principles, a causal rather that haunted universe doctrine?
I think that we can convincingly argue for a distinction in terms of confirmability and in
the role that such principles or doctrines might play in science. Watkins’ takes them to be
unfalsifiable and thus, as a good Popperian, not part of science – they fall into a ‘no man’s
land’ between the realms of the analytic and the empirical (Watkins 1958 359). We should
note again here how weak Watkins’ notion of ‘confirmable’ is  - as a Popperian he does not
believe  that  anything can  be confirmed in  any manner  beyond mere  consistency with
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observations.  Again,  think  of  Popper’s  example  in  Conjectures  and Refutations  of  the
psychoanalyst. 
Watkins happily grants that such principles can be useful but that use does not extend to
them being part of science. Neither does their entailment by scientific theories even grant
the ‘high probability’ that they are true (and presumably along with it  some epistemic
warrant  for  believing  in  them)  (1958  364).  Watkins  does  not  think  that  they  are
meaningless or that scientists should be banned from talking of them, but he only grants
this for pragmatic considerations, i.e. they have utility for theory production but they do
not tell us about the world.  Watkins worries that different theories may have incompatible
metaphysical principles. He also argues that although such principles do have utility in
challenging orthodox positions, it’s really only when they they challenge the orthodox that
they play a useful role (1958 365). They are a useful tool for theory generation and for
challenging orthodox positions, but they are not in any way confirmable and they are not
part of science. This seems to be precisely at odds with what Born thinks the contemporary
status of his principles is. 
Hendry (forthcoming 2018) contrasts this position with that of Lakatos and Zahar. For
them, metaphysical principles are a proper part of scientific theories, forming part of the
hard core of a research program (Zahar 2007 138). Not only do metaphysical principles
inspire  research  programmes  and  influence  their  development  but  the  success  of  the
empirical  (i.e.  falsifiable)  components  of  those  research  programmes  also  acts  as
confirmation  of  their  metaphysical  components.  Zahar  writes  ‘the  sustained  empirical
success of an RP [research program] can legitimately be claimed to lend some support – if
only an indirect one – to its hard core’ (2007 141). Both Watkins and Zahar recognise that
metaphysical principles have an influence on science. They differ on whether or not those
principles  are  a  proper  part  of  theories  and  whether  or  not  they  are  confirmable.  For
Watkins they are neither a proper part of science nor confirmable in any way beyond the
trivial. For Zahar they are. So we can see that Zahar’s position is much more in line with
Born’s.  For  Born,  not  only  did  his  principles  of  causation  inspire  and  guide  theory
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production,  but  the  success  of  the  contemporary  theories  of  physics  that  respect  his
principles act as confirmation of them, i.e. he thinks that they are empirical – precisely
what Watkins does not. 
Now there are some ways in which Born’s and Watkins’ positions are similar. Born seems
to understand ‘metaphysical’ to simply refer to that which lies outside the remit of science.
Empirical is not quite precisely defined but seems to refer to that which is testable and
within  the  remit  of  science.  Like  Watkins,   he  sees  these  as  two  mutually  exclusive
categories. For Born, such metaphysical principles can be  useful to science, even if they
are  not  testable  –  he  sees  a  belief  in  induction  as  falling  into  this  camp.  Unlike  the
positivists, Born does not think that we should drop everything that is not either deductive
or directly observable. So there is a way in which it does look like Born follows Watkins.
We should remember though, that Born is not using a fine-grained distinction between
metaphysical  and  empirical  and  that  although  he  thinks  that  his  principles  are  not
metaphysical,  they  plausibly  are.  The  distinction  between  Born  and  Watkins,  and  the
similarities between Born and Zahar are then made clear in the way that Born thinks that
his principles gain empirical support from the physics that is generated by and respects
them. 
I think we can also say a few more general things about Born’s principles and what they
indicate about his philosophy. He clearly does think that his principles are confirmable. As
opposed to Kant or Chang, he wants to say that his principles are (at least) continuous with
physical laws and commensurable with physical theories. We can also see that he rejects
the transcendentalist move to regulative principles prior to physics being indispensable to
it. This sort of move is indicative of a naturalist position (Maddy 2001) and so we can
reasonably infer that Born holds such a position. 
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 5 Does  Physics  Actually  Respect  Contiguity  and
Antecedence?
Before finishing, it  should be noted that here are a number of potential problems with
Born’s thesis that he does not address. We might think that Born’s principles are violated
by  ‘spooky action at a distance’  in quantum mechanics—this appears to be explicitly non-
contiguous. We might also think that the solutions of the general theory of relativity that
allow  for  closed  time  like  curves  and  wormholes  appear  to  violate  the  antecedence
principle.  Whilst a full discussion of these issues goes beyond the scope of this chapter—
it would be a substantial task to settle the question of whether not contemporary physics
violates locality or allows time travel—it is worth devoting at least some time to them.
 5.1.1 Spooky Action at a Distance
The problem of action at a distance in quantum mechanics has to do with measurement
collapsing distant wavefunctions, i.e. EPR correlations. Imagine that two quantum systems
have interacted in a way that means some particular quantity, for which the value is known
prior to interaction, is conserved after that interaction. Until we make a measurement on
one system we don’t know the value of that quantity in it because the state of that system
exists in a superposition of the various possible quantities. However, because the quantity
is a conserved one, as soon as we know the value for one system, we instantly know it for
the other.  The reason that this  looks like action-at-a-distance at  a distance in orthodox
quantum  theory  is  because  it  looks  like  measurement  of  one  system  collapses  the
superposition of the other system, thereby changing the wavefunction that describes it.
It’s not actually clear that Born would have been aware of this particular problem when he
wrote  Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance—he certainly does not address it there.
Although the first presentation of this problem was in Einstein, Rosen and Podolsky’s Can
124
Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?  (Einstein
et al 1935), it’s not explicitly clear that Born read it. It’s not addressed in the Born-Einstein
letters at least. However, shortly after Born wrote Natural Philosophy…, Einstein sent him
a manuscript  of an updated version of the 1935 EPR argument in which he explicitly
accuses orthodox quantum theory of violating contiguity (Born 2005 168). Born’s response
is discussed in detail in Chapter 6—Born on Probility, but the relevant point here is that he
does  not  recognise  Einstein’s  example  as  a  case  of  action-at-a-distance.  Born  takes
Einstein’s  example—which  is  a  clear  EPR correlation-type  thought  experiment—to be
about acquiring information of some distant system via measurement and not (as Einstein
intends) about acting on that system. Born thinks that such acquiring of information is
merely down to the two systems being correlated by some common history This, again as I
shall argue in Chapter 6, is  mostly likely because Born does not really believe in the
reality of the wavefunction.
 5.1.2 Relativistic Time Travel?
The specific problem that wormholes and closed timelike curves introduce is that they can
produce situations in which cause is indistinguishable from effect for an observer even if
there is only one allowed t solution. This would seem to allow an explicit violation of the
principle of antecedence, one that might even be stronger than the allowed violations in
Newtonian mechanics. After, all the primary problem that Born thinks Newton’s theory
raises for antecedence is that it does not explicitly prevent –t solutions, in that its dynamics
is time-symmetric. Indeed, the same goes for motion in general relativity.
In  the  case  of  timelike  separation,  in  which  signals  can  pass  between  two  points  in
spacetime, we simply have the situation of Newtonian mechanics—two solutions for t, one
going  forwards,  the  other  back.  The  ordering  of  events  is  preserved  across  reference
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frames. But consider two events, a and b, which are spacelike separated. For these events,
there will exist reference frames in which  a occurs prior to  b, frames in which  a and  b
occur simultaneously, and frames in which b occurs prior to a. Ordinarily we should have
no worries regarding a violation of the principles of causation because, as a condition of
spacelike  separation,  there  can  be  no  interaction  between  them short  of  superluminal
travel.
However  consider  a  different  situation—two  sets  of  spacetime  coordinates  which  are
spacelike separated but connected by a traversable wormhole. In this situation there can be
interaction between these spacelike separated coordinates via the wormhole. Imagine two
astronauts, one at each coordinate, playing catch through a wormhole. Consider the case in
which the two spacelike separated events are one astronaut throwing the ball and the other
astronaut  catching it.  Because the ordering of events  is  not preserved across reference
frames, there can be no frame-independent fact of the matter regarding which is the cause
and which is the effect.
Further worries  are  introduced if  we consider the possibility of closed timelike curves
(CTCs),  solutions  of  GR  which  allow  for  world  lines  to  curve  and  interact  with
themselves. One example of this occurs if traversable wormholes are possible, although
there are many other solutions that also allow for CTCs. Think of an asteroid, ambling
through space, which collides with an identical asteroid that hurtles out of the mouth of a
nearby wormhole. The collision knocks the asteroid into the other mouth of the wormhole
such that it collides with itself upon exiting, knocking its earlier counterpart into the mouth
of a wormhole… and so on ad infinitum. It is easy to see how this sort of situation can
create problems for the cause-effect relationship.
This all raises a few questions for my account. The first question is historical: is this a
problem for Born in the context in which he was writing? Ought Born to have explicitly
addressed these issues, or is quite reasonable to conclude that he was simply unaware of
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them  or,  if  he  was,  he  simply  considered  them  irrelevant?  The  second  question  is
ahistorical:  are  traversable  wormholes  and  closed  timelike  curves  physically  plausible
enough to present a possible threat to Born’s wish to read time-ordered causal relations
into physics? 
 5.1.3 Should Born Have Considered Relativistic Time-Travel?
The first thing to consider is when in relation to Born’s work the scientific work on worm-
holes and closed causal loops was published.  Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance
was published in 1949a and is largely a transcript of a lecture series given in 1948. So
when were wormholes first proposed? In their paper The Particle Problem in the General
Theory of Relativity (1935), Einstein and Rosen attempted to solve the problem of the ap-
parent status of particles in GR as being singularities. They described a solution of GR in-
volving ‘sheets’ of spacetime connected by bridges and it is this that later became known
as an ‘Einstein-Rosen Bridge’ (a term frequently heard on science fiction shows). How-
ever, Einstein and Rosen do not appear to consider their bridge to be literally a bridge:  - it
is a way of representing the particle without singularities. “The neutral, as well as the elec-
trical, particle is a portion of space connecting the two sheets (bridge)”, they write (Ein-
stein and Rosen 1935 77). It is not a traversable pathway between regions of spacetime. I
do not know whether or Born read or considered this paper (although given his friendship
with Einstein and his interest in relativity, it is certainly not unlikely that he at least looked
at it), but regardless of that fact, it seems unlikely to say the least that it would lead him to
conclude in the existence of traversable wormholes. Indeed in their 1962 paper on worm-
holes Causality and Multiply Connected Space-Time, Robert Fuller and John Wheeler note
that despite the prior existence of solutions of the GR equations allowing for such situ-
ations, “it was only recently through the work of Fronsdal and Kruskal that one has come
to understand the unusual nature of the topology implied by the Scharzschild solution”
(Fuller and Wheeler 1962 920). The papers referred to by Fronsdal (1959) and Kruskal
(1960) were not published until the late 50s. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that
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Born was unaware of the existence of wormholes when he wrote Natural Philosophy of
Cause and Chance.
So what about closed timelike curves? The first well-known paper on the subject seems to
be Kurt Gödel’s An Example of a New Type of Cosmological Solutions of Einstein’s Field
Equations of Gravitation (1949). This presents a solution of the GR equations in which an
entire universe is contained in a closed timelike curve but was only published in 1949, tak-
ing it out of the scope of Born’s project, or at least gives a good reason for any potential ig-
norance of it on Born’s part. There were, however, earlier solutions allowing for CTCs.
Kip Thorne describes William van Stockum’s (1937) paper, containing a CTC solution for
an infinitely long cylinder of rapidly rotating dust, noting that physicists largely regard it
as unphysical due to the unavoidable infinities it involves (Thorne 1992). So even if Born
was aware of van Stockum’s paper, and there is nothing in particular to indicate that he
was, it is reasonable to conclude that he would not have considered it a threat to his view
of causation because of the unphysical nature of the solution described.
The next question that I will address is this: regardless of what Born knew of them when
he wrote Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, are traversable wormholes and closed
timelike curves physically possible? Kip Thorne argues that although van Stockum’s and
Gödel’s  CTCs  are  unphysical  (because  the  presence  of  infinities  and  because  the
cosmological constant must be non-zero, respectively), this is no reason to conclude that
CTCs in general are not physically possible. He notes that the past failures of physicists
with regards to determining what will turn out to be unphysical should make us suspicious
of such moves. To go into this matter further is outside the scope of this chapter. What we
can say  is  this:  the  physical  possibility  of  CTCs and traversable  wormholes  is  not  so
obvious as to provide the basis of a serious objection to Born’s views on causation.
I  think  that  we  can  see  that  neither  action-at-a-distance  in  quantum  mechanics  nor
relativistic  time travel  present  a  particular  problem for  the historical  Born.  He doesn’t
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believe in such action-at-a-distance (again, see Chapter 6, but this is probably because he
doesn’t believe in the physical reality of the superpositions. It is quite possible that he had
not encountered CTC or wormhole solutions at the time of writing Natural Philosophy…,
but even if he had, those that existed prior to 1948 were clearly unphysical. Indeed, it still
remains unclear as to whether or not such things fall within the domain of the physically
possible.
 6 Conclusion
I’ve argued in this chapter that we should view Born’s principles of causation as being akin
to Zahar’s account of principles in science. They can’t be Kantian or Changian principles
because they are not necessary in the way that those principles are—Born is perfectly
happy to allow for the existence of good physical theories which violate his principles. We
should interpret Born’s account of them as follows: they have their origin in non-empirical
beliefs about causal relations. These are then applied as heuristics that guide theory choice
and  production—we  are  inclined  to  search  for  theories  that  respect  these  principles.
Finally, we find that they have been confirmed, in that the descriptions of nature in the
equations  of  contemporary  physics  respects  the  principles  of  both  contiguity  and
antecedence. We can also see in this an indication that Born holds a naturalist position. 
Whilst we might legitimately ask questions about apparent possibilities—spooky-action-
at-a-distance  and  relativistic  time-travel—that  appear  to  violate  contiguity  and
antecedence, we find that these are not actually problems for Born. His view of quantum
mechanics seems to preclude such action-at-a-distance. Relativistic time-travel post-dates
Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance and it is any case unclear as to whether it is
physically possible at all. 
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Chapter 4—Born on Scientific Realism
 1 Introduction
This chapter will  examine Born’s work related to realism and argue that he fulfils  the
criteria—metaphysical,  semantic,  epistemic  and  progress/continuity  of  reference—for
being a scientific realist. I’m going to separate this discussion into two parts—in the first I
will  examine  a  number  of  Born’s  writings  in  the  1940s  and  50s  in  which  he  gives
arguments  against  positivism and  advance  his  own position,  which  he  terms  invariant
realism—realism about quantities which are invariant under transformation. I’ll then give
an overview of definitions of realism before arguing that Born meets all of the relevant
criteria, as well as responding to an opposing argument of Galavotti’s (1995).
Born deals most directly with realism in two papers, ‘Physical Reality’ (1953) and ‘The
Concept of Reality in Physics’ (1958), in which he offers a criticism of logical positivism
(and of historical materialism in the latter  paper).  ‘Physical Reality’ was published (in
Philosophical Quarterly and reprinted in Physics in My Generation) in response to a talk
delivered by Herbert  Dingle at  the meeting of Section A of  the British Association in
Edinburgh  in  1950,  ‘Philosophy  of  Physics,  1850-1950’ (and  published  in  Nature  as
Dingle 1951). Born was also in attendance at the meeting, giving a paper entitled ‘Physics
in  the  Last  50  Years’  (it  being  halfway  through  the  century,  anniversaries  and
reminiscences seemed to be common themes). ‘The Concept of Reality in Physics’ is a
further development of these ideas and a response to the Russian physicist Sergei Suvorov,
who translated ‘Physical Reality’ into Russian and published it in the Soviet Union, along
with his own criticism of the Copenhagen school and an argument for materialism.
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I’m then going to examine his paper Symbol and Reality (1966) which presents a different
position on realism that I’ll argue is much more structural in nature than the earlier version
based on invariance. This is presented separately because it does represent a change or
development in Born’s thoughts on the topic.
 2 Born, Positivism and Invariant Realism
 2.1 Dingle
In this section I am going to examine Dingle’s (Dingle 1951) argument and Born’s (Born
1953) response to it. Dingle argues that modern physics is positivist in nature and that this
is reflected in the development of particle physics and relativity. He further argues that the
proto-positivism of Arthur Eddington and in particular (a slightly modified version of) the
operationalism of P. W. Bridgeman should be adopted.
Dingle  argues  that  the  traditional  philosophical  position  embodied  in  the  theories  and
practices of physics,  in so far as there was one,  was characterised by a  kind of naïve
realism—there exists an external world and physics aims to discover its ‘contents and laws
of behaviour’ (Dingle 1951 632). This, he says, arose not from an attempt to study or
follow the methods of Newton and Galileo, but simply from common sense, hence naïve
realism (1951 631). The existence of the external world is simply assumed a priori. This
assumption, he says, was something accepted as being ‘apart altogether from the practice
of science’ (1951 632). The discoveries of science had to be accommodated within this
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framework  and,  until  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  this  accommodation  was  entirely
unproblematic.
Whewell’s  Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, he argues, fits quite precisely into this
picture. Dingle argues that ‘the way in which the ideas are presented does take its shape
from the necessity to accommodate the physical science of the time’ (1951 632). Whewell
was, he says ‘unconsciously’ (1951 632) guided to attempt to demonstrate a picture of the
world that justified the current state of physics.  Such a picture, Dingle notes, was easy to
construct and to be confident in.
In  the  next  section  of  his  paper,  Dingle  argues  that  the  history  of  physics  post  1850
represented the ‘uprooting’ of confidence in this picture of the world via the development
of quantum mechanics and relativity (1951 632).  He also notes that,  apart  from these,
physicists  in  the  late  nineteenth  century  had  conceptual  worries  with  the  Newtonian
framework,  specifically  with  regards  to  the  conceivability  of  absolute  space  and  the
circularity of the second law of motion. Dingle doesn’t elaborate on the latter point further
than telling us that there were ‘difficulties in framing the second law of motion in a form
that did not include a circular argument’ (Dingle 1951 p632) but presumably is referring to
Mach’s The Science of Mechanics (1919). The failure of the ether theory, he writes, caused
some physicists (he lists  ‘Kirchoff, Hertz,  Mach, Pearson, Poincaré’)  to doubt whether
physics could actually be regarded as the study of the external world. Again, Dingle does
not elaborate on which this failure consisted in, but presumably it has to do with the failure
of the Michelson-Morley experiments to detect the ether. This, however, had little effect on
the  practice  of  physics—in  general  physics  was  successful.  Why  worry  about  the
foundations?
It was the progress of physics itself, Dingle argues, not the conceptual worries of various
individuals that killed off this philosophy.  There were, as previously noted, two strands to
this  - the gradual development of particle physics from kinetic theory into quantum theory
132
and the sudden (as Dingle puts it, at least) development of special relativity. Dingle deals
with particle physics first. The kinetic theory, he writes, attempted to explain the behaviour
of bodies in terms of particles obeying Newtonian laws. All of our observations ultimately
derive from the mechanical behaviour of molecules. It is these molecules that are real.
What we observe is but appearance. It was thus the job of physics to discover all that it
could about these molecules (Dingle 1951 632-3).
Dingle argues that the development of statistical mechanics represented an introduction of
a positivist methodology into physics. This, he thinks,  happened in the following way:
‘What they [the physicists] were doing was finding the rational relations between their
observations, and using the molecules...as useful conceptions to extend the scope of those
relations’ (1951 633). This does not mean that the physicists considered themselves to be
positivists, rather they were ‘indifferent’ (1951 633) to any tension between their method
and  their  philosophy.  Dingle  claims  that  ‘the  matter...came to  a  head’ (633)  with  the
development  of  atomic  physics.  We  cannot,  he  thinks,  actually  know anything  about
fundamental particles—we can only calculate the probability of them being in a certain
position. They do not obey causal laws. They are not even individuable. And yet they are
supposedly  the  fundamental  constituents  of  reality.  This,  Dingle  thinks,  cannot  be  the
correct  way of  thinking about  them. He writes  ‘The pursuit  of  reality  has  ended as  a
greyhound  race  ends,  with  the  disappearance  of  the  hare  underground.  And  the  only
intelligible conclusion is that the object of the whole business is not to catch the hare but to
run the race’ (1951 633).  Thus,  Dingle thinks,  we can only understand physics  as  the
attempt  to  establish  rational  relations  between  observable  phenomena,  and  not  as  the
attempt to describe some ‘hidden reality’ that lies beneath them.
Dingle next turns his eye to relativity theory. Relativity, Dingle says, teaches us a similar
lesson—that physics will be more successful if it concentrates on examining the relations
between phenomena and abandons the attempt to describe the “reality” of entities that
underlie those phenomena. The objects of Newtonian physics, Dingle says, had precise and
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unvarying intrinsic properties—length, mass —and this is not the case for the objects and
bodies of relativistic physics (1951 633-4). In physics described by the theory of relativity,
such properties depend on the velocity of the body and vary with it. This velocity in turn
depends  on  the  reference  frame of  an  observer  and  can  take  any  value  from zero  to
approaching c. The velocity of the reference frame is simply a choice—Dingle writes that
‘Nature has nothing whatsoever to do with the matter’ (Dingle 1951 634). Hence, Dingle
thinks, we should abandon the idea of objective properties of bodies and instead embrace
the idea that we should concentrate on the relations between the phenomena. This is what
relativity has done, and this is what has led to its success.
Dingle  argues  that  there  are  two  responses  to  the  situation  that  particle  physics  and
relativity presents to us. The first is to carry on as usual and take the objective of physics to
be the investigation of the real and external world, albeit one that is ‘essentially mysterious
and even self-contradictory’ (Dingle 1951 634).  Dingle is  clear  that  he thinks  that  the
conclusions of mysteriousness are inescapable. That the objective of physics is the study of
an  essentially  mysterious  external  world  is  a  position  that  he  takes  to  be  most
unsatisfactory.
The  second  response  is  Dingle’s  preferred  one—to  take  the  developments  of  particle
physics and of relativity to indicate that, rather than studying an objective, external world,
physics  can  only  concern  itself  with  the  establishment  of  rational  relations  between
measurements.
 2.2 ‘Physical Reality’
Born responded to Dingle in his 1953  Philosophical Quarterly  paper ‘Physical Reality’
(Born 1953), republished in the collected volume ‘Physics in My Generation’ (1956). In it,
Born argues against the positivist viewpoint and, in doing so, gives his own views which,
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in his words ‘cannot be explained better than by way of contrast’ (Born 1953 151). Born
disagrees both with Dingle’s argument that physics does not really deal with a real external
world, and with his argument that the practice of physics does not require a concept of
reality.
Born thinks that Dingle is advocating a denial of the existence of a ‘pre-existing external
material  world’  (Born  1953  152)  which  ultimately  expresses  itself  as  a  kind  of
subjectivism  about  the  world  or  a  ‘physical  solipsism’ (1953  152).  Born  notes  that,
although such a position is logically coherent, logical coherence by itself is not much of an
argument for anything. For Born, the main argument for Dingle’s position is historical, and
in particular related to progress. It is the claim that, although perhaps helpful in the past,
maintaining a belief in an objective, observable world would be ‘detrimental’ to scientific
progress. If physics cannot be understood in reference to an objective external world, its
activities  and conclusions  should  be understood instead  in  terms of  experiences.  Born
disagrees.  His  argument  has  three  strands.  Firstly  he  argues  that  such  a  positivism is
methodologically  problematic:  physicists  do behave as if  they are working with a real
external world and that it is implausible that they could act otherwise. Secondly he denies
that  there  is  a  principled  distinction  to  be  drawn  between  the  observable  and  the
unobservable. If this is the case then there would seem to be no basis for the metaphysical
distinction between them that Born thinks that Dingle is drawing. Thirdly, Born objects to
the conclusions Dingle draws from developments in modern physics—that its properties
and entities somehow fail  to meet the criteria for objective reality.   I’m now going to
examine in turn the arguments that Born gives for these positions.
 2.2.1 Methodology
Born argues that concepts of fields,  particles, etc.  are,  far  from being unnecessary and
unhelpful  crutches  that  should be  gotten  rid  of,  are  necessary  for  the  functioning and
progress of physics. He asks ‘How could an experimentalist work and communicate with
his  collaborators  and his  contemporaries  without  using  models  composed  of  particles,
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electrons,  nucleons,  photons,  neutrinos,  fields  and  waves,  the  concepts  of  which  are
condemned as irrelevant and futile?’ (Born 1953 152). I’m not convinced that this is a fair
characterisation  of  Dingle.  Dingle  never  seems  to  make  an  assertion  of  this  kind  of
strength—he might  well  respond by pointing out  that  we are not  supposed to  ban the
discussion of such models, but rather should restrict what we consider real about them to
the bare phenomena and how we might order them.
A position such as Dingle’s is not, Born acknowledges, held without reason. He explains
that ‘a certain caution’ (1953 52) is needed: the ‘naïve’ approach to reality that he says was
taken  by  Newtonian  systems  is  ‘not  satisfactory’ (1953  52),  and  modern  physics  has
demanded a new approach.
Born notes  that  the  word ‘reality’ is  part  of  ordinary  language,  and so its  meaning is
‘ambiguous’, in that it can be used in multiple ways just any word can. He notes that there
is an element of subjectivity in what is considered as “real” by different individuals and
groups—‘the realities of a peasant  or craftsman,  a merchant  or banker,  a statesman or
soldier have certainly little in common’ (Born 1953 152), he writes. What is most real to
these individuals, he says, is what is most important to them. Born wonders if there is any
philosophy  that  can  give  some  definition  of  reality  that  is  ‘untainted  by  some  such
subjective associations’ (1953 153). I think that we might actually fairly point out that we
can differentiate between ‘real’ in terms of what is most important and ‘real’ in terms of
what we actually believe exists in some mind-independent manner.  What concerns Born
here though, is whether it is possible for science to make some such precise definition of
reality.
Could science, as Born thinks that Dingle suggests, discard without detriment the concept
of reality? Born thinks the answer is no. It could only be discarded by ‘men isolated in
ivory towers, remote from all actual doing and observing, the type of man who becomes
extremely absorbed in pure mathematics,  metaphysics or logic’ (Born 1953 153). Born
136
notes that Niels Bohr, who he regards as having ‘contribut[ed] more to the philosophy of
modern  science  than  anybody  else’ (1953  153)  holds  that  it  is  necessary  to  describe
experiments as a naïve realist.  Born writes  ‘it  is  an essential  part  of this  procedure to
distinguish between ideas, projects, theories and formulae on the one side, and the real
instruments and gadgets constructed according to those ideas. Here the naïve use of the
word real, the simple belief in the real existence of the material apparatus, is imperative’
(1953 153). Born says that he does not think that Dingle does forbid applying the term
‘real’ to our equipment, but does forbid its application to ‘atoms, electrons, fields, etc.,
terms used in the interpretation of observations’. There is, Born thinks, a problem here.
The problem is this: how do we draw a line between what is unproblematically real, and
what is not? Where, Born asks ‘is the border between these two domains’(1953 153)?
 2.2.2 Denying the Distinction
Born  then  asks  us  to  consider  a  piece  of  crystal.  Such  an  object  clearly  and
unproblematically falls into the domain of ‘crude reality’ (1953 153). We can grind that
crystal into a powder comprised of a dust whose particles are too small to be seen with an
unaided eye. We can, however, observe such particles with an ordinary light microscope.
He asks ‘are the particles then less real?’ (1953 153). We can use an ultra-microscope (a
microscope which uses light scattering rather than reflection to observe objects up to a
nanometre  scale)  to  observe  still-smaller  particles.  Born  tells  us  that  after  the  ultra-
microscope fails us, we can use an electron microscope to observe large molecules. He
writes ‘Where does that crude reality, in which the experimentalist lives, end, and where
does the atomistic world, in which the idea of reality is illusion and anathema, begin?
(1953 153). The answer he is gives is (of course) that there is no such distinction to be
drawn.  He  writes  ‘if  we  are  compelled  to  attribute  reality  to  the  ordinary  things  of
everyday life and materials used in experimenting, we cannot cease to do so for objects
observable only with the help of instruments’ (1953 153).
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This latter argument seems to be a version of the “denying the distinction” argument given
against positivism by Grover Maxwell in his paper ‘The Ontological Status of Theoretical
Entities’ (Maxwell 1962 181-192).  Maxwell argues similarly for a continuous transition
between  observable  and  unobservable.  Maxwell’s  version  is  more  detailed  and  also
incorporates observing large objects with binoculars and spectacles but the point is the
same—there is no principled way to draw a distinction in the ontological status of some
entity based upon how we observe it. If we cannot do that then the positivist stance of
denying the reality of unobservables becomes untenable. Of course there are arguments
against this position—for one, it is not necessarily the ontological status of an entity that is
relevant, but rather our epistemic warrant to believe in its existence (See van Fraassen
1980, amongst others), but this is beside the point—we are interested primarily in Born’s
position  with  regards  to  realism,  not  whether  he  has  resolved  the  realism/antirealism
debate.
So this seems to be a clear rejection of the positivism that Dingle advocates. First Born
argues that physicists, on the whole, treat ‘theoretical’ entities as real, and indeed have to,
as he thinks that to do otherwise would render scientists unable to communicate ideas with
one another. Secondly, despite worries about reality, the physicist must be a naïve realist
about her equipment in order to be able to get on with the job of experimenting. Thirdly
there is no ontological distinction to be drawn between the equipment and the things it
measures—our equipment is part of the ordinary macroscopic world and Born denies that
there is any ontological distinction to be drawn between that and the world that can only be
viewed through electron microscopes. Therefore we must also treat unobservables as real;
or rather we say that things like electrons—things that are only observed indirectly—are
still observable. Born adds some nuance to this, and discusses precisely what sort of things
we have warrant  to  believe  in  (invariants  of  observation)  later  on in  the  paper.  Next,
however,  he  turns  to  Dingle’s  argument  that  modern  physics  does  not  deal  with  an
objective reality.
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 2.2.3 Invariant Realism
Born deals first with Dingle’s arguments from kinetic theory. He notes that he cannot tell
whether or not Dingle thinks that kinetic theory is entirely ‘superfluous’ (Born 1953 154)
or whether he thinks that we should not regard molecules as real, and rather as simply
‘“counters” or “dummies”’—i.e. simply as place-holder terms with no meaningful content
(Born 1953 154). Born argues that Dingle has missed a crucial point in his discussion of
kinetic  theory—that  kinetic  theory  provides  strong  evidence  for  the  existence  of
molecules.
Born notes that kinetic theory gives ‘definite properties’ to molecules: ‘weight, size, shape
(degrees  of  freedom),  mutual  interaction’ (Born  1953  154).  He  explains  that  ‘a  small
number  of  molecular  constants  determines  an  unlimited  number  of  phenomenological
properties,  in  virtue  of  the  molecular  hypothesis’ (1953  154).  Therefore,  Born  thinks,
predictions of new phenomenological properties act as confirmation of the existence of
molecules.  Born  gives  as  examples  x-ray  scattering  by  crystals  and  radioactive
phenomena. The latter he thinks give ‘striking’ evidence for the molecular hypothesis and
therefore  the  positivist  position:‘to  speak  of  a  dummy producing  a  track  in  a  Wilson
chamber’ is ‘inadequate’ (1953 155)—i.e. something that is merely a place-holder or a
model cannot produce tracks in a cloud chamber. Something real (a particle) must be doing
the job.
Born gives the following argument for this inadequacy. Imagine that you see a gun fired
and a man collapse some distance away. Do you know that the bullet found in the man’s
wound actually traversed the distance from the gun to the man’s body? You have not seen
it travel and indeed nobody could have seen it travel, except in the case that someone had
happened to set up a sophisticated photographic system. Born is doubtful that one would
be willing  to  hold  that  the  bullet  in  flight  is  merely  a  theoretical  dummy in  order  to
organise the observable phenomena of the shot being fired and the bullet being found in
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the wound. Yet he thinks that this is exactly what a positivist attitude implies. He writes ‘I
only wish to point out that if one denies the existential evidence of an atomic track which
can be seen, one is committed to denying the existence of a bullet in flight which cannot
be seen, and of numerous similar things’ (Born 1953 155).
Born thinks that the origin of the positivist denial of the reality of things like molecules is
due to the concept of reality being understood as ‘known in every detail’ (Born 1953 155),
something which he thinks is at odds with the way it is ordinarily used. He notes that we
think of the Romans contemporary to Caesar and the Chinese people contemporary to
Confucius as being real, although we have no way of directly observing them. He asks
(rhetorically):  ‘Are these Romans or Chinese of the present or the past  only dummies
invented by the historians to connect phenomena? Which phenomena? Perhaps the words
found in newspapers, in books, or on ancient tombstones?’ (Born 1953 155).
So  Born  clearly  thinks  that  not  only  is  there  no  distinction  between  observable  and
unobservable for the positivist to get to grips with, but that even if there were, Dingle
applies such a distinction inconsistently. Born appears to think that it cannot be applied just
to the microscopic world, but also to many elements of the macroscopic world—very fast
objects in motion, and historical persons. This is a bullet that Born clearly thinks that the
positivist would not be willing to bite.
Born next discusses Dingle’s argument from the development of the theory of relativity.
He quotes the conclusion of Dingle’s argument that ‘by abandoning all attempts to assign
any property at all to matter [because the properties of mass and length become observer-
dependent] we can learn more and more about the relations of phenomena’. Born thinks
that  this  is  a  completely  mistaken  characterisation  of  relativity.  Indeed,  he  describes
Dingle’s position as a ‘misrepresentation’ of relativity. It has not at all abandoned such
attempts. Rather, it has ‘refined the method of doing so in order to conform with certain
new experiences, such as the famous Michelson-Morley experiment’ (Born 1953 156).
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Why does Born think Dingle is so mistaken? He writes ‘This root of the matter is a very
simple logical distinction which seems to be obvious to anybody not biased by a solipsistic
metaphysics; namely this: that often a measurable quantity is not a thing, but a property of
its relation to other things’ (Born 1953 156). To explain this Born gives the example of a
shadow cast by a circle of some opaque material on a wall. The shadow will,  he says,
generally be elliptical. By turning the circle, one can generate an elliptical shadow with an
axis length of any value between ‘almost’ zero and some maximum. He writes that this is
an ‘exact analogue of the behaviour of length in relativity which in different states of
motion may have any value between zero and a maximum’ (Born 1953 156). He similarly
gives an analogue of mass in relativity by describing the cutting of a long sausage into
elliptical  slices  with  one  axis  varying between some minimum value  and ‘  ‘practical’
infinity’ (Born 1953 156).
The point of these examples is this: by observing the shadows cast on different planes we
can determine that the thing casting the shadow is a circle and uniquely determine its
radius.  This  is  because  the  radius  is  an  invariant  of  transformations  from the  parallel
projection. Similarly, the cross-section with the smallest area is an invariant of the various
cross-sections of a sausage. Born thinks that most measurement in physics is concerned
with projections, rather than directly with the things being measured.
Born then explains projections, explaining that they are defined in relation to some system
of reference. He notes that there many equivalent systems of reference and that for any
physical theory there is some rule, called a law of transformation, that connects projections
from the  same thing  across  different  systems of  reference.  There  are  quantities  called
invariants that hold the same value across all systems of reference and so are independent
of the various transformations. Born will later come back to invariants—it is these that he
thinks we are epistemically entitled to believe in (Born 1953 157).
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For  Born,  the  point  about  projections  with  regards  to  Dingle’s  argument  is  that  the
discovery that mass and length are projections of invariant quantities, rather than being
invariants  themselves,  is  nothing  new.  Indeed,  he  writes:  ‘the  main  advances  in  the
conceptual  structure of  physics  consist  in  the discovery that  some quantity  which was
regarded as the property of a thing is in fact only the property of a projection’ (Born 1953
157), i.e. discovering that something is a projection of some property is not abandoning the
objective reality of it, it is simply coming to understand it better.
Born gives the example of the transition from a ‘primitive (pre-Newtonian)’ concept of
gravity  to  the  Newtonian  one.  Pre-Newtonian  gravitation  is  described  by  group  of
transformations for which ‘the vertical, the normal to the plane surface of the Earth, is
absolutely fixed’. In this system of transformations, gravitational force is an invariant and
the weight of a body ‘an intrinsic property’, i.e. an invariant. In a Newtonian system, space
is isotropic and weight  dependent  on the position of a  body (Born 1953 157).  In  this
system, mass is the invariant quantity
Born argues that  relativity  is  simply a continuation of this.  He notes that the Galilean
transformations of Newtonian physics separate space and time (i.e. there is no connection
between spatial coordinates and time) whereas the Lorentz transformations of the theory of
relativity connect them. Because of this, Born explains, many quantities that were thought
to be invariants in the classical system—‘distances in rigid systems, time intervals shown
by clocks in different positions, masses of bodies’ (Born 1953 157)— turn out not to be,
rather  they are ‘projections,  components of invariant quantities not directly accessible’
(Born 1953 157). Born tells us that, just as in the case of the shadow and the sausage, these
invariants  - ‘maximum length and minimum mass’ (Born 1953 157)  - can be determined.
Born thinks that this explanation clearly answers the question of whether or not relativistic
science  has  abandoned  attempts  at  objective  descriptions  of  the  properties  of  bodies.
Bodies do have definite, invariant quantities—rest mass, proper length and proper time -
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but the older quantities of mass and length turn out not to be among them. These, it turns
out, are rather properties of the relations between a body a particular reference system. So
we have not given up trying to give objective accounts of properties -  it is simply the case
that what we thought were invariant properties turned out to be projections and that bodies
are possessed of a different set of invariant properties (Born 1953 158). Born notes that we
might have avoided some confusion by renaming mass and length to something else and
reserving the older terms to refer exclusively to invariant properties.
Born next discusses the situation in atomic/quantum physics. He writes of Heisenberg’s
uncertainty  principle  ‘Is  not  this  vagueness,  this  impossibility  of  answering  definite
questions  about  position  and velocity  of  a  particle,  an  argument  against  the  reality  of
particles and altogether of the objective material world?’ (Born 1953 158). Born  answers
that we must reflect on what we mean by a  particle with regards experimental evidence.
Once more, he thinks that ‘these words [particle] signify definite invariants which can be
unambiguously constructed by combining a definite number of  observations’ (Born 1953
158).  His point seems to be this: uncertainty certainly exists, but it is a matter of physical
law. There does exist some definite total amount of information about a system that can be
obtained, including a number of invariant quantities. By performing multiple experiments,
we are able to determine them. Thus the world of the particle is not, as Born takes Dingle
to think, an unreal and subjective one. 
Born explains how the relevant projections work in quantum mechanics. He notes that
although we abandon the idea that particles in quantum mechanics follow deterministic
laws, instead embracing a theory which can only give us probability distributions, we have
not abandoned the idea of a real description of particles. He writes of the probabilistic
descriptions of quantum mechanics ‘This is of course a decisive change in our attitude to
the world. It calls for new ways of describing the physical world, but not the denial of its
reality’ (Born 1953 159).
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He explains this new way of describing the world by reference to an experiment involving
refracting a polarised beam of light. First we polarise a light beam by passing it through a
Nicol  Prism (an  optically  clear  polarising  crystal).  Then we pass  the  beam through a
crystal which double-refracts it, producing two separate beams of light which are linearly
polarised perpendicular to each other. These beams are then projected onto some detector.
The intensity of a beam is the square of its amplitude, given in the following way: Let the
primary beam have amplitude A. Let the angle between the direction of polarisation of the
primary beam and either of the secondary beams be  θ.  The amplitudes of the secondary
beams are then given by A cos(θ) or A sin(θ) . The intensity of either wave is then
the square of the amplitude A cos2(θ) or A sin2(θ) . Next we reduce the intensity of
the primary beam until it is low enough that only individual photons are impacting on the
detector. We then count these photons, finding that their average number is given by the
square of the amplitude. The point of this is that the intensities of the secondary beams are
projections of the amplitude of the primary beam. Born writes ‘The prediction made by the
theory in regard to the intensities of the emerging beams, or the number of photons in
these, has a meaning only in relation to the whole experimental arrangement, the Nicol
prism and the crystal’ (Born 1953 159).
Born notes that this goes for all quantum phenomena—any measurement is of a projection
from some natural  phenomena with respect to a system of reference comprised of the
experimental  apparatus  as  a  whole  (Born  1953  159).  He discusses  Bohr’s  concept  of
complementarity  with  respect  to  the  idea  of  invariants  of  observation.  Born  describes
complementarity as follows: ‘Bohr has introduced the idea of complementarity to express
the fact that the maximum knowledge of a physical entity cannot be obtained from a single
observation  or  a  single  experimental  arrangement,  but  that  different  experimental
arrangements,  mutually  exclusive  but  complementary,  are  necessary’ (Born 1953 160).
Born relates this to his earlier example of the shadows cast by disc on a surface. Just as we
needed to observe its shadow cast on different planes in order to determine its invariant
properties, he tells us, Bohr’s principle of complementarity tells us that in order to obtain
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maximum knowledge of some entity,  we need to make observations of many different
projections from it. When we obtain such maximum knowledge, we get information about
the  invariant  properties  (Born  lists  charge,  rest  mass,  spin,  etc.  (Born  1953  160))  of
whichever  entity  we  are  studying.  He  argues  that  when  we  have  determined  these
properties, we decide that they are properties of some particle. He writes that ‘I maintain
that we are justified in regarding these particles as real in a sense not essentially different
from the usual meaning of the word’ (Born 1953 160)).
Born gives the following argument for his position. He notes that the positivists regard
only sense data as real and everything else as conceptual tools for ordering that data. He
also makes reference to Henry Marganau’s position that there are two layers of reality—
that of sense data and that of constructs. Born thinks that both the positivists and Margenau
are incorrect in their positions—they ignore ‘two essential points of reality’ (Born 1953
161). The first is that it is wrong to regard ‘crude sense impressions as primary data’. The
second is that it is only constructs that are invariant under transformation that have ‘the
character of a real thing’. Other scientific ‘constructs’ do not. We should note for fairness
here that although this may be an accurate characterisation of Dingle’s position (who does
seem to  be  a  phenomenalist  of  some stripe),  it  is  not  an  accurate  characterisation  of
positivism as  a  whole—Schlick,  for  example,  characterises  positivism as  rejecting  the
debate between realism and idealism (Schlick 1948).
Born writes that as children we develop the ability to ‘distinguish and recognize objects’
(Born  1953  161).  We  do  not  experience  the  world  as  a  ‘kaleidoscopic’ sequence  of
impressions and sensations, but as a sequence of recognisable events and objects in which
the identity of entities is preserved despite their changing impressions. Born thinks this is
due to the mind picking out the invariant features of the observable world. He describes
the situation of walking your dog and it chasing a rabbit. As the dog runs further away
from you, you still see it as your dog, not a series of impressions of gradually decreasing
size. Born thinks that the Gestalt school of psychology agrees with this situation. Indeed he
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thinks that “Gestalt” should be translated not as shape or form, but as “invariant” (Born
1953 162).
Born further notes that the information transmitted to the brain by nerve fibres is nothing
like  the  ‘physical  stimulus’ that  causes  them.  He tells  us  that  the brain decodes  these
signals ‘determining the invariant features in this welter of ever-changing signals’ (Born
1953 162).
We cannot, Born thinks, describe scientific activity by assuming that we start with raw
sense impressions. He writes ‘if we attempted to build a philosophy of science based on
the assumption that our raw material is unordered sense impressions, we could not even
describe our manipulations and simple instruments’ (Born 1953 162). This is, presumably,
because we start with the ability to pick out invariant features of the world—it is already
partly  ordered  for  us.  Born  writes  that  science  must  start  with  ordinary  concepts  and
language—the  naïve  realism  he  discussed  earlier.  When  we  go  beyond  the  directly
observable world—using ‘magnifying devices, telescopes, microscopes, electro-magnetic
amplifiers,  etc.’ (Born  1953 162)—we cannot  use  our  unconscious  power  to  pick  out
invariants  and  must  instead  use  conscious  methods  ‘thinking,  mathematics  and  all  its
tricks’ (Born 1953 162). Using these devices, we are able to pick out the invariant features
of the unobservable world, and it is these that we are entitled to treat as real. Born writes
‘Thus we apply analysis to construct what is permanent in the flux of phenomena, the
invariants. Invariants are the concepts of which science speaks in the same way as ordinary
language speaks of ‘things’, and which it provides with names as if they were ordinary
things’ (Born 1953 163).
Born acknowledges that entities such as electrons are ‘of course’ (Born 1953 163) not
precisely the same as ordinary, macroscopic objects. They are not, for one thing, always
individuable—Born explains that if we knock an electron out of an atom with another
electron, there are no circumstances under which we can determine which was the knocked
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and which was the knocker (Born 1953 163). Born thinks that they do, however, have
enough in common with a macroscopic particle to be described by the same term. Such an
extension  of  a  term  is,  Born  thinks,  commonplace  enough  to  be  unproblematic.  He
explains  how  the  mathematical  term  ‘number’ was  extended  from  purely  describing
integers  to  being  used  for  fractions,  irrational  numbers,  transcendental  numbers  and
imaginary numbers. He explains that in physics we are perfectly content to describe infra-
red and ultra-violet radiation as light, despite the term ‘light’ initially referring purely to
the visible spectrum. In the same way, we call electrons particles even though they do not
share all the same properties as grains of dust. Born writes that ‘the principle of doing this
is always the same’ (Born 1953 p163): we identify the invariant features.
Born explains this by discussing the concept of a wave. He notes that we consider waves
on a body of water as real, even though they are merely ‘a certain shape on the surface’.
We do this because a wave is picked out by a set of invariant features—wavelength and
frequency.  Water  waves  have these.  Born argues  that  exactly  the  same holds  for  light
waves in quantum mechanics. That they represent ‘only a distribution of probability’ is no
reason to claim that they are not real. They share the invariant features of any other wave,
and thus they are real waves (1953 163).
 2.3 ‘The Concept of Reality in Physics’
In a 1958 talk entitled ‘The Concept of Reality in Physics’ delivered in Düsseldorf and
reprinted in English in the 1962 collection Physics and Politics Born offers a restatement
of his position with a few additions. The arguments are largely the same—positivism is
mistaken in thinking both that there is some proper distinction between observable and
unobservable; we are entitled to believe in invariants of observation—with the addition of
a criticism of materialism (in the Marxist sense). Born’s earlier paper had been read by
Sergei Suvorov, a Russian physicist who suggested that, as Born rejected positivism, he
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should  embrace  materialism.  Unfortunately,  Suvorov’s  paper  only  exists  in  Russian
(Suvorov 1958—Soviet Physics Uhspeki Vol1 Issue 2).
Born  disagrees  with  Suvorov.  He  writes  that  Suvorov  agrees  with  Born’s  position  on
positivism, but disagrees with him regarding invariance, arguing that it is materialism that
solves the problem. Suvorov, Born tells us, thinks that invariant properties are insufficient
to  identify  individual  types  of  entity.  Instead  we  must  find  all  of  the  ‘objective
relationships  which  are  specific  to  that  object’ (Born  1962  p31).  Born  discusses  two
examples  of  Suvorov’s  which  Suvorov thinks  are  identifiable  only  by  discovering  the
objective  relationships,  and not  merely  by  the  invariant  properties.  The  examples  that
Suvorov gives are the anti-proton and the anti-neutrino. Suvorov thinks that the invariant
properties of charge and mass are insufficient to identify the anti-proton. This is because,
as Born notes, it can be ‘confused’ with a negative hydrogen ion as they have the same
charge.  They  can  however  be  distinguished  because  the  anti-proton retains  its  charge,
whereas the hydrogen ion will often lose its, by losing one of its electrons. Therefore we
need to know the probability for the hydrogen ion to lose an electron in some particular
time in order  to  distinguish  between the  ion  and the  anti-proton.  Suvorov calls  this  a
‘specific relationship’. Born’s response is that that the ionisation probability of a negative
hydrogen ion is just another invariant. He writes ‘if anyone wants to use the term “specific
relationships” to designate the totality of invariant properties associated with a particle, I
do  not  object—except  that  this  a  somewhat  vague,  nebulous  term’ (Born  1962  32).
Presumably Born considers the probability to be an invariant because it is something that
all observers, after a number of tests, will come to agree upon.
Born also offers some specific criticisms of materialism. He quotes Suvorov’s ‘ominous
assertion’ that ‘Objective laws exist in society which are specific for a given society and
independent of human conscience’ (Born 1962 33), linking it  to historical materialism.
Historical materialism, Born thinks is ‘a descendent of the physical determinism derived
from Newtonian mechanics’ (Born 1962 34). In a deterministic system we ought to be able
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to predict precisely what will occur in the future. Born thinks that the materialists apply
this principle to history and society. Born, however, does not think that the assumptions of
measurements of perfect precision that are required for determinism were viable even in
classical physics (there is more detailed discussion of this argument in the Chapter 5—
Born on Determinism), let  alone in quantum mechanics. So Born thinks that historical
materialism is derived from a false premise—that of physical determinism—and is hence
defunct.
So we can see that ‘The Concept of Reality in Physics’ (Born 1962) does not add a huge
amount to the arguments given in ‘Physical Reality’ (Born 1953), but we can glean a few
things.  The first  is  that,  rather  unsurprisingly,  Born rejects  (Marxist)  materialism as  a
philosophy of science. This is certainly consistent with him being a scientific realist, but it
doesn’t confirm him as one either: we should consider that rejection of materialism is not
confined  to  scientific  realists.  Also  of  note  is  that  Born  seems  to  consider  the  decay
probability  of  a  hydrogen ion as  an invariant  quantity,  which  implies  an objective  (as
opposed to epistemic) view of at least some probabilities in physics. Born’s position on
probabilities in physics is discussed in detail in Chapter Six—Born on Probability.
 3 What Is It to Be A Realist?
In this section I wish to offer definitions of the positions available in the realism debate so
that  Born’s  writings  can  be  compared  with  them  in  the  hope  of  finding  where  his
allegiance lies. It must again be stressed that Born’s position may not fit precisely (or at
all) with the positions that modern philosophy of science allows. This survey is for the
purposes  of  illumination  and  elucidation.  It  is  not  intended  to  provide  a  number  of
differently shaped holes, through one of which Born must be shoved, however inelegantly.
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Crudely put, scientific realism is the thesis that our current best scientific theories are at
least  approximately true. It claims that our theories really do explain the nature of the
world and that  they really  do describe those parts  of  it  that  are  beyond our  ability  to
perceive directly.
In The Scientific Image Van Fraassen (1980) offers what he considers to be minimal and
general definition of realism: ‘Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story
of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is
true’ (1980  8).  This,  he  thinks,  should  be  acceptable  to  realists  of  all  stripes.   Anjan
Chakravartty  (2009)  also  offers  a  minimal  definition  in  A Metaphysics  for  Scientific
Realism: commitment to a theory also involves commitment to the content of that theory—
the entities, processes and interactions describe by it. There is no universal agreement by
realists to anything more than this.
In  Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, Stathis Psillos (1999) offers a meatier
definition. Realism, he thinks, involves commitments to three theses, one metaphysical,
one semantic and one epistemic. The metaphysical thesis is this: The world has a mind-
independent natural kind structure. This is required because in order for realism to be true,
the world must be a certain way. In particular the entities posited by scientific theories
must exist independently of our minds. We cannot even get the epistemic commitments of
realism off the ground if this is not the case.
The semantic thesis regards the statements of scientific theories as having truth values;
they are either true or false. If a theory is true, then the entities (or whatever) posited in it
exist. It is not the case that all a scientific theory really refers to is direct observation, i.e.
they are intended to refer to the mind-independent world of the metaphysical thesis. Nor is
it the case that one need not take there to be an objective reality behind such theories. If
scientific theories refer at all, then they refer to reality.
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The epistemic thesis is that we are entitled to take the theoretical statements of mature
scientific theories as being true (as opposed to false). If our best scientific theory says that
there are electrons then we are, ipso facto, justified in believing in electrons.  One could
still hold the metaphysical and semantic theses but not be a realist because one does not
think that we have the epistemic warrant to accept one.
Richard N. Boyd offers a fourfold definition of realism in his paper On the Current Status
of  the  Issue  of  Scientific  Realism  (1983).   His  definition  includes  the  metaphysical,
semantic and epistemic theses mentioned above and adds the claims that (i) the progress of
science is due to theories becoming better approximations of the truth and (ii) that newer
science is in some sense continuous with older science. This is needed in order to assuage
worries about theory change and the pessimistic meta-induction.
We may also wish to make a distinction between theories about the status of science and
the  aims  of  science.  Van  Fraassen  (1980)  famously  argues  that  we  can  successfully
construe the aim of science to  be empirical  adequacy rather  than truth.  Although it  is
unlikely that the realist will simply want to stop at claiming the aim of science to be truth,
it does seem that this is going to be a condition.
 3.1 Is Born A Realist?
So we have four (maybe five) theses which are central to scientific realism 
1. There exists a mind-independent world.
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2. Semantic reaism: The teoretical terms of scientific theories are intended to refer to
this mind-independent world (as opposed to merely referring to sense-data or to
readings on meters or suchlike).
3. The progress of science is due to the increasing verisimilitude of scientific theories.
We might put it  another way: scientific theories gain in explanatory power and
empirical  accuracy  because  the  descriptions  that  they  provide  of  a  mind-
independent  reality  more accurately describe that  mind-independent  reality  than
previous (less empirically accurate) theories.
4. We have the epistemic capacity to confirm our scientific theories and furthermore
least some of those scientific theories have in been fact confirmed. 
5. The aim of science is truth rather than empirical adequacy.
Not  all  realists  accept  all  of  these  things  whole-heartedly.  In  particular  there  is
disagreement over which parts of theories we are entitled to regard as confirmed and about
which parts of the world (for example, structures or entities) we can take science as having
continuity of reference. There will also be disagreement on how it is that we can condirm
our theories and what sort of threshold of success supplies this. But all realists must agree
that some manner of confirmation is achievable and has (in some circumstances) been
achieved. For this reason, we would not need to see Born having a whole-hearted realist
commitment to all the statements of a scientific theory in order for us to consider him a
realist of some stripe—an indication that he thinks that we are entitled to believe in parts
of our theories and that we have some principled reason for doing so would be sufficient.
 3.1.1 The Metaphysical Commitment
I’m now going to look at each of these commitments in turn, with reference to the parts of
Born’s work (and a few other relevant points). First, we need to ask whether or not Born
has the appropriate  metaphysical  commitment.  I  think that  we can argue here that  his
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invariant realism does commit him to a mind-independent world. Born doesn’t use those
exact words, but remember what the goal is—to explain subjective experiences in terms of
objective  elements  of  the  world  and to  oppose  Dingle’s  phenomenalism.  Born  clearly
recognises  the  problem at  hand—that  we  could  not  be  committed  to  the  truth  of  our
theories if we do not think that there is at least some objective component of the world.
Invariant realism seems to be a clear commitment to the claim that there are at least some
aspects  of  the  world  that  are  mind-independent  in  that  there  exist  properties  that  all
observers, perhaps after making multiple observations, will come to agree upon. We get a
very clear statement of this in Born’s paper Physics and Metaphysics (Born 1950), one of
his various works in which he takes issue with Einstein’s philosophy of science. He writes
of the view of quantum mechanics in which ‘there is no objectively existing world, no
sharp distinction between subject and object’, saying of it ‘There is of course some truth to
it, but I do not consider this position to be very fortunate’ (Born 1950 105). It’s not very
fortunate, Born thinks, because we should really understand external world talk (which is
at best ‘pre-scientific’ in his view) as talk about invariants of observation  - the gestalt
psychology that I’ve mentioned earlier. Physics is able to identify such invariants on ‘a
different  level  of  perception’ via  measuring  equipment.  Again,  we  can  see  clearly  a
commitment to invariant features as mind-independent.
 3.1.2 The Semantic Commitment
We  can  also  make  a  case  for  Born’s  invariant  realism  adhering  to  the  semantic
commitment. Invariant realism makes this commitment because it states that in talking
about quantities like charge, mass or spin we are talking about real aspects of the world
behind the phenomena and not just, for example, where the needle on the meter of our
measuring equipment lies. I also think that Born’s commitment to the reasonableness of
particle and wave talk discussed earlier  indicates a semantic realism about them. Born
thinks that it is still perfectly meaningful to talk about electrons being particles in modern
physics despite their odd properties in quantum mechanics. In Physics and Metaphysics he
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writes,‘I  think the fact  that  various  observations  of  electrons  give us  always the same
charge, rest-mass and spin, justifies perfectly speaking of them as real particles’ (Born
1950 105). This seems to be a clear commitment to the claim that electron talk refers to
objects in the real world. He goes on to criticise the conventionalism espoused by Poincaré
(in  his  youth)  and  Einstein.  Born  understands  this  doctrine  as  saying  that  ‘all  human
concepts  are  free  inventions  of  the  mind  and  conventions  between  different  minds,
justifiable  only by their  usefulness  in  ordinary  experience’ (1950 105).  This  he  thinks
might be appropriate for the more abstract components of theories but is the wrong way to
regard the measurable parts of a theory like this. He supplies the proposal of Schrödinger’s
to replace the concept of an electron with a ‘diffuse cloud of electricity’ saying that ‘It was
soon abandoned since electrons could not be counted. The corpuscular character of the
electron is certainly not a convention’ (Born 1950 106).
So  we  can  see  here  that  Born  clearly  has  a  commitment  to  reality  that  goes  beyond
experience. This commitment is to invariants, but we should be clear that this is not just a
commitment to invariant mathematical structures but also to quantities such as charge, rest
mass,  etc.  Furthermore  it  also  appears  to  contain  a  commitment  to  the  entities
(fundamental particles) that possess such quantities.
 3.1.3 The Epistemic Commitment
Can we find a commitment to the concept that we have an epistemic warrant to regard at
least some of the content of our scientific theories as true, or that we can know things
about an objective, mind-independent world, in Born’s work? Something that does indicate
that  he  has  such  a  position  is  the  ‘denying  the  distinction’ (see  Maxwell  1962)  style
argument that he gives in Physical Reality (Born 1953). We can see in this the epistemic
commitment  because  it  commits  Born  to  the  claim that  observations  of  the  world  of
electrons via complex measuring equipment is not a fundamentally different activity to
observation of the everyday world with our senses, i.e. that there is not an epistemically
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significant distinction between the observable and the unobservable. We can also see it in
two elements of Born’s invariant realism. The first is his claim (for example in Born 1950
105)  that  observation  of  the  everyday  world  rests  on  identification  of  invariants.  The
second is in realism about invariant quantities full stop. Born thinks that it is in virtue of
our  capacity  to  identify  such  quantities  as  invariant  under  transformation  that  we  are
entitled to be realist about them. Thus, we have the capacity to gain knowledge about the
external world via identifying and measuring invariant quantities.
Born also employs something very much like an inference to the best explanation or no
miracles  argument  in  Symbol  and Reality  (Born  1966).  Recall  that  he  writes  that  the
‘coincidence  of  structures  revealed by using different  sense organs  and communicable
from one individual to the other is accidental’ is extremely improbable and that we are thus
entitled to consider it essentially wrong.
Now it does seem to be the case that Born does not have an epistemic commitment to all
aspects of a theory.  His commitment  is  merely to the  invariant components of such a
theory. Hence, Born’s realism is of the selective variety, although it does not appear to be
either entity or structural realism. There are structural elements to invariant realism (more
on  this  later  in  this  chapter),  but  Born  seems  to  be  primarily  committed  to  invariant
quantities.
 3.1.4 Commitment to Progress/Continuity
It’s a little less clear that Born is committed to the increasing verisimilitude of science and
to the continuity of its current theories with past ones. I think, though, that we get at least a
hint of this in Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance (Born 1949) when Born discusses
the possibility  of  physics  returning to  a  deterministic  world view at  some time in the
future. Here he writes:
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It would be silly and arrogant to deny any possibility of a return to determinism. For no
physical  theory  is  final;  new  experiences  may  force  us  to  alterations  and  even
reversions. Yet scanning the history of physics in the way that we have done we see
fluctuations and vacillations, but hardly a reversion to more primitive concepts. (Born
1949 109)
Now it’s true that this is not quite equivalent to a commitment to progress and continuity
but I think we might find an implication of it here: Born understands that theories can and
do change—no theory is immune to it. Despite this, when theories change they do not
revert to ‘more primitive concepts’. By ‘primitive’, Born could just mean ‘earlier in time’
but he could also mean ‘less sophisticated’ or ‘less comprehensive’. We can find reason to
take the latter interpretation in Born’s discussion of mass and length in relativity—we find
that what we once thought were objective quantities to be mere projections. This I think is
at least an indication that Born considers theory-change in physics to be progressive in
nature.
I do think that it is fairly clear that Born thinks that physics progresses, rather than merely
changes, over time though. This seems implicit in the structure of Natural Philosophy of
Cause  and Change,  which  tells  a  story  of  increasingly  sophisticated  physical  theories
increasingly coming to respect Born’s principles of contiguity and antecedence as they
grow in sophistication (there are details on this in Chapter 3—Born on Causation). We can
also see Born’s views on this in Physics in the Last Fifty Years (Born 1951), a published
version  of  a  talk  that  Born  gave  to  section  A of  the  British  Association  meeting  at
Edinburgh in August 1951 (incidentally, this is the meeting at which Dingle delivered the
talk that Born responds to in  Physical Reality). Here, Born gives his own account of the
changes in physics from 1901-1951, a period throughout which he had been active as a
scholar. The whole thing gives an impression of revolution and progress, but I think this
comes across most clearly when Born discusses advances in atomic physics in the early
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20th century. He writes ‘In fact, atomic research had reached here a point where progress
was not possible without a radical change in our fundamental conceptions’ (Born 1951
116). The meaning here seems clear—that revolution in physics lead to progress in our
understanding.
What  about  continuity  of  ideas/concepts?  Born  certainly  understands  the  problem.  He
writes in  The Concept of Reality in Physics  with regards to realism about invariants that
‘One  complication  arises  in  physics,  and that  is  that  the  magnitudes  which  appear  as
invariants  in  one  period  of  knowledge,  and  are  therefore  considered  there  as
representations of “reality”, lose their standing in other periods’ (Born 1962 28). In the
particular case of relativity, where we find that quantities like length and mass are observer
dependent.  Born writes that ‘Distances, time intervals, and masses as defined before are
no longer invariants but projections. In their stead are now other invariants called “rest
length”, “proper time”, and “rest mass”. If these are used one again obtains symbols which
are suitable for describing material realities’ (Born 1962 29). Born’s solution here seems to
be that although we’ve discovered that some quantities are not in fact invariants, we’ve
also found they are projections of invariants which corresponds to the old properties. So
although we find that mass is not an invariant, we do find a new corresponding invariant
property, rest mass, of which the old concept of mass is a projection. In this way we still
get some continuity across different physical theories.
Born gives a slightly different response to this problem in terms of quantum mechanics,
which comes through his ideas about the widening of concepts. Recall his argument that
we are entitled to call electrons in quantum mechanics particles (Born 1953 136, 1962 24-
5). He thinks that although a quantum-mechanical particle like an electron does not share
all of the same characteristics as a classical particle, we are still entitled to refer to both as
‘particles’. This is because they both still share enough properties—for Born it is that both
are possessed of invariant properties like charge and mass—to say that what we have done
is  to  widen the  concept.  Such widening  of  concepts  is  something that  Born  thinks  is
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standard practice in mathematics and physics. So I think this again indicates that Born
thinks that there is continuity in the history of physics—that ‘electron’ refers to the same
thing in both classical and quantum physics. In this sense I think we can be justified as
seeing Born as at  least  in some cases being sympathetic to continuity of reference for
theoretical terms such as mass even though the meaning of the term has changes. These
particular  cases  are  where  we  can  justify  ‘extending  the  concept’ talk.  One  thing  in
particular that I think does point to this is Born’s (earlier mentioned) claim that it might
have been better to have kept the term “mass” referring to the invariant quantity (which we
call  “rest  mass”). In  this  sense,  what  is  understood  by  ‘mass’ still  has  continuity  of
reference to the invariant quantity.
 3.2 Hold On a Minute…
So I’ve given an argument  that  Born fulfils  all  four criteria  needed to commit  him to
scientific realism but he does say certain things that don’t realist. Born repeatedly praises a
heuristic technique, attributed by him to Einstein and Heisenberg, that says that we should
remove things that are not observable from our physical theories and it’s worth saying why
this doesn’t indicate that he is an anti-realist. He says in Natural Philosophy of Cause and
Chance:
Heisenberg justified  the  rejection of  traditional  concepts  by a  general
methodological principle: a satisfactory theory should use no quantities
which  do  not  correspond  to  anything  observable.  The  classical
frequencies  mv(n)  and  the  whole  idea  of  orbits  have  this  doubtful
character...Now quantum mechanics itself is not free from unobservable
quantities.  (The  wave-function  of  Schrödinger,  for  instance  is  not
observable, only the square of its modulus.) To rid a theory of all traces
of such redundant concepts would lead to unbearable clumsiness. I think
158
though  there  is  much  to  be  said  for  cleaning  a  theory  in  the  way
recommended by Heisenberg, the success depends entirely on scientific
experience, intuition, and tact (Born 1949a 88-89).
He espouses a similar position in Is Classical Mechanics in Fact Deterministic? (discussed
in detail in Chapter 5—Born on Determinism):
Modern  physics  has  achieved  its  greatest  successes  by  applying  a
principle  of  methodology,  that  concepts  whose  application  requires
distinctions that  cannot  in principle  be observed, are  meaningless and
should  be  eliminated.  The  most  striking  examples  of  this  are
EINSTEIN’s foundation of the special and general theories of relativity
(of which the first rejects the concept of absolute simultaneity, and the
second the distinction between gravity and acceleration as unobservable)
and HEISENBERG’s foundation of quantum mechanics (by eliminating
the unobservable orbital radii and frequencies from Bohr’s theory of the
atom) (Born 1955 167).
On the face of it, this does sound like an operationalist principle and it is clear that Born
agrees  with  its  application  in  physics.  But  remember  that  Born  believes  in  molecules
because we can see their tracks in a cloud chamber. He believes in invariant quantities that
stand behind the appearances which are their projections, and he thinks that it is perfectly
acceptable to talk about particles because they possess such invariant quantities. None of
these things can be directly observed. Remember too that Born explicitly does not think
that there is a meaningful distinction between ‘observable with the senses’ and ‘observable
with equipment’. What Born means (and indeed what he says in the second quotation) is
that we should not treat as real things that are unobservable even in principle. There is a
world of difference between arguing that we should not be realists about things not directly
observable and arguing that we should be sceptical about things that are not observable or
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measurable even in principle. The first position is indeed anti-realist,  but the second is
merely a species of weak empiricism or weak operationalism.
Redhead (1980) notes that we can regard some theories as having ‘surplus’ structure in
their mathematical formulations, in that they have components which are uninterpreted in
the sense that they play no part in the inferences by which the theory can be tested. We
might also think of van Fraassen’s discussion of absolute space in Newtonian mechanics
(1980): absolute space is to all intents and purposes empirically irrelevant to the theory, in
that any particular value that absolute coordinates take is as equally empirically adequate
as any other value. Van Fraassen is of course not a realist, but with regards to realism we
can say the following: if we have an argument that some particular aspect of a theory
cannot be confirmed (or indeed falsified) by any test whatsoever, then it is by no means
unreasonable to argue that this aspect should not be the subject of realist commitment. This
position would be a selective realism, but we have already seen that Born subscribes to
such a position in that he is only committed to invariants. For Born to reject the reality of
in principle unobservable components would be entirely consistent with his position on
invariants and, frankly, is quite a plausible position for any realist to take full stop.
Still, there is at least one philosopher who thinks otherwise. Galavotti in  Operationism,
Probability and Quantum Mechanics (1995) defends Born against a charge of subjectivism
about probability (more on this in Chapter 6—Born on Probability). Part of her defence is
based on Born and Heisenberg’s rejection of positivism based on crude sense data. She
cautions us, though, against taking this to mean that Born is a realist. She writes ‘Here the
word “realism” should not lead us astray, for Born seems to be as much of an anti-realist as
Heisenberg:  “...scientific  forecasts—Born  says—do  not  refer  to  ‘reality’  but  to  our
knowledge of  reality”’ (Galavotti  1995 107).   How can we,  if  at  all,  reconcile  such a
statement with the realism that I’ve argued Born espouses? First, I’m going to look at the
context  of  the  quote  Galavotti  uses.  It’s  from the  paper  In  Memory  of  Einstein,  first
published in  1965 and reprinted in  a  later  edition of  Physics  in  My Generation (Born
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1969). In the section that Galavotti quotes from, Born discusses his disagreements with
Einstein over quantum mechanics (again, there is more detail on some of this in Chapter 6
—Born on Probability).  He thinks  that  the  root  of  these  disagreements  was in  fact  ‘a
fundamental difference in our view of nature’ (Born 1965 163). Born gives his view as
follows:
What it boils down to is that scientific forecasts do not refer directly to
‘reality’ but to our knowledge of reality. This means that the so-called
‘laws  of  nature’  allow  us  to  draw  conclusions  from  our  limited,
approximate knowledge at the moment on a future situation which, of
course,  can  also  only  be  approximately  described.  This  is  a  way  of
thinking diametrically opposed to Einstein’s own, and it is not surprising
that  he  looked  upon me as  a  renegade.  Yet  I  have  the  feeling  that  I
pursued the path which he showed us in his great days, while he himself
stopped at a certain point. The point is the idea that the outer world as it
really is, is faithfully and exactly described by science. Seen from this
angle,  today’s theory of matter is  indeed a jumble of absurdities,  and
EINSTEIN from his own point of view was quite right to reject it or, at
most, to accept it as only provisional. (Born 1965 163-4)
 
This certainly does sound an awful lot like an anti-realist position. I think that we are faced
with three options here—1) Born was a scientific realist but by the time he came to write
the above in 1965, he had changed his position; 2) Born was always an anti-realist and
although much of his work appears to express a position aligned with scientific realism, to
think that it does is to misinterpret it; 3) Born was always a scientific realist and although
the above appears to express a kind of scientific anti-realism, to think that it does is to
misinterpret it; 4) Born does not have a considered, consistent position– he has conflicting
intuitions with regards to the matter and has not reconciled them. I think that 1) is certainly
possible, but we can make a decent case for 3). Both options 2) and 3) require extra work
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to establish what Born really means in the above passage if he is not an anti-realist, and I
see little evidence for 2). A decent case for 3) ought to also function as an argument against
4)
How could this statement be compatible with a realist position? One thing to remember is
that Born is not a realist about  everything in a physical theory, merely about invariants.
Another is that Born is committed to a statistical explanation of physics. Something else is
that although Born regularly praises Heisenberg’s position that things that are in principle
unmeasurable  are  not  meaningful,  he  is  also  committed  to  realism  about  indirectly
measurable entities like electrons. This is indicative of a weak empiricism, not a strong one
—Born means that we ought not to take as real elements of a theory that are in principle
unmeasurable,  not merely unmeasurable in any direct manner.  Despite not taking such
elements as real, Born does not think that we should purge them from a theory (Born 1949
89), so he clearly does not think they are semantically meaningless. He writes that ‘to rid a
theory of all traces of such redundant concepts would lead to unbearable clumsiness. I
think, though there is much to be said for cleaning a theory in the way recommended by
Heisenberg, the success depends entirely on scientific experience, intuition, and tact’ (Born
1949 89).  So there is clearly some useful role that such concepts can play in a theory, even
though we regard them as redundant. I suspect that what Born means is this: there is no
sense in ridding a theory entirely of such concepts because they can be useful when we
talk about the theory—hence why throwing them all out can lead to clumsiness. Still, such
concepts are ‘redundant’ and so we should not take them as real.
A further note here is  that Born takes Einstein to have used this  principle  in unifying
gravitation and acceleration (Born 1955 167). This, I suspect, is what he refers to when he
talks about himself ‘pursuing’ the path that Einstein showed in his early days.  The point of
all this is that when Born tells us that he does not agree with the view that ‘the outer world
as it really is, is faithfully and exactly described by science’, we can still understand him as
being a  realist  because his  realism is  a  selective  one:   he thinks  that  theories  contain
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elements that we are not justified in being realists about, as well as those that we are.
Modern physics contains things like superpositions of the wavefunction (which I’ll argue
Born doesn’t take as being real in Chapter 6—Born on Probability) which are in principle
unobservable, as well as various invariant quantities which are.
I think we can say a few things about Born’s statement that scientific forecasts refer only
to our ‘knowledge of reality’. The first is that, as we’ve already seen, Born does not take
any scientific theory as being final. The second is that Born is committed to the uncertainty
principle and the fundamental indeterminism of quantum mechanics (1949 104-5). This
means that we only ever have incomplete information about some particular state and it
means that we can only make predictions within the limits of that information. For Born
we are limited in what we take as being real by what we can determine to be invariants of
observation and transformation. We also necessarily operate under epistemic restrictions—
we cannot know everything due to (at least) the restrictions on measurement imposed by
the uncertainty principle. I suspect that this is what Born means by ‘knowledge of reality’
rather than ‘reality’.  We might also say that the reference to ‘knowledge’ refers to the
epistemic component of realism, i.e. that scientific forecasts tell  us  what we can know
about reality.
So what Born is saying here is this: when he was corresponding with Einstein and arguing
about quantum mechanics, Einstein took Born’s defence of it to be a defence of the whole
theory,  laws,  superpositions  and  all.  But  Born  doesn’t  interpret  the  whole  theory
realistically—only the observably invariant components of it. That is what the confusion
was about. So we can still say that Born is a realist, it’s just that it is clear that he is only a
realist about invariants and the entities and structures that possess them.
We might also worry that Born does not apply this principle in a consistent manner – after
all a wavefunction does not seem to sit in the same category as electron orbits. A response
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to this point is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 – Born on Probability (section 4.2.2)
because the bulk of the discussion regarding Born’s anti-realism regarding wavefunctions
is  there.  The  conclusion  of  the  argument  there  is  there  is  a  way  of  reading  Born
consistently, but even if we do take him to be misapplying the principle in this instance, it
does not seem to threaten his realism. 
 3.2.1 A Lack of Identity
Born acknowledges that electrons are not individuable. Ought we to worry that this is in
conflict with the argument that he is a realist? We can cash out this worry in three ways:  1)
Is there a general conflict between realism about electrons and the fact that they are not
individuable? 2) Is there a specific conflict between Born’s invariant realism and realism
about  particles  that  are  not  individuable?  3)  Does  Born  think  that  things  that  are  not
individuable are not real, or at least things about which we ought not to be realists?
3) Might come about in the following way: Something about the inability to individuate an
electron might lead to an inability to identify invariant quantities born by it.W.V.O. Quine’s
famous slogan holds ‘no entity without identity’. This rather pithily sums up the position
that our ontology should not contain entities for which there are no clear identity criteria
(SEP Quine). Quine’s target here is primarily abstract objects, but given that particles in
quantum mechanics also plausibly lack clear identity criteria might we also have worries
about them? We might also think to Leibniz’s identity of indiscernables – that no two (or
more) entities share all of the same properties. 
It  is  important  to  consider  exactly what is  implied by the claim that  electrons are not
individuable. Lowe (1994) describes the standard example as follows: If some electron a is
captured by an atom and at some time that atom releases some electron b, then there is no
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objective fact of the matter as to whether or not  a=b. What is not implied by quantum
mechanics is that electrons are not self identical. There does exist a fact of the matter that
some determinate number of electrons persists in the system – the state with one electron is
measurably distinct from the state with two electrons – and an electron is always identical
with itself  (Lowe 1994).  Lowe further notes that he considers this   -  determinate self-
identity  –  to  be  the  ‘hallmark’ of  entityhood.  Lowe  further  argues  that  there  is  no
contradiction  in  regarding  electrons  as  (sometimes)  vague  objects,  i.e.  that  during
entanglement the fact that quantum mechanics implies that there is no fact of the matter as
to whether or not some a=b is not in and of itself a contradiction of the idea that they are
individuals.
This is not the be-all-and-end-all of the matter: French and Krause (1995) note that we
might find Lowe’s position to be unsatisfactory.  There is no mere epistemic problem of
telling whether or not some electron is a or b. Quantum mechanics tells us that we cannot
in principle do this. They write ‘two (or more) bosons or two (or more) fermions in the
appropriate  entangled  state  have  the  same monadic  properties  and the  same relational
properties to one another’ (French and Krause 1995 20)
So if we are to account for (particles like) electrons as individuals whilst in an entangled
state despite their being indistinguishable, then there must be some ontology of relations to
allow this.  French and Krause note that there does exist such a relation, but accepting it
comes with a heavy price These relations will  have to  be ‘strongly non-supervenient’.
They are non-supervenient because they cannot be dependent on the monadic properties of
the electrons (or any fermion or boson) involved. Now, when we apply this to Lowe’s
position, we find that electrons are individuals but it is indeterminate whether or not some
particular electron of an entangled pair a and b is a or b. Therefore the indeterminacy of
indeinity of the electrons must arise because of these relations. French and Krause write
‘One view might be to say that, given particles are individuals, their identity is perfectly
determinate, only, because of the existence of non-supervenient relations, we cannot tell
whether electron a  is identical to b or not’ (1995 22). Further to this (French and Krause
165
1995 22)  we cannot in principle tell whether or not this is the case. Quantum mechanics
does not allow us to get inside an entangled state and find out what is ‘really’ going on,
This, French and Krause note is the ‘price’ of Lowe’s position (1995 22), and it is a fairly
heavy one. The alternative, which they take to be more palatable given the ontological cost
of  Lowe’s  position,  is  to  argue that  electrons  (and particles  like  them)  are in  fact  not
individuals at all. 
We  might  also  note  again  here  that  Lowe  regards  self-identity  as  the  hallmark  of
entityhood and takes electrons to uncontroversially possess it. French (2015) argues that
Born,  amongst  others,  denies  the  self-identity  of  particles  in  quantum mechanics.  He
writes: ‘Alternatively, but relatedly, non-individuality can be understood in terms of the
denial of self-identity. This suggestion can be found most prominently in the philosophical
reflections of Born, Schrödinger, Hesse and Post (Born 1943; Schrödinger 1952; Hesse
1963; Post 1963). It is immediately and clearly problematic, however: how can we have
objects that are not identical to themselves?’ (French 2015). So what exactly does Born say
about the individuality of quantum particles. He writes:
If now these photons are treated as genuine particles, having an individuality
of their own, Planck’s law would not be obtained. One has instead to assume
that two states which differ only by the exchange of two photons are physically
indistinguishable and have statistically  to be counted only as  one state.  In
other words, photons have no individuality. (Born 1943 27-28)
He writes similarly of electrons: 
States in which two electrons would have the same set of quantum numbers
(those of the spin included) do not exist; and, moreover, if two sets of quantum
numbers differ only by exchanging those of one electron with those of another
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they represent only one and the same state of the whole atom. Here again we
recognise the lack of individuality of electrons. (Born 1943)
So we can see here how, if we take Born’s statement about photons not being ‘genuine
particles, having an individuality of their own’ to also apply to fermions, which does not
seem  unreasonable  given  how  how  he  phrases  the  exclusion  principle  in  the  above
quotation, we might regard him as taking quantum particles in general to lack self-identity.
We might also take this to express an antirealism about quantum particles  -  things that
lack an individuality of their own ought not to be considered genuine particles, and thus
we ought not to realist about them. Equally, it might also be taken to merely express a view
that bosons and fermions ought not to be counted as particles and no more than that – they
are simply weird objects that do not correspond to the notion of ‘particle’. In this way, we
need not take what he says to indicate any kind of general antirealism – it’s just a statement
about what sort of objects fundamental particles are not. It’s also not clear from this that
Born is thinking in terms of the formal and metaphysical properties of lack of self-identity
here.
The question is then what Born’s position on the matter is with regards to his invariant
realism,  if  indeed  he  has  a  considered  one.  In  Physical  Reality  (1953).  He  writes  of
particles :
The main invariants are called charge, mass (or rather: rest-mass), spin, etc;
and in every instance,  when we are able to  determine these quantities,  we
decide we have to do with a definite particle. I maintain that we are justified in
regarding these particles as real in a sense not essentially different from the
usual meaning of the word (Born 1953 160). 
He expands on this point in The Concept of Reality in Physics (1958), saying
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...by making complementary experiments with negative or positive rays, we
can  obtain  sets  of  invariant  magnitudes  associated  with  these  phenomena:
charges,  masses,  spins,  numbers.  This  is  enough  to  permit  us  to  talk  of
electrons or ions as particles of a definite kind, using the previously explained
principle  of  the  widening  of  concepts.  These  particles  are  no  longer  like
particles of grain or dust. True, under certain conditions of experiment we can
directly see the paths of individual particles; many have seen the atomic tracks
observed  in  the  cloud  chamber,  or  traces  produced  in  fine-grained
photographic  emulsions.  On  the  other  hand,  these  particles  have  no
individuality. For statistical purposes, they must be counted in a different way
from the way in which ordinary objects are counted. In large numbers they
lose their particle character altogether and produce interference phenomena,
which make one think of waves. (Born 1958 30-31)
The ‘widening of concepts’ is the previously discussed position that it’s unproblematic to
expand concepts to admit newly discovered features of mathematics or nature, even if they
don’t share all of the same properties. Now, even if we do grant that the position Born
takes in  Experiment and Theory in Physics  (1943) is one in which the self-identity of
particles in quantum mechanics is denied and that this denial is in conflict with a realism
about those particles, it does not seem that the position expressed here (in Born 1953 and
Born 1958) is the same. He fairly clearly takes it that there is nothing about a quantum
particle’s lack of individuality that means that it is not a particle or that it is not real. 
There are a couple of options here – one is that there is simply an unconsidered tension in
his position. Born realises that electrons are not individuable, and may not even possess
self-identity, but does not realise that this introduces a metaphysical problem if we want to
take electrons to be entities. The other is that he does realise that electrons are not entities
in some sense, but whatever they are, they are also collections of invariant properties and
can be referred to as particles and considered real. So maybe the object causing the track in
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the cloud-chamber lacks individuality in some important sense and so maybe it is not a
‘thing’ or  an  entity.  He  writes  in  Physical  Reality  ‘a  thing  may  be  real  though  very
different from other things we know’.  But whatever its ontological category is,  for Born
an electron is that microscopic collection of invariant properties that causes tracks in cloud
chambers. There are a number of things which point to Born considering electrons to be
‘real’, not least that he explicitly says that they are. 
Now, we might make a criticism of this point. French and Krause (1995) in their reply to
Lowe (1994) if electrons are not self-identical, then it seems hard to to imagine them to be
‘bundles’ of properties – how exactly can we tie the properties that make up the bundle
together if they are supposed to be held by something that lacks self-identity. Again, we
might point out that Born doesn’t seem to regard this as a problem for his position, so if
there is a tension, it’s one that he doesn’t recognise.
If electrons do lack self-identity, then I think it might well be hard to see how they can be
real entities. So this might well point to some unconsidered tension in Born’s position.
Precisely why Born does not seem to recognise a tension is not really clear. He may well
simply be acting under an experimentalists intuition – we can still observe electrons via
tracks in cloud chambers, and we can still count them, although as Born mentions we don’t
do so in  the  way that  we do for  classical  particles.  He might  well  be  unaware  of  or
uninterested any wider metaphysical or formal implications. As mentioned earlier, there is
certainly no indication that he (especially when he is explicitly writing on realism in the
‘50s) is committed to Quinean and Leibnizian principles. 
 It’s also worth noting briefly that there are potential roads for realists about particles to
take even if they deny the self-identity of a quantum particle This might seem odd – how is
it that we can even refer to something that does not have self-identity? Marcus (1993 25)
suggests that we might make a distinction between objects and things. All objects can be
referred to, but not all objects are ‘things’ that identity applies to. French (2014) takes this
as starting point for a ‘philosophically respectable’ account of non-individuals in quantum
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mechanics in which we are still able to count such objects, albeit in an ordinal, rather than
cardinal  manner  (i.e.  first,  second,  third  etc.).  There  is  obviously  considerable
disagreement over whether such an approach should be accepted and indeed no indication
that Born endorses this sort of solution. I would not want to argue that he does, but merely
to note that if there is a tension in his account, it’s not one which will necessarily tear it
apart. 
  It seems fairly clear from this that Born does not sign up to anything like a ‘no entity
without identity’ principle. He thinks that we have good reason to think that electrons are
real because via a complementary set of experiments we can determine the magnitudes of
the invariant properties that they bear.   It  is  worth remembering that  there are  several
strands to Born’s realism  -  he runs a ‘denying the distinction’ style argument against the
observable/unobservable  dichotomy  and  an  inference  to  the  best  explanation  style
argument regarding particle tracks in cloud chambers as well as the argument that we can
have objective knowledge of invariant properties.  It’s fairly clear that objective knowledge
of invariants is meant to be objective knowledge of the microscopic world. Born seems to
be aware of the issue at hand, noting that such particles have no ‘individuality’. Although
this means that they are not like the particles of classical physics, he does not take this as a
barrier to them being particles or to them being real. Born doesn’t think that anything
about their lack of individuality leads to us being unable to identify invariant quantities.
So again  we  can  see  that  invariant  quantities  are  the  hallmarks  of  reality,  or  at  least
epistemic warrant for belief, for Born.   
One other thing that might be going here is a tension of  realist intuitions. One reading of
invariant realism is that it is a variety of structural realism (a more detailed consideration
of this appears in the next section). One obvious way out of worries about the individuality
of particles in quantum mechanics is to interpret them as real, but in a purely structural
manner, i.e. not as individuals at all. Now Born does seem to want to talk about ‘definite
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particles’  but acknowledges that they are not individuals, at least in large numbers. He
certainly wants to say that we can talk about particles as being real. He is also clearly
impressed by cloud chamber experiments and might well have an intuition that they tell us
something important about the reality of particles. So one other way we might see Born
looking at particles than simply as weird objects is that there is an unacknowledged tension
between experimentalist/entity realist intuitions and structuralist inclinations. 
Now, this might be a tension in his position, but at the very least, it seems to be a tension
that he himself does not recognise, or perhaps is unaware of. I think that it’s fair to argue
that a realist account of science that contains tensions is still a realist account. 
 4 Symbol and Reality: Is Born a Structural Realist?
It’s clear that Born is a semi-realist of some kind. Given that this realism is focussed on
invariants  we might  reasonably ask if  he is  actually  a  structural  realist  of  some kind.
Ladyman  (2016)  indicates  that  Born’s  invariant  realism  is  at  least  related  to  Ontic
Structural Realism. Born is quoted, along with Cassirer and Eddington, and Ladyman goes
on to say ‘The idea then is that we have various representations of some physical structure
which may be transformed or translated into one another, and then we have an invariant
state under such transformations which represents the objective state of affairs’ (Ladyman
2016).  In  Remodelling  Structural  Realism,  French  and  Ladyman,  also  write  that
‘structuralist  element  creeps  in’ when Born  relates  psychological  gestalts  to  invariants
(2003 51).
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We should take a look at precisely what structural realism entails. Broadly, it comes in two
flavours: epistemic structural realism (ESR) and ontic structural realism (OSR). Both agree
that we ought to be realists about only the structural components of scientific theories.
What they disagree on is how we should regard the non-structural components (Ladyman
2016).  ESR  claims  (broadly)  that  we  cannot  know anything  about  them  beyond  the
relations that hold between them, i.e. it acts as a purely epistemic constraint on realism.
OSR  makes  a  metaphysical  (ontic)  commitment,   regarding  the  ontological  status  of
individuals.   Ladyman  (2016)  notes  that  a  crude  statement  of  OSR is  the  claim  that
structure is all there is. OSR is a broader church than this. Ladyman (2016) writes ‘On the
broadest  construal  OSR is  any  form of  structural  realism based  on  an  ontological  or
metaphysical thesis that inflates the ontological priority of structure and relations’ . 
It certainly seems that there is a relation between invariant realism and Ontic Structural
Realism. Born certainly seems to want to talk about particles in addition to structures, but
we could  easily  read  Born’s  invariant  realism as  arguing  that  invariant  properties  are
ontologically prior to the particles that bear them. We could also take particles to really be
something like nodes in a quantum field.. Although it’s clearly the mathematical structure
of an invariant that defines it as such, for Born they seem to be the markers of properties
and entities that possess those features. So Born is a realist about invariants because of
their structural features
We can still quite happily interpret Born as being fully committed to realism in a structural
manner. He is still committed to a mind-independent external world. He still thinks that
there is no proper distinction between observable and unobservable and that ‘theoretical
language’ does not simply just translate to directly observable concepts. We still  retain
continuity of reference across theories via reference to invariant structures. We still have
epistemic warrant to believe in the structural elements of theories as telling us truths about
the world and beyond the directly observable. 
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 4.1 ‘Symbol and Reality’
The above is at least true for Born’s writings on the subject in the 1940s and 50s, when he
is focussed on invariant realism. I think he does lean more towards something that might
be a more elimintive variety of OSR (i.e., one that contains only structures). I’ve separated
the  discussion  of  this  paper  from  the  others,  because  I  do  think  that  it  represents  a
somewhat  different  position  to  that  presented  in  Physical  Reality.  Here,  he  does  talk
explicitly  about  structure  as  the  hallmark  of  reality,  arguing that  it  is  well-defined
structures that are the key to finding out what we can know of the world.
Born  starts  the  paper  by  again  describing  naïve  realism and  discussing  an  experience
which induced in him a kind of scepticism. Born had an older cousin studying philosophy
who once asked him how he knew that they both saw the same leaf as the same colour.
Born says ‘Thus it dawned on me that fundamentally everything is subjective, everything
without exception. That was a shock’ (Born 1966 144). The problem, as Born sees it, is not
to distinguish between subjective and objective, but to move from the subjective to the
objective. He notes that he has not found any solution to this problem in philosophy, but he
thinks that he has found one in physics (1966 144).
Born gives a brief overview of Kant, noting the distinction that he makes between a priori
and a posteriori forms of reasoning. Born also notes that the ‘thing in itself’ (1966 145),
that which lies behind the phenomena, is according to Kant not knowable.  This is not
particularly satisfactory to Born as he takes it that one must accept that there is such a
thing as the thing in itself in order to understand how there can be ‘objective statements
valid for all individuals’ (Born 1966 145) and also declare that it itself is not knowable.
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Born  then  briefly  mentions  Husserl,  whose  lectures  he  attended  as  an  undergraduate,
noting that his position ‘did not satisfy me’ (Born 1966 146). Presumably, he is referring to
the course on the philosophy of mathematics that he attended, as Born found the other
course  of  Husserl’s  too  dull  to  see  to  completion.  According  to  Born,  Husserl’s
mathematics  course  offered  a  phenomenological  solution  to  the  problem  of  the
epistemological validity of mathematical axioms (Born 1978 96).  He then gives a brief
account of logical positivism and materialism, charactering them in much the same terms
as he did in his earlier discussions of realism.
He then turns to his argument—how we can obtain objective knowledge via the processes
of science. Born starts by returning to the familiar theme that most scientists are naïve
realists  when  it  comes  to  experiments.  They  are,  he  says  ‘content  to  observe  a
phenomenon, to measure it and describe it in their characteristic slang’ (Born 1966 146).
This, Born thinks, is no different to any other craft. Things become different, he tells us,
when  scientists  start  to  develop  theories.  They  use  concepts  that  transcend  those  of
ordinary experience and ultimately develop complex mathematical formalisms to describe
their theories (Born 1966 147). Born asks what is happening when physics does this. He
answers ‘In physics the mathematical formulae are not an end in themselves, as in pure
mathematics, but symbols for some kind of reality which lies beyond the level of everyday
experience’ (Born 1966 147). Born thinks that the question of how to achieve objective
knowledge is connected with this answer.
Born  proposes  to  approach  the  problem by examining  certain  methods  of  thinking  in
physics. He notes that these are not primarily derived from philosophy, rather they have
been developed by scientists  when ‘the  traditional  thinking  of  philosophers  has  failed
when applied to modern physics’ (Born 1966 147). Nor are they ‘empiricist’ in that they
have been derived exclusively from experience. Rather, they are ‘pure ideas, inventions of
great thinkers’ that have been extensively tested by experience. Further, they have been
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enormously successful, not just in contributing to the understanding of natural phenomena,
but also in discovering new ones and to ‘human domination over nature’ (Born 1966 147).
The first of these methods is ‘decidability’, which he defines as ‘Use a concept only if it is
decidable  whether  it  can  be  applied  in  a  special  case,  or  not’ (Born  1966 147).  Born
describes how this principle was applied by Einstein in the development of relativity. As an
observer in sealed chamber cannot decide whether she is accelerating or in a gravitational
field, we must unify these concepts (Born 1966 148). The concept which we are unable to
apply,  and thus  ought  not  use,  is  that  acceleration  and  gravitational  force  are  distinct
things: hence we must unify them. Born also argues that decidability was crucial in the
development of quantum mechanics. When it became clear that the planetary model of the
atom was  inadequate,  Heisenberg  noticed  that  it  involved fundamentally  unobservable
concepts and developed a new theory using only those concepts which were empirically
decidable (Born 1966 148). Born thinks that we ought to apply the principle of decidability
to the problem at hand—how to gain objective knowledge of the world.
Born’s next section is titled ‘Comparability, Symbols’ (Born 1966 149). Here, he discusses
his solution to the problem discussed at the start of the paper—how is that we can obtain
objective data from sense impressions? Born thinks that we can do this  by comparing
different  sense impressions.  He notes  that  it  is  not  possible  to  determine  whether  one
person sees the same colour another—to conclusively determine whether the content of a
single sense impression is shared. He thinks, however that the situation is different with
multiple impressions of the same sense. Consider, he says, two different colours—for these
‘there exist decidable, communicable, objectively testable statements’ (Born 1966 149). He
notes that although it is not possible to determine if on viewing two leaves you share all
visual experience with another individual, it is perfectly possible to see if you agree on
whether or not they share the same hue. Born notes that this principle of ‘objectivication
[sic]’ is practised ‘systematically’ in physics (1966 149). He also states that this principle is
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the root of speaking, writing and of mathematics and proposes to term all such means of
communicating objective statements between individuals ‘symbols’ (1966 149).
The next method is ‘Correspondence, Coordination’ (Born 1966 150). This is the discovery
or development of corresponding pairs of symbols and sense impressions. Born gives some
of examples of this: Pythagoras’ discovery that the ‘natural’ intervals in music correspond
to the divisions of a vibrating string; measurement of temperature with a thermometer is
the  correspondence  of  the  sense  perception  of  heat  with  what  Born  refers  to  as  a
‘geometrical quantity’, the height of the mercury or the position of the needle (Born 1966
151).
Born notes that ‘In every field of experience this correspondence of sense impressions with
symbols has been established’ (Born 1966 151). In ordinary life, he thinks, this is done in a
fairly  simple  manner:  ‘the  words  and  sentences  of  a  language…  corresponding  to
perceptions, emotions etc. are learned and used without being further analysed’ (Born 1966
151).  He thinks that science goes much further though, and this leads him onto his next
method of thinking: structures.
The mathematical techniques (‘symbols’) used by the physical sciences reveal ‘structures’,
according to Born. He writes that ‘mathematics is just the detection and investigation of
structures of thinking which lie hidden in the mathematical symbols’ (Born 1966 151).
Born writes that the integer line consists of symbols which can be combined and operated
on by the axioms of  arithmetic.  From this,  he says,  we can reveal  a  ‘vast  number of
structures’ such prime numbers  and their  properties  (1966 151).  He further  notes  that
geometry and group theory also reveal and deal with structures.
Born doesn’t think that mathematical structures are, in and of themselves, real. Physics,
however, uses them by correlating mathematical symbols with observed phenomena. Born
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writes that ‘when this is done hidden structures are coordinated to phenomena’ (Born 1966
152).Those structures are taken by the physicist to be ‘the objective reality lying behind
the subjective phenomena’ (1966 152).
As an example of this, Born gives the gradual movement away from explanations in terms
of mechanical models and hidden mechanisms (for example, early atomic theory and the
ether explanation of EM forces)  to explanations in terms the mathematical structures of
theories themselves (Born describes Hertz’s treatment of the EM field as an ‘entity in its
own right (Born 1966 152)).  The development of quantum mechanics is, Born thinks, a
further example of this: it has moved far away from the need for explanation in terms of
mechanical models. He tells us that ‘Thus physical research has won a freedom necessary
to handle the ever increasing amount of observations and measurements, We try to find the
mathematics appropriate to a domain of experience, then we investigate its structure and
regard it as representing physical reality, whether it conforms to accustomed things or not’
(Born 1966 153).
The last of Born’s methods is probability. It’s less clear how Born thinks that this lets us
arrive at objective knowledge of the world but it seems to be that the death of determinism
as physical principle has freed science from a commitment to ‘absolute certainty, absolute
precision, final truth etc.’ (Born 1966 153). These are merely ‘phantoms which should be
excluded from science’.
So  how  does  this  all  come  together?  Born  notes  that  this  question  of  reality,  whilst
avoidable in everyday life, cannot be ‘eluded’ easily in science. When we observe with the
aid  of  instrumentation,  those  observations  must  be  interpreted—they  are
‘incomprehensible without theory’ (Born 1966 154). Those observations are of phenomena
which do not correspond to our everyday experience. Born tells us that they ‘can only be
described with the help of abstract concepts’ (1966 154).
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He notes that he does not think that we can give a categorical answer to the problem at
hand, but we can ‘make use of the freedom to consider an extremely improbable statement
as wrong’ (Born 1966 154). Born argues that the idea that the ‘coincidence of structures
revealed by using different sense organs and communicable from one individual to the
other  is  accidental’ is  just  such an extremely improbable statement.  This,  I  think,  is  a
version  of  a  no  miracles  argument   -  Born  is  arguing  that  it  would  so  fantastically
improbable that idea the agreement on the structures of science by many scientists using
many methods could be accidental is so fantastically improbable that we ought to consider
it wrong.
These structures, Born thinks, can be identified with Kant’s thing in itself. Born tells us
that they are ‘pure form, void of all sensual qualities’ (1966 155). By this, I think Born
means that they are entirely objective, having been stripped of their subjective phenomenal
qualities. He notes that of course this does not fit with the ‘traditional’ definition of the
thing in itself (Born 1966 155). Although he agrees that they are perfectly abstract, he does
not think, contra Hegel (whom he quotes here) that they are empty, ‘from a world beyond’
(Born 1966 155). The objects of atomic physics might be perfect abstracta, but they are not
from a world beyond, Born thinks, because of the practical use that we can gain from them
in their application (1966 155).
Born concludes by arguing that we ought not to move to a completely abstract system of
science.  We still  need to  describe our  experiments  in ordinary language.  Indeed,  Born
writes ‘physicists are bound to describe the content of their abstract formulae as far as
possible in terms of ordinary language with concepts based on intuition’ (Born 1966 156).
We should remember, Born tells us, that experience is based on our senses—we cannot and
should not abstract away from them entirely. Born writes ‘A theoretician who, immersed in
his  formulae,  forgets  the  phenomena  which  he  wants  to  explain  is  no  real  scientist,
physicist or chemist, and if he is estranged by his bocks [sic] from the beauty and variety
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of nature I  would call  him a poor fool’ (Born 1966 156).   We ought,  Born thinks,  to
preserve a ‘sensible’ balance between experiment and theory.
We can see that this is a development of Born’s position, but it is clearly not the same as
the one described in Physical Reality (1955) and Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance
(1949a).  He  is  much  less  interested  in  causation,  arguing  that  the  concept  should  be
replaced by that of ‘coordination’. Invariants appear only as part of the general group of
mathematical structures that physics uses to describe reality (Born 1966 152). He does not
really talk about the reality of particles in the way he does earlier.  It’s clearly still a realist
position—there  exists  an  objective  external  world,  we  refer  to  that  world  using
mathematical structures and something like a no-miracles argument is employed to argue
that we can know about that world—but it seems to be much more structural in emphasis
than Born’s earlier work.
When he writes that the physicist regards the mathematical structures that are coordinated
to the phenomena as the ‘objective reality lying behind the subjective phenomena’, and
when he says that he is not afraid of identifying ‘well-defined structures with Kant’s ‘thing
in itself’’ (Born 1966 155), it  seems clear that he is giving us a kind of realism about
structures . The problem at hand is whether or not this he is making epistemic or ontic
claims here. 
 Given that  the  task he  sets  himself  is  explicitly  how to  move from subjective  sense
impressions to knowledge of an objective world outside them, we might suspect that his
motivation is epistemic rather than ontological, i.e. he is more interested in what we know
than what  there is.  Perhapshis position is   that  the only way to objectively coordinate
subjective phenomena with explanations is via those explanations having a well-defined
mathematical structure. But might he still hold a position that is aligned with OSR? I think
that he might. As I have noted earlier, he does not discuss particles in the same realist
terms that he does in Physical Reality (Born 1953). In fact in Symbol and Reality he seems
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to take care to avoid doing so. He writes ‘the trace of droplets in a Wilson expansion
chamber suggests a  particle  in  flight...One cannot  give up such interpretations without
paralysing intuition which is the source of research and rendering communication between
scientists  more difficult’ (Born 1966 156). This does not seem at all  like a resounding
defence of the reality of particles. It sounds much more like a defence of using particle talk
for primarily pragmatic reasons—it makes thinking about the theory intuitively easier and
it  aids communication between experimentalists.  Given the fairly clear commitment to
realism about  structure in  this  paper,  I  think that we can  read  Symbol and Reality as
espousing a version of  structural  realism that  is  at  least  epistemic in nature.  It  is  also
clearly compatible  with the version of  OSR that  maintains  that  ‘individual  objects  are
constructs’ (Ladyman 2016). In this, objects are heuristic devices only. We might also note
that  we could at  least  plausibly read this  as a  wholesale elimination of of particles as
something we count as ‘real’. 
Born’s above mentioned claim that the physicist regards the mathematical structures that
are coordinated to  the phenomena as the ‘objective reality  lying behind the subjective
phenomena’, and when he says that he is not afraid of identifying ‘well-defined structures
with Kant’s ‘thing in itself’’ (Born 1966 155) is very plausibly an ontic rather than merely
epistemic claim.
On the other hand, if Born is an ontic structural realist,  then might this conflict with some
of  his  other  writings?  We  have  seen  that  Born  is  generally  cautious  about  reading
metaphysics off physics.  This is apparent in the criticism that he gives in  Is Classical
Mechanics In Fact Deterministic? (Born 1955) of the idea that the success of Newtonian
mechanics implies that the world is deterministic. There, he argues that the fact that the
dynamics of Newtonian physics are deterministic is not sufficient reason to conclude that
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the  world  is  (there  is  a  detailed  examination  of  his  argument  in  Chapter  5—Born on
Determinism). We might also recall his remarks in an appendix to Natural Philosophy of
Cause  and  Chance that  ‘metaphysical  systematization  means  formalization  and
petrification’ (Born 1949a 209). We can also see in his ‘expansion of concepts’ argument a
desire to avoid heavily revisionist readings of the metaphysics of physics—we can still
quite intelligibly call particles and waves in quantum mechanics particles and waves even
though they do not share all of the properties of their classical analogues. This all  might
suggest that the strong metaphysical claim of ontic structural realismsis something that is
at odds with Born’s general approach to the relationship between physics and metaphysics.
Also pertinent to this is Born’s argument in Symbol and Reality that we should preserve a
balance between experiment and theory (1966 157). We can see that Born holds a similar
position in his earlier work too. In his short book Experiment and Theory in Physics (Born
1943—a slightly expanded version of a talk delivered to the Durham (!) Philosophical
Society in May 1943) he argues that it is a mistake (contra Eddington) to think that theory
should and does lead experiment. He writes, for example, the theoretical predictions (and
eventual experimental discovery) of the positron and the meson are ‘not products of pure
reason, but the final outcome of a long chain of empirical research’ (Born 1943 31). We
might take this to indicate something like the view that experiment and theory are separate
sources of knowledge—Galison (1988) and Chang (1995) espouse similar positions about
the roles of theorising and experimentation in physics. 
One simple response here is that by 1966 he has changed his mind, and become more
comfortable with drawing such metaphysical conclusions. On the other hand, as we saw in
the discussion of the status of Born’s principles of causation (See chapter 3), Born isn’t
really running a fine-grained distinction between empirical and metaphysical. He is happy
to  consider  principles  that  philosophers  would  generally  take  to  be  metaphysical  as
empirical because they have inspired successful theories and are consistent with them. If,
in  Symbol and Reality,  Born is giving an argument that the success of our theories of
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physics is down to their regarding their only structural content as being ‘objective reality’
(1966 155),  then there is  a clear  and consistent  road to an ontic position for him: the
success of those theories acts as confirmation of structural realism. He also might simply
not be paying attention to the distinction.
Something else that might tell against an OSR interpretation of Born’s position is that we
have seen how strongly he cleaves to Einstein’s and Heisenberg’s maxim that elements of
physical theories which are in principle unobservable, or are in principle unmeasurably
distinguishable  from  some  other  concept,  ought  not  to  be  the  subject  of  realist
interpretation. This is all perfectly in line with ESR—we are unable to decide whether or
not the components of physical theories that are non-structural are real, and so we are only
committed to a realist interpretation of the structural components. The stronger claim of
OSR, that only the structural components are real, might be seen by Born as just such an
undecidable statement and, as such, not one that we ought to be committed to. However,
Born does not give such an argument in Symbol and Reality and so we might be cautious
about putting one in his mouth. For one thing, it might be a position that he has abandoned
by this point in his life. Even if we grant that he still wants to hold fast to this principle,
then I think there is another reading consistent with an ontic position: All that the non-
redundant  components  of  physical  theories  tell  us  about  is  structure,  and  so  it  is
meaningless to talk of the existence of anything beyond that. Again, this is consistent with
OSR.
 
So I think that it is fairly clear that Born, in Symbol and Reality at least, holds a position
that it at least an ESR and is at least compatible with OSR. There are additionally some
indications that it is indeed the latter position that he holds. 
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As for where all of this comes from, if I were to hazard a guess I would point out that, as
Ladyman (2006) tells us, invariants and group theory were a major part of the toolbox of
early  structuralists  like  Cassirer  and  Weyl,  and  Born  has  read  Cassirer  on  quantum
mechanics.  He  mentions  Cassirer’s  book  Determinism  and  Indeterminism  in  Modern
Physics (1937) in the appendix of Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance (Born 1949a
208). Born writes that it ‘gives an excellent account of the situation, not only in physics
but also with regards to the possibility of applications of the new physical ideas to other
fields’ (1949a 208). The only part of Cassirer’s book that Born specifically mentions is
unfortunately not about realism, but rather the idea that the indeterminism of quantum
mechanics has nothing at all to do with free will, a position of which Born approves. He
does mention in passing that Cassirer also sees the importance of multiple complementary
perspectives, an idea from which Born might well draw the idea of invariant realism, but
doesn’t give us anything else to go on. Unfortunately, a detailed examination of Cassirer is
outside the scope of this project, although I suspect that there might be something fruitful
in it.
 5 Conclusion
I’ve argued in this chapter that Born is a realist about physics. He presents a view in papers
in the 1940s and 50s termed ‘invariant realism’ that argues that we ought to be realists
about only invariant properties and the  particles that possess them. We might interpret this
structurally  Furthermore, Born denies that there is an ontologically significant distinction
between the observable and the unobservable, and argues that it is not practically possible
to work as an experimental physicist whilst being a positivist. Whilst Born does say certain
things that might lead us to think that he is an anti-realist, it is in fact the case that he is
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merely a weak empiricist who thinks that we shouldn’t be realists about the components of
our theories that are in principle unobservable, even indirectly so. We ought also to bear in
mind when reading him that he does not think that the current theories of physics are final,
is committed to the idea that quantum mechanics allows only statistical predictions and is
only committed to realism about invariants. He has a later development of this position
which more closely resembles a structural realism that is at least epistemic, and may well
be ontic.  We might  also acknowledge that  there  may be  some tension in  his  view on
particles. 
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Chapter 5—Born on Determinism
 1 Introduction
In his 1955 paper  Is Classical Mechanics in Fact Deterministic?  (1955 164-170), Born
argues that classical mechanics is not, in fact, deterministic. His argument for this is that
the laws of classical mechanics, in combination with the inescapability of experimental
error,   mean  that  we  are  unable  to  produce  precise  deterministic  predictions  of  the
behaviour of any classical system whatsoever. 
The purpose of the paper appears to be to oppose those physicists such as Einstein who
still  persisted in  arguing,  contra  Born’s own view of quantum mechanics,  that physics
could still be deterministic and do so (according to Born at least) for philosophical reasons
regarding the unsatisfactoriness of indeterministic physics. Born wishes to argue firstly
that the idea of determinism as the only conceptually satisfactory position arises largely
from the success of an apparently deterministic  classical  mechanics;  and secondly that
classical mechanics is not in fact committed to determinism. Hence, given the conjunction
of  these  two  positions,  there  is  no  reasonable  conceptual  worry  regarding  the
indeterminism of quantum mechanics. 
I’m going to give a detailed examination of Born’s argument which rests upon the claim
that measurements of absolute precision are not possible in classical worlds and hence any
classical system is in actual fact unstable. I will note that this argument has similarities to
those found Stone (1989) and Suppes (1993). Stone (1989) argues that this means that we
should drop absolute predictability as a necessary requirement for Laplacean determinism.
Suppes  (1993)  argues  that  this  means  that  we  should  be  transcendentalists  about
determinism as we are rendered unable to distinguish between a deterministic but chaotic
(i.e.,  unstable  in  Born’s  terms)  world and one that  is  fundamentally  stochastic.  Born’s
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argument resembles Suppes’(1993), although he does not engage in any transcendentalism.
Born cleaves strongly to his interpretation of Heisenberg’s principle that distinctions in
principle unmeasurable are not physically meaningful (Heisenberg 1925 261-2). From this
principle, he argues that our inability to distinguish between a world that has absolutely
precise but unreachable values (for quantities such as position and velocity) and one in
which such absolutely precise values do not exist  means that we cannot conclude that
classical mechanics describes a deterministic world. 
 2 Born’s Argument
 2.1 No Return to Classical Determinism
I’m now going to examine Born’s argument  in  detail  and try to pull  out some details
regarding how he understands determinism and probability. Born describes determinism in
classical physics thus: ‘The laws of classical mechanics, and through them the laws of
classical physics as a whole, are so constructed that, if the variables in a closed system are
given  at  some  initial  point  in  time,  they  can  be  calculated  for  any  other  instant—in
principle,  at  least...’  (Born  1955  164).  One  should  not  here  conclude  that  Born  is
identifying determinism (as he does in  Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance (1949a
8))  with  predictability  rather  than  simply  with  a  single  possible  future  or  a  unique
trajectory in phase space.  He tells us that modern quantum physics has abandoned such
determinism and only deals in statistical descriptions of systems and that most physicists
have accepted this due it’s correspondence with experiment. 
Despite  the  success  of  quantum mechanics,  there  were  physicists  who did  not  accept
indeterminism—Born lists Planck, Einstein, Schrödinger and De Broglie. Born does not
think that they deny the experimental accuracy of quantum mechanics but rather that ‘their
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rejection  is  in  every case  founded on the  assertion that  the  usual  interpretation of  the
quantum formulae is obscure and philosophically unsatisfactory’ (Born 1955 165). Why is
this  interpretation  considered  philosophically  unsatisfactory?  Because  it  is  not
deterministic. 
Born thinks that such a commitment to determinism comes purely from the huge success
of the Newtonian program. It does not seem to exist prior to the scientific revolution—he
writes that ‘the religious tenets of fate and predestination relate not to the processes of
Nature,  but  to  Man,  and  are  certainly  fundamentally  different  from  the  mechanical
determinism which we are here to consider’ (Born 1955 165). That sort of mechanical
determinism, we are told, is ‘inconceivable’ (Born 1955 65) without the great success of
Newtonian celestial mechanics. 
 2.2 Problems of Scale
Having defined determinism and given arguments that those who reject the indeterministic
interpretation of quantum mechanics do so only because of the success of deterministic
classical mechanics, Born proceeds to give his argument for classical mechanics not being
deterministic after all, or rather against the idea that ‘classical mechanics in fact permits
prediction in all circumstances’ (Born 1955 165). 
He starts out by suggesting that some doubts should be sown when we consider that we are
attempting to apply a rule, determinism, derived from celestial processes to atomic ones,
particularly when we consider the relative timescales involved. He notes that the age of the
universe is something like 109 orbital periods of the Earth, whereas ‘the number of periods
in the ground state of the hydrogen atom is of the order of 1016 per second’. If we consider
each of these situations in units  appropriate to their  timescales we see that ‘the stellar
universe is short-lived, and the atomic universe extremely long-lived’ - i.e. there are far
more units of action in the atomic universe than there are in the stellar one. We might think
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here of how we use the concept of ‘dog years’ to compare the ages of dogs with their
longer-lived human owners. In terms of hydrogen atoms and planets,  we define year as
‘orbital period’. In this sense, the world of atomic physics is much longer-lived than the
world of planetary mechanics, i.e. for a hydrogen atom, more ‘years’ pass in a second than
do for a planet over timescale as long as the age of the universe. Born thinks that this
should induce some doubt in the universal validity of determinism—we ought not to draw
conclusions from the short-lived universe and apply them also to the long-lived one. Born
doesn’t elaborate on this argument here, so I think it should just be taken at face value—
we  ought  to  worry  about  whether  or  not  we  have  the  epistemic  warrant  to  draw
conclusions  about  an  unfamiliar  domain  of  the  universe  from  our  experience  of  the
familiar one. In any case, he follows this up with a different and stronger argument. 
 2.3 Absolute Predicability 
Born next considers the state in the kinetic theory of gases. He writes of it ‘It is usually
asserted in this theory that the result [of some prediction or calculation] is in principle
determinate, and that the introduction of statistical considerations is necessitated only by
our ignorance of a  large number of molecules. I have long thought that first part of this
assertion to be extremely suspect’ (Born 1955 165). 
Born asks us to consider a simple a case—a spherical particle, bouncing around between
other fixed particles. (He likens the situation to a three-dimensional bagatelle. We might
compare it to pinball). In a situation like this any arbitrarily small change in the initial
velocity of the moving particle will at some time later result in very large changes in its
path as it bounces around—eventually, Born points out, some particle that was hit will be
missed and vice versa. It doesn’t matter by how much we reduce the initial change in the
particle’s velocity, the path will eventually be significantly changed (earlier on for larger
deviations, later on for smaller ones). If, Born says, we want the system to be deterministic
(i.e. allow precise predictions of the path of the moving particle) for all times, we must
188
disallow  any variation in the initial velocity of the particle, no matter how small. This,
Born thinks is not a physically meaningful idea (a point on which he elaborates later in the
article) and hence ‘systems of this kind are in in fact indeterminate’ (Born 1955 166). What
we can say here is this: there exists some level of precision of the specification of the
initial  conditions  of  a  system  below  which  we  are  unable  to  distinguish  between  a
predictable and an unpredictable system. 
In the next section of the paper, Born attempts to justify his assertion that such systems are
in fact indeterminate, or at least that they should be considered so for scientific purposes.
His argument runs as follows: Consider the distinction between dynamically stable and
dynamically unstable systems. A system is stable in just the case that some small change
Δx0 Δv0  in the initial coordinates and velocities of the system will result in a small change
in the final state of the system. If this is not the case, the system is unstable. If a system is
not stable, it presumably will not be deterministic in Born’s sense of the word, i.e. being
able  to  fully  specify a  later  state  of  the  system from an earlier  one.  The problem for
determinism as Born sees it is that no system is actually deterministic as long as there is
any non-zero value for Δx0 Δv0.  He illustrates this with the following example: Consider
another simple system—a particle with no forces acting upon it moves frictionlessly along
some straight  line  and is  elastically  reflected  by some wall  at  the  end of  the  line  (at
distance l). The coordinate at which we find the particle will then always be in the interval
0 < x < l for the initial state x0 v0. Because no forces are acting on the particle the velocity
will remain constant but the deviation in x will increase with time as follows Δx = Δx0 +
tΔv0.  Thus the deviation in x will eventually reach any arbitrarily large value.  What this
means, as Born points out, is that if we want to maintain the determinacy (predictability) of
a system there can be no deviation whatsoever in the initial state of the system  -  Δx0 Δv0
must be zero.
This means that we must be able to measure the initial conditions of some system with
absolute precision in order for it to be deterministic. Born, however, not only thinks that
we  cannot  do  this,  but  to  talk  of  such  absolute  precision  is  meaningless.  He  writes
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‘Statements like ‘A quantity x has a completely definite value’ (expressed by a real number
and represented by a point in the mathematical continuum) seem to me to have no physical
meaning’ (Born 1955 167).  Why does  he think that  such statements  are  meaningless?
Because  he  takes  seriously  the  principle  that  if  some physical  condition  cannot  be  in
principle  observed  or  observably  distinguished  from  some  other  condition,  then  it  is
meaningless. He gives examples of the successful application of this principle: Einstein’s
dissolution of the distinction between gravity and acceleration in general relativity, and
Heisenberg’s elimination of planetary-like orbits from the model of the atom. We should,
he thinks, apply this principle to the current problem. When we do we come up with the
following: ‘a statement like  x = π cm would have a physical meaning only if one could
distinguish between it and x =  π n cm for every n, where n is the approximation of π by the
first n decimals’ (1955 167). Given that there is no upper limit on the value of n, it seems
clear that there is no way that such a statement can be meaningful. 
This doesn’t mean that we need to banish real numbers from physics—we just replace
precise values with the probability of some value lying within some interval. Born notes
that  in  classical  physics  this  system  was  only  used  for  modelling  large  numbers  of
particles, but the model just presented shows that it must be used for all classical systems,
even those consisting merely of a single particle. The initial probability density for a single
particle system, representing something close to precise knowledge of the initial conditions
will, we are told, eventually become the microcanonical distribution for that system (i.e.
representing a distribution of the particle over all energy-accessible states of that system). 
Born then describes the treatment of the same model in quantum mechanics: We start with
some initial state for which there is an uncertainty in the initial position Δx0 described by
some wave packet,  and an uncertainty  in  initial  velocity  Δv0 given by the  uncertainty
relation as Δx0Δv0 > ħ/2m   (where m is the mass of the particle—note Born follows his
initial example in giving the initial state in terms of velocity and not momentum). If the
mass is large,  Δx0   and Δv0 are small and the formulae describing the system will be a
close approximation of their classical counterparts. As with the classical system, there will
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be some time at which the uncertainty will become large enough that the system can only
be described statistically and will be described by stationary waves, which Born describes
as ‘the analogue of the classical canonical distribution’ (Born 1955 169). 
Born concludes from all this that the primary distinction between classical and quantum
mechanics is not that one is  deterministic and the other statistical,  but ‘other features’
(1955 169), primarily the quantum mechanical treatment of the probability density as the
square of the probability amplitude of a system (i.e. the square of either a vector in a
Hilbert space or of the complex number given by the Schrödinger equation)—this gives
rise to probability interference making it ‘impossible to apply without modification the
idea of an “object” to the mass particles [sic] of physics’, the ultimate consequences of
which, he tells us, are beyond the scope of the present paper. 
So, Born argues that classical mechanics is not in fact deterministic, but statistical—the
treatment of probability in it will be different from that in quantum mechanics, but both
theories are still fundamentally statistical ones. Crucial to Born’s argument is acceptance
of the principle that one ought to consider distinctions and quantities which are in principle
unmeasurable as being meaningless.  It would seem that we have to accept this principle as
more than a mere heuristic—Born wishes to conclude from it that because we are unable to
measure the initial conditions of classical systems (or indeed quantum ones) with absolute
precision,  it  is  meaningless  to  talk  of  those  systems  having  absolutely  precise  initial
conditions: we are unable to distinguish between  arbitrarily small differences between one
initial state and another, and thus must consider such a distinction meaningless. We are
unable to tell via measurements if a classical system has infinitely precise initial conditions
and thus we must take the concept to lack physical meaning. 
There is also a brief precursor of this argument in the section of  Natural Philosophy of
Cause and Chance  on statistical mechanics. In this he argues that absolute precision of
measurement in classical systems cannot be achieved due to Brownian motion. Born writes
of experimental accuracy:  ‘Before Einstein’s work [on Brownian motion] it was assumed
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that progress in this direction was limited only by experimental technique. Now it because
obvious that this was not so’ (Born 1949a 64). Why was this the case? Because as we make
the needles and indicators of our measuring equipment smaller, they become increasingly
affected by Brownian motion. Born also notes that the phenomena of noise in electronic
equipment produces a similar limit of accuracy. 
 2.4 The Structure of the Argument
So does Born’s argument here work? Let’s examine its structure :
P1 Einstein, De Broglie, etc. oppose QM because they do not want to accept a theory that
is not deterministic. 
P2 The only reason to prefer a deterministic over an indeterministic theory (given that QM
is experimentally successful) is because classical mechanics was extremely successful and
deterministic. 
But:
P3 Classical Mechanics is not deterministic.
[Because: P1 A theory is deterministic IFF precise predictions of the state of some
system can be made for any point in time, i.e. that the initial state of the system determines
all other states of the system. 
P2 For any classical system, any non-zero uncertainty in initial conditions will lead
to there being some critical time at which precise predictions of the state of the system
cannot be made. 
P3 For any classical system there will always be some non-zero uncertainty in initial
conditions. 
Therefore
192
C Classical mechanics is not deterministic]
Therefore
C There is no good reason to oppose QM on the grounds that is is indeterministic. 
P1 seems reasonable—it does appear to the be the case that the root of many physicists’
disagreement with QM was to do with it’s indeterministic status. P2 is plausible, but seems
a little weak without serious supporting historical work, which Born doesn’t provide. He
does seem correct to assert that mechanical determinism has its origins in the success of
Newtonian mechanics. So this part of the argument is certainly not watertight, but it’s not
unreasonable either.  Certainly,  it  would seem to be the case that  a good argument  for
classical mechanics not being deterministic would undercut at least some of the motivation
to pursue a deterministic physics. 
 3 Determinism and Predictability. 
So  we  need  to  look  at  the  argument  for  premise  3—that  classical  mechanics  is  not
deterministic. Firstly, we should investigate how Born defines determinism and compare
that to accepted definitions of determinism given by other philosophers—for this I am
going to use John Earman’s A Primer on Determinism (Earman 1986). Earman formulates
a  definition  that  attempts  (successfully)  to  avoid  binding  determinism  up  with
predictability, and thus mixing one’s ontology with one’s epistemology. He cautions ‘The
history of philosophy is  littered with examples where ontology and epistemology have
been  stirred  together  into  a  confusing  brew’  (Earman  1986  7).  His  point  is  that
determinism concerns whether or not earlier dynamic states uniquely determine later ones,
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rather than whether or not, given the dynamics and the initial  state,  we can accurately
predict later states. 
Earman defines determinism as follows: take the set of all physically possible worlds, i.e.
the set of possible worlds which have the same laws of physics as ours. Determinism is
true of the world if it  is the case that if this  world and some other share all  the same
physical properties at some time, then they do so for all times. So this is a modal definition
for determinism about worlds. It’s clearly independent from predictability. This definition
says nothing about our ability to know about the world and make predictions from that
knowledge.  It  therefore  applies  to  worlds  in  which  we  are  unable  to  make  absolute
predictions about, for either principled or practical reasons. Principled reasons might be
something like a hidden variable theory. Practical reasons might be to do with difficulties
in making precise measurements and/or performing the relevant calculations. 
We  might  also  usefully  make  a  distinction  between  determinism  about  worlds  and
determinism about theories. A theory might be deterministic even if the world is not. We
can even apply much the same definition—a theory is deterministic if, given the same data
set for time t, it will always produce the same predictions for all later times. So we might
say that the dynamics of classical mechanics mean that it is a deterministic theory even if
(a la Born) we are unable to make the precise measurements that we would need in order
to ensure that it is stable or (a la Earman) we worry about the possibility of space invaders
(Smith 148). 
 3.1 Space Invaders and Norton’s Dome
It’s worth saying a little about two cases in which determinism and classical mechanics
come apart: space invaders (Earman 1986 36-37) and Norton’s dome (Norton 2008). In the
space invaders case, a system of four colliding particles can become unbounded in finite
time, i.e. their position on some axis goes off to infinity in finite time. Because classical
194
mechanics is time-symmetric, we can reverse this solution to describe particles coming in
to  some system from infinity  over  a  finite  time  (Earman  1986  36).  The  problem for
determinism here is that no state of the system can be considered closed because of the
possibility  of  intrusions  from  spatial  infinity  (Earman  1986  34).  We  might  consider
imposing boundary conditions at infinity to prevent such intrusions, but this only serves to
prevent ‘space invaders’ by fiat (Earman 1986 38). 
Norton’s dome is as follows: consider a ball sitting atop of a dome in a gravitational field.
The dome is radially symmetric and described by:
h=(2/3 g)r3 /2
Where  h  is  the  vertical  distance  between  the  apex  of  the  dome,  g  the  constant  of
acceleration in the gravitational field the dome rests in and r the radial distance coordinate
(Norton 2008 787). The ball is modelled as a point mass. At some time, the ball may
spontaneously roll down the surface of time. It also may not. Whether or not the ball rolls
down the  dome or,  if  it  does,  at  precisely  what  time,  is  not  specified  by  the  laws of
classical mechanics (Norton 2008 788). This is indeterministic because the dynamics do
not tell us that the initial state of the system is followed by a single possible series of later
states. 
Born’s  argument  does  not  of  course  concern  either  of  these  scenarios.  The  point  of
bringing them up is to demonstrate that there can be classical dynamical worlds that are
not  deterministic,  i.e.  the  laws  of  Newtonian  physics  fail  to  ensure  that  the  world  is
deterministic. 
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 3.2 Stone on Deterministic Chaos
A number  of  other  philosophers  also  advocate  the  separation  of  determinism  from
predictability  (Stone  1989,  Bishop  2003,  Rummens  and  Cuypers  2010,  for  example).
Having separated determinism from predictability,  we need to examine how these two
concepts  come  apart.  One  area  where  they  do  which  is  particularly  relevant  to  the
discussion  of  Born  is  deterministic  chaos,  in  which  systems are  deterministic  but  not
predictable. 
Stone (1989 123) discusses what  he calls  ‘Scientific  Determinism’ in  the light of this.
Scientific  determinism  is  drawn  from  Laplace,  and  involves  two  claims:  1)  all
deterministic systems are predictable,  and 2) all  systems are deterministic (Stone 1989
123). From this it follows that 3) all systems are predictable (Stone 1989 123). Of course,
we know from quantum mechanics that it is least far from clear that 2) is the case, and so
the inference to 3) does not go through. Stone cautions us against concluding that it is only
because of quantum mechanics that not all systems are predictable (1989 124). In fact, he
thinks that both claims 1) and 2) fail under what he calls ‘deterministic chaos’ (1989 124). 
Stone also raises what is essentially the same problem as Born for the predictability of
classical mechanics but does not deem it a problem for determinism. He notes that it is true
that our measurements always contain errors and is doubtful that there exists such a thing
as an error-free measurement. He also raises the same problem that Born does with regards
to the continuity of numbers. Stone writes ‘for example, in any calculation in which I must
use the value of π, I must use an approximation because I cannot write down the entire
string of digits of π…The problem is not one of measurement but one of representation,
and hence it is not just a practical problem but a problem in principle’ (Stone 1989 125). It
is  a  problem  in  principle  because  there  will  always  be  some  non-zero  error  in  our
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specification of the initial conditions and consequently there will always be some non-zero
error in our calculations. He thinks, though, that this does not mean that we are unable to
distinguish deterministic from indeterministic systems. This is because for a deterministic
system ‘the accuracy of a state description is infinitely refinable’ (Stone 1989 125).  For an
indeterministic system like quantum mechanics, this is not the case because such systems
contain  some  built-in  limit  on  accuracy.  What  Stone  means  is  that  if  the  system  is
deterministic then, at least in principle, for any given measurement we can make another
with a higher degree of accuracy. We can’t do that with indeterministic systems. Stone then
offers his own definition of determinism as follows: 
(a) there exists an algorithm which relates a state of the system at any given
time to a state at any other time and the algorithm is not probabilistic;
(b) the system is such that a given state is always followed by the same history
of state transitions;
(c) any state of the system can be described with an arbitrarily small (nonzero)
error.  (Stone 1989 125)
(a) ensures that if a system is deterministic then there are some laws or some mathematical
formalism that  enables  prediction.  (b)  ensures  something  like  Earman’s  definition—if
some world is in some particular state, then that state will always be followed by the same
set  of  states.  (c)  distinguishes  a  deterministic  system  in  which  absolute  precision  of
measurement is not possible from an indeterministic system in which there exists some
non-arbitrary upper bound on the accuracy of measurement. 
Stone thinks that this definition of determinism pulls away from predictability, i.e. it is the
case that not every system that meets these conditions will be predictable, because of the
existence of chaotic systems (1989 127). This is because in chaotic systems our mapping
algorithm (i.e. the dynamics of the system) magnifies initial errors to a very large degree.
As Ornstein and Weiss put it,  ‘for chaotic systems there is a very strong sensitivity to
initial conditions, in the sense that arbitrarily small changes in the starting point eventually
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produce large changes in the trajectory’ (1991 14).  The trajectory referred to here is a
trajectory in phase space, so for chaotic systems the trajectories of objects that start very
close  to  one  another  in  phase  space  can  diverge  dramatically.  This  divergence  is
exponential in nature (Rickles at al 2007 934). 
All  of  this  comes  into  play  with  respect  to  the  separation  of  determinism  from
predictability  because,  as  we’ve  seen  from  both  Stone  and  Born,  even  deterministic
systems  will  always  contain  non-zero  errors  in  initial  conditions.  Because  in  chaotic
systems even paths that start very close to one another in phase space have trajectories that
diverge quickly and dramatically, those non-zero errors multiply exponentially. This means
that even a deterministic system will become unpredictable very quickly if it is chaotic,
because even a slight variance in the position in phase space that our initial conditions give
will lead to wildly divergent outcomes. Stone points out that this is essentially inescapable.
Although we can always insist on a degree of accuracy of measurement that will give us
accuracy of prediction over some particular length or timescale, we cannot insist on this
generally—there will always be a length or timescale for which our predictions will not be
accurate (Stone 1989 127). Stone writes ‘for any input there will always be some distance
[temporal or spatial] over which error will be sufficiently amplified such that all accuracy
is effectively lost. Thus in a strong sense chaotic systems are not predictable even though
they are deterministic’ (Stone 1989 127). 
To define predictability, Stone adds the following condition to those for determinism: ‘(d)
any state of the system can be described with arbitrarily small (nonzero) error from any
other  state  of  the  system’ (Stone  1989  128).  What  the  existence  of  chaotic  systems
demonstrates is that (d) does not follow from the earlier conditions (a), (b) and (c), and so
determinism and predictability cannot be identified with one another (Stone 1989 127). 
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 3.3 Does  Born  Think  That  Predictability  and  Determinism
Are Identical?
So it seems quite clear that we have reasons beyond very general worries about confusion
between ontology and epistemology to think that determinism and predictability are not
the same thing. Born did not have access to arguments deriving from chaos theory when he
wrote Is Classical Mechanics in Fact Deterministic? in 1955—the first formulation of the
problem is generally accepted as Edward Lorenz’s paper Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow
(1963),  which  discussed  extreme  sensitivity  to  initial  conditions  in  weather  systems
(Bishop 2017). So the question is, does he identify determinism with predictability? And
does his argument rest on an identification of determinism with predictability?
So how does he define determinism? Born describes an aspect of classical mechanics thus:
‘The laws of classical mechanics … are so constructed that, if the variables in a closed
system are given at some point in time, they can be calculated for any other instant in time’
and refers to that description as ‘this deterministic idea’ (Born 1955 164). We might note
that this bears a strong resemblance to Stone’s (1989 125) condition (a) for determinism. A
page later, when he begins his argument that classical mechanics is not deterministic he
does so with the following question: ‘But is it the case that classical mechanics in fact
permits prediction in all circumstances?’ (Born 1955 165). So it certainly looks like Born
is running with a definition of determinism that is rooted in predictability. 
This is not overly surprising. According to Earman, this is precisely how determinism is
usually defined—both Laplace (1902) and Popper (1982) define it  in this  manner,  and
although Russell (1912) offers something different, Earman does not think that it works,
hence Earman offering his own definition (Earman 1986 10-12). It ought not to shock us
therefore that Born also defines determinism in terms of prediction. We should also note
that Born doesn’t explicitly offer this up as a considered definition of determinism (and
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indeed never in the paper writes anything akin to ‘I define determinism thus...), merely
describing it as ‘this deterministic idea’. 
Two questions then arise: 1) Is Born aware that there may be some ontological matter
going on behind the epistemic problem of predictability that is important to determinism?
And 2) If not, is Born’s argument only compatible with a definition of determinism based
on  predictability,  or  will  work  with  a  definition  that  separates  the  two  concepts  like
Earman’s or Stone’s? There is, I think a decent but not watertight case to be made for 1). A
primary problem for the idea of predictability as the defining feature of determinism is that
it is perfectly conceivable to have some system in which although there is only ever one
possible trajectory in phase space for any given event or set of events, that path is not
predictable because the information required to predict it is, in some  principled way, not
accessible to us. It is clear that Born is both aware of this concept and that he does not
count such a situation as non-deterministic because he counts de Broglie and his hidden-
variable theory as falling under the category of those who are unsatisfied with quantum
mechanics because of its indeterminism. He describes de Broglie’s approach thus: ‘they
reject waves and seek a re-interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which everything is in
principle  determinate,  and an  uncertainty  in  prediction  arises  only  by  the  presence  of
concealed and unobservable parameters’ (Born 1955 165). 
Later in the paper, when concluding his discussion on instability in classical systems, Born
writes:
If  we wish  to  retain  the  assertion  that  in  this  system the  initial  state
determines  every other  state,  we are compelled to  demand absolutely
exact values of x0, v0 and to prohibit any deviation Δx0 Δv0. We could
then speak of ‘weak determinacy’ as opposed to the ‘strong’ case where
all motions are dynamically stable (Born 1955 167). 
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It’s  clear  what  ‘strong’ determinacy  refers  to  in  this  case—a classical  setup  which  is
entirely stable  and hence entirely  predictable.  It’s  not  immediately obvious  what  Born
means by ‘weak’ determinacy but presumably it refers to the situation that Born has just
finished describing—that in which all classical motion is, after some critical time, unstable
and thus unpredictable. In that case,  we might ask, why refer to it as some species of
determinacy at all if the notion is to be entirely grounded in predictability? I think that we
might reasonably infer from this that ‘weak determinacy’ refers to systems which, in more
precise terms, are deterministic but not predictable, and that therefore Born understands
that predictability is not all there is to determinism—i.e. that it’s about how the universe is
and not just what we can know about it, even though he does not offer a definition in these
terms.     
 3.4 Is Born’s Argument Against Determinism or 
Predictability?
Next we need to look at Born’s argument for his claim that we cannot achieve precise
measurement of initial conditions in classical mechanics. Something to consider here is
that in order to achieve precise measurements we do not merely need precision down to
some specified minimum level. If, as Born suggests we need to express values with ‘a real
number  and  represented  by  a  point  in  the  mathematical  continuum’ we  need  infinite
precision—there exists  infinite space between any two points on the real number line.
Without infinite precision there will be some uncertainty in the initial conditions, i.e. some
ambiguity between two points on the real number line, and therefore there will be some
critical time at which the motions in the system will become unpredictable. Born writes ‘A
statement like x = π cm would have physical meaning [more on the meaning part shortly]
only  if  one  could  distinguish  between  it  and  πn cm  for  every  n,  where  πn is  the
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approximation of π  by the first n decimals’ (Born 1955 167). It is of course impossible to
do this: no matter how accurately we can perform some measurement we can always take
n to another decimal place. This is not simply impossible in practice. It is impossible in
principle because no matter how fine-grained we make our measuring instruments, they
will still not be able to make an infinitely precise measurement. 
We might at this point note that we can supplement Born’s argument with Stone’s point
about chaos. Because we can refine the precision of classical measurements as much as we
want, the critical timescales over which the systems that Born describes become unstable
can  also  end  up  arbitrarily  large.  We  might  thus  wonder  how  unpredictable  classical
systems actually are in practice. Noting that the existence of chaotic systems means that
this critical time may be much smaller might assuage this worry. 
Stone (1989),  as discussed above, acknowledges  this  point  but does not  think that the
necessary non-zero error on measurements in classical mechanics implies indeterminism
of any kind. This is because of the distinction that he makes between deterministic and
indeterministic  systems:  in  indeterministic  systems there  is  a  defined  upper  bound on
accuracy, whereas in deterministic ones there is not. 
If Born’s argument was merely about predictability, he could stop here. He’s shown fairly
conclusively that,  over a sufficiently long time scale,  any classical system will start to
behave  unpredictably.  If  we  supplement  his  argument  with  the  existence  of  chaotic
systems, his point becomes very clear indeed. But Born does not just want to argue that we
cannot take measurements with sufficient precision to avoid instability, he wants to argue
that such talk of quantities having definite values is meaningless. 
Born here applies a principle that he attributes to Einstein and Heisenberg: ‘that concepts
whose  application  requires  distinctions  that  cannot  in  principle  be  observed  are
meaningless  and  must  be  eliminated’  (1955  167).  More  precisely,  Born  attributes
Einstein’s elimination of the concepts of absolute simultaneity in special relativity and of
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the distinction between acceleration and gravitational force in general relativity, along with
Heisenberg’s elimination of the orbital radii of electrons from the model of the atom. It’s
not quite clear however that Einstein did actually apply such a principle.
In  his  1973  paper  Why  did  Einstein’s  Programme  Supersede  Lorentz’s? Elie  Zahar
attributes Einstein’s unification of gravitation and acceleration to the following principle:
II) ‘All observationally revealed symmetries in nature signify fundamental symmetries at
the ontological level—there are no accidents in nature. Hence the heuristic rule:  replace
any  theory  which  does  not  explain  symmetrical  observational  situations  as  the
manifestations of deeper symmetries—whether or not descriptions of all known facts can
be deduced from the theory’ (1973 225). What does this mean? It means that a good theory
should unify the explanations of observationally identical phenomena. We expect good
theories  to  do this  because we expect  that  such symmetries  are  not  coincidental:  they
reflect the ordering of the world. Now, this does not seem to be the quite same thing as
Born’s  principle,  but  it  might  lead  us  to  the  same  conclusion   -  if  there  exists  an
observational  symmetry between two different  physical  conditions,  then the distinction
between those conditions is meaningless. By declaring that distinction meaningless we are
forced to invoke some underlying principle in order to explain this, although I’m not quite
sure that Born has the same demand for explanation that Einstein does. 
It might be slightly better put in the terms that Zahar uses in  Einstein’s Revolutions: A
Study in Heuristic—that this principle is tantamount to saying that there are no accidents in
nature (Zahar 1989 90). So in Born’s terms we ought to consider the concept of precise
physical values meaningless because for any given value, there will be some other from
which it is observably indistinguishable. In Einstein’s terms (by way of Zahar) we might
say that we ought not to consider it a mere accident that we cannot achieve in principle
precise measurements of physical values—it should be considered a reflection of how the
world is. 
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 What we can take from this is that, according to Born, we are not simply in the position of
having to regard classical systems as unstable; we are in the position of having to regard
the concept of a system having the precise initial conditions that would render it stable as
meaningless.  This  is  because  in  classical  mechanics  a  deterministic  world  is
observationally  indistinguishable  from  an  indeterministic  one,  due  to  our  principled
inability to perform the absolutely precise measurements  that would allow us to describe a
stable system. Hence, Born thinks, classical mechanics is not deterministic. It’s important
to  note here one thing that  Born is  not  arguing:  He is  not  making any claim that  the
dynamics of classical physics are indeterministic—if a system has precise initial conditions
then it  will  behave deterministically.  Classical  mechanics  as  an  abstract  theory  is  still
deterministic on Earman’s definition. If we start with precise values then any worlds that
share all of those values at one time will share all of those values at all times. The same is
true for Stone’s definition. 
The problem is that we lack the capacity to determine whether or not classical mechanics
applies to the world not just in practice but in principle.  The world as we find it does not
allow us to conclude that such precise conditions exist. Hence we are mistaken to take as a
conclusion from the success of classical celestial mechanics that classical physics ever in
fact described a deterministic world. 
      
We can also look at this in terms of Stone’s argument. Because of non-zero errors in our
measurements, some apparently deterministic systems will behave unpredictably. They are,
however,  still  deterministic because those errors can be reduced to an arbitrarily small
value, even though this still fails to make the system predictable—this is reflected in his
condition (c) (Stone1989 125). If we apply Born’s principle here we run into the following
problem:  regardless of what our theory says, no measurements that we can carry out can
ever tell us whether or not (c) is true. This is because there is always some indeterministic
upper bound on accuracy that is not measurably distinct from an arbitrary non zero error in
measurement. There are also, one should note, no measurements that one could carry out
in order to determine whether or not (b) is the case. So again, Born would I think say, the
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problem is not that the theory that classical mechanics supplies is indeterministic, it is that
we have no way of distinguishing between a deterministic world and an indeterministic
one. 
To pull this back to a distinction between determinism about theories and determinism
about worlds, what Born’s argument seems to say is that the success of classical mechanics
as  a  deterministic  theory  does  not  enable  us  to  conclude  that  the  world  itself  is
deterministic.  It  can  be  perfectly  true  that  the  dynamics  of  classical  mechanics  are
deterministic. What we can’t do is conclude from those dynamics that the world itself is
deterministic. This is because we are unable to make any measurable distinction between
on one hand quantities that are precise but just  beyond whatever level of accuracy we
happen  to  be  using;  and  on  the  other  hand  quantities  that  are  inherently  ill-
defined/imprecise/indeterminate.   This  leads  to  classical  mechanics  being,  on  the
appropriate  timescale,  a  statistical  theory  in  a  way  that  is  indistinguishable  from  a
genuinely  indeterministic  one  (as  opposed  to  a  statistical  theory  that  is  actually
deterministic). Chaos in a system just lessens this timescale. 
Suppes  (1993) makes a  similar,  but  not  identical  argument  to  this.  Suppes argues that
determinism falls into the category of the transcendental. From Ornstein and Weiss (1991)
he draws the following theorem: ‘There are processes which can equally well be analysed
as  deterministic  systems  of  classical  mechanics  or  as  indeterministic  semi-Markov
processes, no matter how many observations are made’ (Suppes 1993 254). This, Suppes
thinks, puts both determinism and indeterminism into the category of positions that cannot
be refuted by empirical evidence. Hence they are transcendental, in that they are beyond
the reach of empirical evidence to decide (Suppes 1993 256). We should also note that
Suppes does not think that we can convincingly claim that quantum mechanics shows that
the world is fundamentally indeterministic (1993 252-3). 
Earman (2007) is not quite convinced by Suppes’ (1993) argument. He writes ‘There are
two competing hypotheses to explain observed macro-stochasticity:  it  is  due to micro-
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determinism plus sensitive dependence on initial  conditions  vs.  it  is  due to irreducible
micro-stochasticity’ (Earman  2007  1391).  His  scepticism  regarding  Suppes  claim  that
determinism is in the category of the transcendental arises from thinking that not enough
work has been done to show how the second hypothesis (irreducible micro-stochasticity)
could actually be the case. Even if that had been done, Earman thinks that Suppes would
still  have  to  show  that  the  choice  between  the  two  hypotheses  is  genuinely
underdetermined by any possible evidence (Earman 2007 1391). 
Born’s position seems to be very much in line with Suppes’. That we can treat classical
mechanics  statistically  is  entirely  his  point.  Although  he  doesn’t  make  any  kind  of
explicitly  transcendental  claims,  his  argument  about  what  the  success  of  classical
mechanics can tell us about the world depends on a closely related point.  However, the
work of arguing that we, without further argument, we can’t assume classical mechanics
(or at least the world as described by classical mechanics) to be deterministic is done by
the principle which claims that it isn’t meaningful to talk about precise values in classical
systems. Earman is obviously discussing chaotic systems in his response to Suppes, but I
think Born could simply respond by again leaning on his principle to say that the world
doesn’t supply the precise values needed to show that micro-determinism is the case and so
we cannot conclude that classical systems are deterministic. 
We ought to note here how much heavy lifting is being done by the principle that allows us
to claim that talk of precise values isn’t meaningful (although not in a semantic sense—see
Chapter 4:Born on Realism – statements attributing infinitely precise values to physical
quantities  are  not  meant  to  be  meaningless  in  the  sense  that  they  are
gibberish/ungrammatical,  but  rather  in  the  sense  that  they  are  supposed  to  play  no
meaningful role in the physical interpretation of a theory and we cannot make inferences
from them in that sense). If we don’t agree with that principle or with how Born applies it,
then we are going to be left  with something like Stone’s (1989) position that classical
mechanics  is  deterministic  but  not  predictable.  We  should  note  though  that  Born’s
principle might not be unreasonable. We might be able to understand what’s going on via
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Redhead’s notion of ‘surplus’ structure. Redhead (1980 149) argues that we can regard
some theories as having ‘surplus’ structure in their mathematical formulations, in that they
have  components  which  are  uninterpreted  in  the  sense  that  they  play  no  part  in  the
inferences by which the theory can be tested. The surplus or excess structure here would be
the considering a  continuous variable  to  actually,  perfectly  and precisely represent  the
position of a particle to a greater degree of accuracy than any conceivable experiment
could supply, rather than simply treating the representation of physical quantities by real
number variables as being part of the formalism. Such surplus structure isn’t, for Born,
physically meaningful. The determinists then have made the mistake of interpreting part of
the wider mathematical structure that Newtonian dynamics is embedded in (continuous
real number variables) physically, i.e. infinitely sharp real number variables ought not to
be considered part of the physical structure of Newtonian dynamics, merely part of the
mathematical one. 
What kind of things physical quantities are isn’t something that Newtonian dynamics can
tell  us  because in  order  to  tell  if  they are infinitely  sharp we would have to  perform
measurements  to  a  greater  degree  of  accuracy than  any conceivable  experiment  could
supply,  i.e.  we  cannot  actually  make  any  testable  inferences  from  this  notion.  The
assumption that they are this sort of value is surplus to the empirical content of the theory
because this is not something that a system of dynamical laws can tell  us about – it’s
something that has been carried over from the mathematical model that the theory uses. 
 
 4 A Bit of Reconstruction
I’m now going to completely take off my historian hat (which has already become a bit
askew  in  this  chapter)  and  offer  a  reconstruction  of  Born’s  argument  in  terms  of
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determinism alone.  The  first  thing  to  say  is  this:  the  real  number  line  is  part  of  our
representation of reality. We can have no direct empirical reason to think that the quantities
of  physics  are actually real  number-valued.  So,  to  assume that  they  are  is  to  make a
metaphysical assumption. It can’t be an empirical claim. 
By making metaphysical  assumptions  like  this,  we introduce  excess  structure into  the
theory.  There is nothing forcing us to interpret physical quantities as being real-number
valued: we can quite happily  represent them with real numbers without presuming that
they are real numbers.  Excess structure in this manner is non-empirical content of a theory
that we introduce by marrying a physical model with a mathematical structure (Redhead
1980  149).  In  this  case,  the  physical  model  is  Newtonian  dynamics  and  the  excess
structure  is  the  use  of  precise  continuous  variables  rather  than  say,  ranges  of
approximation,  to  perfectly  represent  the  position  of  some  object.  The  mathematical
structure contains real numbers to represent continuous variables and this has been ‘carried
along’ with the theory and been taken to really represent physical values in it, as opposed
to merely being part of the theory’s formalism. 
What Born’s principle tells  us to do is to is to cut out such excess structure from the
physical interpretation of the theory because it doesn’t play any empirical role. This is
because, for any given level of accuracy of measurement there are empirically equivalent
deterministic and indeterministic interpretations of our system. This follows from the fact
that there exists an underdetermination between some quantity in our initial conditions
being  fuzzy  and  that  quantity  being  precise  but  unmeasurable.  The  former  is  an
indeterministic  interpretation  and  the  latter  is  what  we  might  call  an  ignorance
interpretation—quantities are infinitely sharp, but we don’t know exactly what they are.
So  we  have  an  underdetermination  between  a  system  which  is  indeterministic  and
unpredictable and a system which is deterministic and unpredictable. This is a genuine
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underdetermination  because  the  level  of  unpredictability  is  the  same  for  both
interpretations—it is set by whatever level of error exists in our measurements. 
Now, if  quantities are stochastic,  then the world must also be.  A world with stochastic
quantities will fail to meet Earman’s definition of determinism: two such worlds that share
all physical properties at one time will not necessarily share all physical properties at all
time. It doesn’t follow from that, however, that our dynamical laws themselves must also
be stochastic. It is perfectly possible for those laws to be such that, if quantities are precise,
predictions made by them will also be precise. Indeed, this is the situation for the laws of
classical mechanics. In this sense, such a set of laws would not be wrong—they would
produce precise or statistical predictions depending on what sort of quantities we put into
them. Therefore a set of dynamical laws that gives us precise predictions fails to tell us
whether  or  not  the  world  is  deterministic.  Hence  the  reason  to  worry  about  the
indeterminism of quantum mechanics—that classical mechanics was highly successful and
deterministic—vanishes.  We  were  never  able  to  conclude  from  a  deterministic  set  of
dynamical laws that the world itself is deterministic, even if those laws were correct. 
 5 Conclusion
So to summarise, Born’s argument is follows. We are mistaken to conclude that classical
mechanics shows that determinism is true of the world. This is because there is a necessary
non-zero error on all measurements taken in classical systems (to say nothing of quantum
ones), and this means that for any classical system there exists some critical time after
which the system must be treated statistically. Born thinks that we cannot simply stipulate
that there do actually exist precise values even if we cannot reach them (he calls this ‘weak
determinism’) because there are no measurements that could possibly tell if this is the case.
This,  we should note,  is  independent  of  whether  or not a  ‘deterministic’ mathematical
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formalism exists  for  classical  mechanics:  without  precise  values  we are  forced  to  use
statistical methods. Hence, he thinks, we ought not to conclude that the world of classical
mechanics is a deterministic one. Stone (1989) and Suppes (1993) discuss arguments that
bear a similarity to Born’s, although theirs concern chaotic systems. By looking at these
arguments  it  is  made  clear  how  much  Born’s  argument  relies  on  the  aforementioned
principle—without it, the most that he can show is that classical mechanics is deterministic
but not predictable. A reconstruction of Born’s argument in terms of underdetermination
has also been offered. 
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Chapter 6—Born on Probability
 1 Introduction
This chapter will examine Born’s interpretation of probability in quantum mechanics. He is
not  explicit  about  it,  so  we  have  to  try  to  tease  out  his  thoughts  from  his  writings
concerning probability.  As with many of the other questions that I ask throughout this
thesis, I am not trying to argue that he holds the correct interpretation of probability in
quantum mechanics, if indeed there is one; nor am I trying to argue that there is a best
interpretation, and so he must hold it. Once again, the categories that Born may fit into
were not necessarily available to him. What I am trying to find out is which interpretation
makes fits his position the best. More particularly, the questions to be asked are whether he
holds any view on probability at all, and if so, is that view objective or epistemic? Which
of  the  subcategories  for  these  positions  does  that  view fit  into?  What  I  am going  to
conclude is that he certainly has an objective interpretation of probability and most likely
considers probabilities in quantum mechanics to be something like propensities. 
Probability and statistical physics is a topic to which Born devotes considerable attention.
His  work  on  quantum  mechanics  in  the  1920s  was  focussed  on  statistical  quantum
mechanics.  In his  paper  On the Quantum Mechanics of Collisions  (Born 1926a),  Born
introduced  the  statistical  interpretation  of  the  wavefunction,  that  one  could  interpret
|Ψ2| as giving the probability of observing some particular solution to the superposition
of the wavefunction. The statistical approach was developed in later papers with Jordan,
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Schrödinger  and  Heisenberg,  finding  further  grounding  in  Heisenberg’s  Uncertainty
Principle. Born and Heisenberg also presented the statistical approach in a joint paper at
the 1927 Solvay Conference. 
Before taking a detailed look at Born’s views on probability, it is worth first examining the
different ways in which the notion of probability can be interpreted. In other words, what
can we mean when we say that there exists a probability P of event E occurring? There are
a  number  of  different  interpretations  of  probability  which  I’m going  to  discuss—The
classical interpretation, the frequency interpretation, the subjective interpretation and the
propensity interpretation.  It  should also be noted that one can hold a pluralist  view of
probability. One could, for example, hold that probabilities in the everyday world are best
described by the subjective theory and that probabilities relating to parts of fundamental
physics, such as radioactive decay, are best described as propensities. 
These theories can be understood on an axis of objective vs. epistemic interpretations. An
objective theory of probability holds that probabilities are in some important sense given to
us by the world and there exist objectively correct and incorrect assignments of probability
for the outcome of any particular event. Within this category are frequency interpretations,
which identify probabilities with the frequency with which a particular outcome to some
event occurs over a long run of such events; and propensity interpretations, which explain
probabilities  as  being  physical  properties  of  systems that  give  rise  to  frequencies.  An
epistemic theory of probability holds that probability is fundamentally a feature of our
knowledge,  or  indeed  our  ignorance,  about  the  world.  Into  this  category  fall
classical/logical interpretations and subjective interpretations. The classical theory (in the
Laplacean mould) regards probability as arising from unavoidable epistemic fallibilities in
a deterministic world; the logical interpretation arises from this and treats probability as
degree of rational belief; and finally the subjective interpretation identifies probabilities as
entirely internal to some agent as degree of belief in some outcome full stop. 
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Much  of  Born’s  non-scientific  work  throughout  his  career  is  devoted  to  the  topic.
Statistical physics and its development is central to his argument in Natural Philosophy of
Cause and Chance (1949a), and the collection Physics in My Generation (1956) contains
three papers that explicitly address the subject. 
In this chapter I am going to survey the standard theories of probability, and argue that it is
implausible to view Born as having a classical or subjective view of probability. This is
because they are incompatible with the objective view that Born takes of probabilities in
quantum  mechanics.  Hence,  if  he  holds  any  view  at  all,  it  must  be  a  frequency  or
propensity  view.  Next  I  will  examine  some  of  Born’s  work  in  quantum  mechanics,
particularly  On the Quantum Mechanic of Collisions  (Born 1926a). I will then give an
exegesis of Cartwright’s (1987) paper on Born, in which she argues that Born’s work on
quantum mechanics indicates that he holds a propensity view of probability. I’ll use that as
a springboard to examine some of Born’s later writings on probability, in particular an
exchange of letters between him and Einstein on the topic, arguing that these indicate that
the best fit to his position is a long-run propensity interpretation. Finally, I will look at
Cartwright’s (1987) claim that Born seems to hold one of the modal interpretations of
quantum mechanics and argue that although his views do seem to be consistent with van
Fraassen’s initial (1991) formulation, there does not exist enough information to claim that
Born’s views align with any of the contemporary programs for modal interpretations. 
 2 Epistemic Interpretations of Probability
 2.1 Epistemic Probability: Laplace and Keynes
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 2.1.1 Laplace and the Classical Theory of Probability
The classical theory takes probability to be epistemic, coming simply from our ignorance
of the world. Pierre Simon Laplace expresses this thesis in his  Philosophical Essay on
Probabilities (1814). Laplace describes conceiving of a vast intelligence. He writes:
We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect
of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow.
Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the
forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the
beings  who compose it—an intelligence sufficiently  vast  to  submit
these  data  to  analysis—it  would  embrace  in  the  same formula  the
movements of the greatest  bodies of the universe and those of the
lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the
past, would be present to its eyes. (Laplace, 1814, 4)
So for such a super-intelligence, there would be no such thing as chance.  There was really
only one face upon which a flipped coin could land, only one result that a thrown die could
give. It is just that we are ignorant of whatever set of laws and conditions determines the
outcome  and  are  probably  unable  to  perform  the  calculations  which  would  precisely
predict it. The super intelligence is not ignorant of these considerations, and so for them
there would be no need for a theory of probability. We can see that the classical theory, at
least in its Laplacean conception, is bound up with the ontological determinism present
within Newtonian mechanics. A rejection of determinism, it would seem, would entail a
rejection of Laplace’s view of probability or at best adopting a pluralist view of some kind.
So how does the classical theory actually work? In a nutshell, when we are ignorant of the
outcome of some particular event, we assign a probability by giving an equal weighting for
every outcome of the same kind in such a way that the sum of those probabilities is one—
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in effect we divide equally the certainty that one out of the range of possible outcomes will
occur between the number of possible outcomes. 
Formally speaking, this works in the following way: the probability of some outcome A
occurring is given by m the number of possible outcomes that give us A,  (this can be more
than one—think of the probability of drawing a card of a particular suit from a complete
deck, rather than just the probability of drawing the ace of spades)  divided by the total
number of possible outcomes n. The probability of A is then
P(A)=m /n
So for the probability of drawing a spade,  m will be 13, the total number of spades in a
deck and n will be 52, the total number of cards in the deck. Thus P(drawing a spade) =
13/52 = ¼. 
It does not seem to be quite clear how Laplace’s theory deals with cases which are  not
equiprobable. Gillies (2010 18) writes that there does not seem to be a way for the classical
theory to deal with a biased coin. Although he notes that Laplace does at one point discuss
calculations for a biased coin, considering a case in which there are particular non-equal
probabilities for heads and tails, Gillies takes this to imply that there is some objective
measure of probability used to determine how biased the coin is and so thinks that this
contradicts Laplace’s epistemic interpretation of probability (Gillies 2010 18). Galavotti
disagrees with Gillies, writing that ‘this is not so much a case of unknown chances, but
rather of chances known to be unequal’ (Galavotti 2005 61). She notes that the process of
determining such unknown chances is the starting point for the frequentism of those such
as Von Mises. This doesn’t mean that there is any circularity in Laplace’s understanding of
probability. Galavotti understands Laplace as basing his interpretation of probability partly
on our ignorance and partly on our knowledge (2005 60). She writes ‘once probability is
taken as epistemic, it stands on a different ground from the possibility of events’ (Galavotti
2005 61). 
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Something will turn on this dispute with regards to Born.  If the classical theory is really
only able to deal with situations in which all outcomes are equally likely, then it seems
unlikely that Born holds a classical view of probability, particularly in quantum mechanics,
for  the  primary  reason that  this  is  simply  not  always  how probabilities  are  treated  in
quantum mechanics.  Born’s statistical  interpretation calculates probabilities in quantum
mechanics  from  the  square  of  the  modulus  of  the  wavefunction.  When  we  want  to
calculate the odds of an electron being deflected at some particular angle from an atom, he
does  not  take  the  range  of  energetically  possible  deflections  and  divide  one  by  their
number,  assigning  each  possible  outcome an  equal  probability.  Instead  he  models  the
electron as an incoming plane wave and performs a perturbation theory calculation to give
us a superposition of each of the solutions. The square of the modulus of the wavefunction
for each particular solution gives us a transition probability for the electron to transition
from its eigenstate before collision to some eigenstate afterwards.  This is simply not a
classical model. This is to say nothing of the interference of probabilities in the two-slit
experiment, something else that Born is well-aware of. We should note here that it is of
course the case that  statistical  physics  does  often  use this  method to determine  initial
probabilities—this point is discussed in more detail further on. 
It’s not clear that Gillies’ interpretation of Laplace is the correct one, so we need more than
this  to argue that  Born would not  accept  the Laplace interpretation of probability.  We
might note that there seems to be a determinist motivation for the classical theory and Born
does  not  support  a  determinist  interpretation  of  quantum mechanics.   We can see this
clearly  in  his  (1926a)  collisions  paper  when he writes  that  he is  ‘inclined  to  give  up
determinism  in  the  world  of  atoms’,  and  indeed  in  later  work  such  as  Is  Classical
Mechanics  In  Fact  Deterministic?,  (Born  1955  and  see  also  Chapter  6—Born  on
Determinism) in  which he argues  that  we are not  in  fact  entitled to  interpret  classical
mechanics as telling us that the world is deterministic 
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I  think  a  deciding  point  is  that  it  seems  fairly  clear  that  Born  does  not  think  that
probabilities  are  epistemic  in  nature.  He  asks,  for  example,  in  Natural  Philosophy  of
Cause and Chance ‘how could we rely on probability predictions if by this notion we do
not refer to something real and objective?’ (Born 1949a 106). We can also see in Born’s
arguments against those who think that physics ought return to determinism, either via a
new  (non-quantum  mechanical)  theory  or  via  hidden  variables,  (Born  1955,  see  also
Chapter  5—Born  on  Determinism)  a  belief  that  quantum mechanics  is  fundamentally
probabilistic. Again, this seems to be indicative that Born does not have an epistemic view
of probability
 2.1.2 The Logical Turn 
In  the  early  part  of  the  20th century  John  Maynard  Keynes  developed  a  theory  of
probability that interprets it as partial logical entailment (Gillies 2000 Chapter 3). Gillies
explains  that  Keyne’s  thinking  runs  as  follows:  We  know  that  there  is  no  deductive
entailment from prior observations to later ones. The fact that the sun rose yesterday does
not deductively entail that it will rise tomorrow, nor does the observation of white swans
on the Thames entail that swans observed on the Severn will also be white. Such matters
are instances of induction, rather than deduction. Can we, Keynes asks, understand such
things in a formal way as instances of a partial deductive relation? (Gillies 2000 30). 
So  Keynes  aims  to  give  a  logical  account  of  the  relation  between  some  set  of  prior
knowledge and the likelihood of some outcome given that knowledge, that account being
based on some relation of partial entailment. Gillies notes that Keynes also frames this as
degree of rational belief in some outcome as well as degree of partial entailment. If we
have  some  set  of  propositions  as  our  premises  and  some  set  of  propositions  as  our
conclusion, then if knowledge of our premise set justifies some particular rational degree
of  belief  in  the  conclusion  set  then  we  can  identify  that  degree  of  belief  with  the
probability relation between the two sets (Gillies 2000 31). 
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Keynes’ theory has some peculiar elements, namely that he divides probabilities into two
sorts: those to which numerical values can be attached and those to which they cannot. We
can only assign numerical values to those situations in which all outcomes are equally
likely.  In other situations we cannot assign numerical values. This doesn’t mean that we
cannot give something like relative weightings for outcomes in those cases; it does mean
that we cannot put numbers to those weightings (Gillies 2000 34). 
In  order  to  make  the  distinction  between  when  we  can  and  cannot  use  equiprobable
distributions, and so when we can and cannot assign numerical values to probabilities,
Keynes employs what he calls The Principle of Indifference. This states essentially that
when we have no prior reason to prefer one outcome to another,  we should assign all
outcomes an equal probability. We should note that that there are several paradoxes that
arise from application of this principle (Weatherford 1982 55-66), but I’m not going to
discuss them because I don’t that there is anything to suggest that Born accepts or rejects a
logical understanding of probability on the merits of those paradoxes, or that he is even
aware of them. 
It is worth noting, however, that the principle of indifference appears to have successfully
been used in science and in particular statistical physics and that we might take this to give
us reason to think that it is true (Jaynes 1973, Hájek 2012). What else are we doing when
we assume a micro-canonical distribution but applying the principle of indifference? The
argument runs that as we have been successful in applying the principle of indifference in
developing  multiple  successful  theories  of  statistical  physics—Maxwell-Boltzmann,
Fermi-Dirac  and  Bose-Einstein—we  ought  to  consider  the  principle  as  valid.  Gillies
criticises this position on the grounds that it confuses a (undoubtedly successful) heuristic
with a logical principle.  The point is  that whilst  this  may be a good argument for the
principle itself, it cannot serve as an argument for an a priori interpretation of probability:
we  can  only  determine  the  utility  of  the  principle  of  indifference  in  constructing
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empirically  adequate  systems  of  physical  statistics  a  posteriori.  Hájek  (2012)  raises  a
similar problem, that different statistics apply to different types of particle—Fermi-Dirac
statistics to  fermions like the electron and Bose-Einstein statistics to Bosons—none of
which can be determined a priori.  
Interestingly  in  Einstein’s  Statistical  Theories  Born  (1949b)  says  something  like  this.
When discussing arguing that Einstein was involved in the foundation of wave mechanics,
he writes ‘I cannot see how the BOSE-EINSTEIN counting of equally probable cases can
be justified without the conceptions of quantum mechanics’ (Born 1949b 89). He goes on
to explain that even in cases in which particles are indistinguishable, such particles can still
be distributed ‘between two boxes’ in a number of different ways. Key for Born in the
Bose-Einstein case is the use of a symmetric wavefunction to describe the system. He
explains that in the case that the wave-function is ‘skew’ (i.e. non-symmetrical) we end up
with Fermi-Dirac statistics (Born 1949b 89). 
So I actually think that Born might well be sympathetic to the line of argument that we
should consider the principle of indifference valid because it has been used successfully in
physics. It’s a similar argument to ones that he has made about his principles of contiguity
and  antecedence,  and  the  heuristics  used  by  Heisenberg  and  Einstein  to  eliminate
unobservable  distinctions  (See  chapters  3  and  5  on  causation  and  determinism).  The
problem here is that the principle of indifference, even if considered valid by Born for
these reasons, would not be an a priori  principle,  but rather would be an empirical or
metaphysical  one.  We get a  very clear  statement  that  this  is  indeed Born’s position in
Physical Aspects of Quantum Mechanics (1927). He writes when discussing the ergodic
hypothesis ‘it thus seems that the justification of the choice of equally probable cases by
dividing the phase space into cells can be only be derived a posteriori from its success in
explaining the observed phenomena’ (Born 1927 6).   
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Furthermore, I don’t think that Born would follow Keynes in thinking that any time we
cannot  apply  the  principle  of  indifference  we  cannot  give  numerical  values  for
probabilities, largely for the same reason that I argued he would not hold the Laplacean-
classical  view  of  probability—it’s  not  going  to  be  compatible  with  how  quantum
mechanics  treats  probability  in  all  cases.  In  addition  we  have  the  already-mentioned
indication that Born thinks about probability as objective, rather than epistemic. 
 2.2 The Subjective Interpretation
The subjective interpretation was developed independently in the 1920s and 30s by Frank
Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti. Gillies (2000) notes that although Ramsey developed his
version in the 1920s, prior to de Finetti’s publications in the 30s, Ramsey’s work was not
published until 1931, after de Finetti’s initial publications. Thus there is justification for
the claim that their  work was genuinely developed separately.  Unsurprisingly given its
name, the subjective theory holds that probabilities are not objective things. Rather, the
probability of an event occurring is the degree of belief that an individual has that that
event will occur. Note that this means that there exists no one probability for any particular
outcome. There is merely a series of probabilities for different individuals. The question
then, is how can this degree of belief for an individual be measured? Both Ramsey and de
Finetti conclude that betting, or more particularly the odds that individual is willing to
place on a bet for a particular outcome, can provide this measure.
This is done in the following way: consider a situation in which a person A is called upon
to place a bet upon an event E. In order to do this A must choose a number q, referred to as
the betting quotient. Another person, B chooses the stake S. A pays B qS for the promise
that B will pay out S if E occurs. Importantly, S can be positive or negative, reflecting
whether or not A’s bet is for or against the occurrence of E, but the sign of S is chosen by
B and not known to A. The degree of A’s belief in E can now be measured by q.
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But we are not done yet. Now we must show that such measure of degree of belief leads to
a set of rules that can be used to construct the probability calculus. This is done through
the introduction of the notion of coherence. This is defined as follows: A set of betting
quotients chosen by A q1...qn for events E1...En is coherent if and only  if B cannot choose
stakes S1...Sn such that B will win whatever happens. The situation that B always wins is
referred to as a Dutch book (Hájek 2012).  
 2.2.1 The Axioms of Probability
It can then be proved that a set of betting quotients is coherent if an only if they satisfy
the axioms of probability as stated below.
0⩽P (E)⩽1
For any event E and the probability for some certain event P(Ω) = 1. 
If E1....En are events which are exclusive and exhaustive then 
P(E1)+ ...+P(En)=1
For any two events E, F, 
P(E∧F )=P(E∣F)P (F)
Where P(E∧F ) is  the  probability  of  both  P and  F  occurring  and  P(E∣F) is  the
probability of event E given event F. 
So it can be shown that a Dutch book cannot be formed IFF an individual’s degrees of
belief satisfy the probability calculus. In this respect it would seem that the subjective
theory is a success (Hájek 2012). However there is an obvious objection at  this  point.
Whilst  it  seems reasonable  to  claim that  many probabilities  are  subjective,  or  at  least
contain a substantial component that is subjective, there are surely some probabilities that
are truly objective—think of the result of the throw of an unbiased die or the chance for an
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atom to decay. So how does the subjectivist deal with the apparent existence of objective
probabilities?  There,  are,  as  Gillies  (2000) notes,  two solutions.  The first  is  to  simply
accept,  as  Ramsey  does,  that  there  are  two  acceptable  notions  of  probability,  each
applicable in different circumstances. The second approach, which de Finetti takes, is to
insist  that  even  apparently  objective  probabilities  are  in  fact  subjective  and  can  be
calculated as such. De Finetti does this by introducing the concept of exchangeability.
So what is it precisely? It is the condition under the assignment of a probability value for
some particular result amongst a set of outcomes is dependent only on the number of times
that result occurs and so is independent of the ordering of those outcomes. More formally,
we might say that a sequence of variables is exchangeable IFF the probability for some
outcome  of  that  sequence  is  invariant  to  the  random  permutation  of  those  variables.
Consider  how  this  works  when  throwing  a  die.  The  probabilities  assigned  to  some
particular outcome are said to be exchangeable IFF the same probability of the die coming
up six is assigned no matter where the sixes occur amongst the other results of one, two,
three, four and five in any set of outcomes for which the same number of sixes is observed
(Gillies 2000 71). Probabilities will not be exchangeable when the ordering of events is
important to the assignment of a probability value for some result.
Observers with differing prior probabilities for some apparently objective event can come
to agree, via Bayesian updating, on the same prior probability. For example, in the case of
throwing a die, bettors might initially offer different probabilities based upon whether or
not they think that the die is balanced. The more times the die is thrown, the more closely
the probability assignments from different individuals will converge as the results either
give an even distribution of faces or some faces occur significantly more frequently. As
Gillies  points  out  (2000  70),  although  this  might  look  like  an  objective  probability
assignment to those who cleave to such theories of probability, De Finetti thinks that such
a  concept  is  meaningless.  Gillies  writes  ‘All  that  is  happening is  that,  in  the  light  of
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evidence,  different  individuals  are  coming  to  agree  on  their  subjective  probabilities’
(Gillies 2000 70). Exchangeability is the condition that allows this to happen. 
What  exchangeability  is  supposed to  do is  to  replace  the  notion of  independence  that
occurs  in  objective theories  of  probability.  We are  not  supposed to  need to  make any
assumptions about the independent nature of the results outside of what we observe of
them. We can reduce assumptions of probabilistic independence to that of exchangeability,
thus reducing apparently objective probabilities to subjective ones (Gillies 2000 75). It’s
important to note that although independence and exchangeability are closely related, they
are not identical. Although it is true that all independent sequences are also exchangeable,
the  converse  is  not  the  case.  For  example,  sampling  without  replacement,  where  one
selects individuals from a population at random with the exception that no one is chosen
more than once is exchangeable, but it is not independent. Imagine the simple example of
drawing three coloured balls from a bag which contains five white balls and five black
balls. The probability of drawing a white ball on the first draw will be:
P(W 1)=5/10=1 /2
The probability of drawing a white ball on the second drawn will be:
P(W 2)=(W 2∣W 1)+(W 2∣B1)=(5/10)(4 /9)+(5 /10)(5/9)=1 /2
The probability of drawing a white ball on the third draw will be:
P(W 3)=(W 3∣(W 2∣W 1))+(W 3∣(B2∣W 1))+(W 3∣(W 2∣B1))+(W 3∣(B2∣B1))=
(5/10)(5/9)(3/8)+(5 /10)(5 /9)(5 /8)+(5/10)(5/9)(5/8)+(5 /10)(4 /9)(5 /8)=1/2
Hence as the probability of drawing a white ball on either of the three draws is equal, the
sequence  is  exchangeable.  However  it  is  not  independent.  If  the  sequence  was
independent, then:
P(W 1)=P(W 2∣W 1)
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i.e. the probability of drawing a white ball on the second drawn after having drawn a white
ball on the first drawn is equal the probability of drawing a white ball on the first draw.
However in this example,  
P(W 2∣W 1)=4 /9 and P(W 1)=5/10=1 /2
 As ½ ≠ 4/9, we can say the sequence is not independent. 
 2.2.2 Is Born A Subjectivist?
So, might Born be a something like a subjectivist about probability? How is it that could
we tell?  I’d suggest  that  if  we were to  characterise  Born as  subjectivist,  we wouldn’t
necessarily need to find evidence that he thinks of probabilities in terms of rational betting
quotients. He doesn’t need to have the same formulation of subjectivism as de Finetti.  It
would be enough to show that he thinks of probability in terms of subjective, not objective
assignments. 
In a 1973 paper entitled Einstein: Originality and Intuition, de Finetti discusses Einstein’s
views on probability, substantially mediated by several papers in Born’s  Physics in My
Generation. In it, de Finetti argues that Born’s and Einstein’s views on probability are in
line  with  his  subjective  interpretation.  In  this  section,  I’m  going  to  argue  that  he’s
mistaken.  The  various  claims  that  de  Finetti  makes  about  Born,  that  he  is  strongly
empiricist, that the subjective interpretation is in line with the way that Born thinks about
probability don’t stack up when we consider Born’s wider views. 
De Finetti argues that both Einstein and Born are empiricists, citing in support Einstein’s
favourable views on Mach, and some remarks that Born makes on observables. Why does
de Finetti want to argue that Born and Einstein are empiricists? Because the subjective
theory itself is empiricist with regards to probability.  For the subjective theorist, there is
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nothing going on underneath the betting quotients that people assign to outcomes. At the
very least, if there is, then it’s got nothing to with the things we call probabilities.
I  don’t  want  to  engage with de Finetti  on Einstein (although Eli  Zahar  would I  think
disagree with de Finetti here—see Zahar 1973 and 1989 for example), but I do want to
disagree with regards to Born.  He cites the following passage from Born ‘the world of
physical objects lies outside the realm of the senses and of observation, which only border
on it’ (de Finetti 1978 124) as evidence. According to De Finetti, we could not know a
region simply from observing its edge: ‘we thus find ourselves in the impossible situation
of one who would claim to describe a whole unexplored region whilst knowing only its
contour’ (de Finetti 1978 124). The problem is that Born does not think this. Consider the
next clause in the quotation from Born ‘…; and it is difficult to illuminate the interior of an
extensive region from its boundaries’ (1928 25). He then proceeds to discuss some of these
difficulties  in  the  context  of  quantum mechanics.  Now, there  is  a  world of  difference
between a difficulty and an impossibility and these difficulties are not ones which Born
thinks are insurmountable, as I’ve argued in some detail on in the Chapter 4—Born on
Realism. 
This is not the only arrow in de Finetti’s quiver. He quotes Born with regards to micro-
coordinates in classical statistical mechanics ‘“of course it is not forbidden to believe in
the existence of these co-ordinates; but they will only be of physical significance when
methods have been devised for  their  physical  observation”’ (de Finetti  1978 124).  De
Finetti thinks that this is a clarifying quotation with regards to the ‘fatuous disquisition as
to whether a given thing ‘exists’ or ‘does not exist’’ (de Finetti 1978 p124). Given that de
Finetti thinks that Born agrees with him, it would seem that he interprets this quote as
indicating that, for Born, the question of whether or not something exists is meaningless—
all that matters is what is measurable. 
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The context  of the quotation is  Born’s  paper  Physical  Aspects of  Quantum Mechanics
(Born 1927). Born wishes to point out that the epistemic situation in quantum mechanics is
actually  not  so  different  from that  in  classical  mechanics.  In  classical  mechanics  one
introduces  micro-coordinates  for  the  positions  of  the  particles  in  the  system and then
averages over them to give a statistical result for the whole system.  Born’s point is that as
far as the experimentalist is concerned, the classical micro-coordinates might as well not
exist—they are only introduced ‘to keep the individual phenomena at least theoretically
determinate’ (Born 1927 8). Averaging over the system destroys the initial coordinates and
they are at no point practically measurable.  Quantum kinetic theory achieves the same
result without ever introducing precise micro-coordinates—they don’t exist in the theory
or in the results. Born’s point is this: in both classical and quantum mechanics we calculate
the  statistical  behaviour  of  ensembles.  In  quantum  mechanics,  there  are  no  precise
trajectories  because  the  position  and  momentum operators  don’t  commute.  Despite  in
classical mechanics it always being assumed that there were precise trajectories, Born does
not think that there was any good reason to do so. 
Now,  this  might  mean  the  following:  Born  thinks  that  the  question  of  the  reality  of
quantities which are not in principle measurable and play no role in theoretical calculations
is meaningless (although not in a semantic sense), or at the least irrelevant.  It doesn’t
indicate, at least on its own, a kind of operationalism or logical empiricism. The micro-
coordinates  that  Born  refers  to  are  not  simply  impossible  to  measure  indirectly  or
independently of other parts of the theory. Rather, they play no role in the theory for any
understanding of the terms “observable’ or ‘measurable”. The micro-coordinates are for all
intents and purposes hidden variables. Denial of hidden variables is not an indication of an
operationalist stance. It is merely consistent with one.
It is possible that de Finetti might want to argue for something weaker than the claim that
Born  is  a  subjective  theorist.  It  could  be  that  Born’s  position  is  consistent  with  the
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subjective interpretation and that de Finetti thinks that Born should be a subjective theorist,
given the theory’s other advantages. So what does de Finetti think that the core of the
subjective theory is? It is this: probabilities do not exist as entities in their own right. The
probability of an event only exists ‘as an estimation of hope or fear or at any rate a degree
of expectation of its coming to pass’ (de Finetti 1978 126). 
The problem here for de Finetti here is that, as Galavotti points out in her 1995 paper,
Operationism,  Probability  and  Quantum  Mechanics,  although  the  subjective  theory  is
operationalist and Born certainly says things that make it sound like he’s an operationist
(see his repeated emphasis on the heuristic principle that Heisenberg used to eliminate
quantum orbits because of their unobservability, and his argument that classical mechanics
is not determinist based on what looks a very strong commitment to that principle), de
Finetti is also a positivist, and Born is not. 
For the operationalist,  theoretical  concepts can only be defined in  terms of observable
concepts.  Now it  might  seem that  Born  makes  noises  in  this  direction,  but  we  must
understand that by “observable”, Born does not mean ‘observable with the senses’. He is
quite happy (see Chapter 4—Born on Realism) to regard microscopic things or even fields
as observable and denies the sharp distinction that the positivist wants to make between
observable and unobservable. Born might be an empiricist of some type (he regards the
term as merely meaning that theories should correspond to observable results, something
that he thinks is ‘trivial’), but not of the Machian variety, and this is precisely the position
that De Finetti occupies. Galavotti notes that De Finetti describes himself as a Machian,
and  thus  ‘probability  is  for  him  nothing  other  than  the  sensation  of  the  individual
(Galavotti 1995 114). As Galavotti points out and I have gone into some detail on in the
realism chapter, this is a position that Born rejects explicitly.
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I suppose that one could attempt a reconstruction of the subjective theory that did not rely
on some form of positivism but, as I will argue later in this chapter, I consider it far more
likely  that  Born  holds  some form of  propensity  view.  Think  of  his  talk  in  Einstein’s
Statistical  Theories of  the importance of  ‘fundamental’ laws of  probability.  De Finetti
seems to take this to mean that Born wishes to base all of physics on probability rules. In
many ways, De Finetti is right—Born argues that we should replace the deterministic laws
of  classical  mechanics  with  a  statistical  reformulation  in  Is  Classical  Mechanics
Deterministic? (Born 1955—see Chapter 5—Born on Determinism for a detailed account
of his argument). This does not mean, however, that Born wishes to replace the certainty of
classical  laws  with  subjective probabilistic  ones.  It  could  just  as  easily  be  a  realist
commitment  to  objective,  although  probabilistic,  laws  of  nature.  In  this  light  we  can
interpret his commitment to fundamental probability laws as a commitment that to the idea
that  the  probabilities  themselves  are  features  of  the  physical  world.  In  this  way  we
certainly have a kind of propensity theory. 
De  Finetti  does  though  think  that  there  is  an  alignment  between  Born’s  treatment  of
quantum mechanics and his notion of exchangeability. He writes ‘the notion of “mixture of
pure cases” coincides  with the one derived from my definition of ‘exchangeability’,  a
notion that (apart from its relevance for applications) serves to express in an intrinsic and
exact  manner  the  case  which  normal  usage  describes  as  one  “of  independence  with
constant but known probability’’’ (De Finetti 1978 p126).  He then goes on to elaborate on
the notion of exchangeability vs independence,  writing ‘To take a trivial  example: if  I
extract poll balls and them return them to a ballot box, the composition of the contents of
which is unknown, the extractions would be independent if I knew the percentage of black
and white balls; if I do not know it each extraction is informative, increases the probability
of  compositions  richer  in  balls  of  that  colour,  and  will  all  told  almost  certainly  tend
towards an asymptotic value corresponding to the observed frequency and coinciding with
that of the true percentage’ De Finetti 1978 p126).  
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So the idea is this: we don’t know that the ball extractions are independent because we
don’t  know anything  about  the  composition  of  the  ball-box  system.  However,  such  a
system is exchangeable, so the order in which we pull balls out of the box doesn’t matter.
Hence every ball-pulling is equally informative and contributes equally to generating the
“correct” probability distribution for the balls. This is no doubt a decent argument for the
utility of exchangeability as a concept or formal definition.  The problem with it  as an
argument  for  subjectivism  is  that  it  is  not  at  all  clear  that  only  subjectivists  about
probability can use exchangeability. It seems that we can quite happily define it as a formal
property of some (but not all) independent sequences and leave it at that. 
He  then  goes  on  to  quote  Born  again,  saying:  ‘In  Born’s  words  (ibid)  “each  new
observation annihilates the former distribution of probability and substitutes another one;
thus  we  have  the  phenomenon  of  the  ‘reduction  of  probabilities’ that  I  have  already
mentioned and to which Einstein took exception”’ (De Finetti 1976 p126-7, quoting Born
1965  163).  De  Finetti  does  not  deign  to  furnish  this  quote  with  further  explanation,
presumably considering in conclusive. 
So I think that de Finetti must be attempting to draw a direct analogy between the mixture
of pure cases, exchangeability, and the reduction of probabilities in quantum mechanics. At
least,  he doesn’t  give us  anything else  to  go on,  so it  seems fair  to  presume that  his
argument  rests  on  some  supposed  similarity  of  them.  First  off,  the  reduction  of
probabilities that Born refers to is this: that a wave-function is changed into a different one
on measurement. Earlier in the article that de Finetti is quoting from, Born writes of the
reduction ‘a state represented as a wave-function in configuration space (more generally: a
vector in the Hilbert space) is turned into another one by experimental interference’ (Born
1965  162).  We  can  see  that  the  idea  in  quantum  mechanics  of  each  measurement
‘destroying’ the previous probability distribution (i.e. the collapse or projection postulate)
and replacing it with a new one coincides with exchangeability in the following way—
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each measurement is equally informative with regards to the system, just as is the case if
exchangeability  is  applicable.  A mixed  case  in  quantum mechanics  is  an  ensemble  of
wave-functions,  or vectors in Hilbert  space.  It  is,  importantly,  not the same thing as a
superposition of those wavefunctions (Rae 2005 277). The pure state is what some system
ends up in after measurement, i.e. when properties of that state are known definitely. A
measurement is also not a transition from a mixed state to a pure one. In fact, as Rae tells
us: ‘In the context of ensembles, therefore, collapse corresponds to a transition from a pure
state to a mixture’. It’s not clear how applicable the subjective notion of exchangeability is
here: we might already have to have some objective knowledge of the system before we
can know that it is in a mixed state, rather than a pure one. (see Rae 2005 277). So it seems
inconclusive that Born is aligned with de Finetti on this basis, especially if we consider
that he already disagrees with him on operationalism. I also want to note that I’m not
arguing that  de  Finetti  is  wrong (or  right,  for  that  matter)  to  say subjectivist  view of
probability might make some sense of quantum mechanics, just that he doesn’t give us
much to suggest that Born holds such a view. 
I also think that even if de Finetti is correct about exchangeability being appropriate in this
context (and he says so little that it’s hard to tell exactly how he thinks it applies) I’m not
convinced that the notion of exchangeability is uniquely tied to a subjective interpretation.
All it means is that in some sequences, ordering does not matter. 
Galavotti, on the other hand, does think that de Finetti may be correct about this point. She
explains that exchangeability works if we start from the presumption of subjectivity, rather
than objectivity. This may well be correct, but given that there’s good evidence that Born
has an objective view of probability, I don’t think that it cuts against my argument. She
goes on to say ‘Going back to the analogy of a mixed state, this is indeed striking with
respect to such authors as Born and Heisenberg, especially in view of Heisenberg’s claim
—recalled above—to the effect that there are two components of a probability function in
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quantum mechanics: a subjectivist one and an objectivist one’ (Galavotti 1995 131). On
this matter I would say this: Galavotti specifically refers to a point of Heisenberg’s here,
not of Born’s. 
One  criticism  of  my  argument  is  this:  It  may  well  be  the  case  that  Born  is  not  an
operationalist about theoretical concepts in general, but he could be an operationalist about
probability.  Perhaps he could reject de Finetti’s positivism but still think that probabilities
can only be understood in terms of their observable frequencies. But I don’t think so, as I
shall argue next. 
 3 Objective Interpretations of Probability
 3.1 The Frequency Theory
The frequency theory of probability was developed in the 20th century by Richard von
Mises and Hans Reichenbach. Both Gillies (2000 88) and Galavotti (2005 71-81) note that
it  had  precursors  in  the  19th century.  The  frequency  theory  takes  probability  to  be  a
mathematical science, the subject of which is ‘mass phenomena and repetitive events’ (von
Mises 1957 vii). Gillies notes the contrast to the subjective theory—rather than considering
probabilities assigned by single individuals to single events, the frequency theory takes
probabilities to be measurable, objective quantities, defined by the behaviour of systems
consisting of a  very large number of  parts  or  by a  single event  repeated a  very large
number of times.
Crucial to von Mises’ frequentism is the notion of a collective. He does not think that it
makes sense to talk of probabilities with regard to individuals. We can only talk about
them with reference to collectives, which he defines as follows: ‘a sequence of uniform
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events or processes which differ by certain observable attributes, say colours, numbers or
anything else’ (von Mises 1957 12). So a collective can be a group of anything that we
want—the crucial thing is that there exists an observable common characteristic amongst
all of its members.
Von Mises developed the theory from two ‘empirical’ laws of probability.  He describes
the first in the following way:
It is essential for the theory of probability that experience has shown
that the game of dice, as in all the other mass phenomena which we
have mentioned, the relative frequencies of certain attributes become
more and more stable as the number of observations is increased. (Von
Mises 1928)
Gillies terms this the ‘Law of Stability of Statistical Frequencies’ (Gillies 2000 92).  So as
the number of observations of a particular process tends towards a very large number the
frequency of a particular outcome tends towards a stable quantity from which a probability
for that outcome can be derived. 
Von Mises’ second empirical law concerns the failure of gambling systems. He explains it
in the following way:
The Authors of all such systems have all, sooner or later, had the
sad experience of finding out that no system is  able to improve
their chances of winning in the long run, i.e., to affect the relative
frequencies with which the different colours or numbers appear in
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a  sequence  selected  from the  total  sequence  of  the  game. (Von
Mises 1957 25)
So the relative frequencies found in long runs of a particular game remain the same even
for a  smaller subsequence of the whole game.  Gillies terms this  the  Law of Excluded
Gambling Systems.
From  these  empirical  laws  Von  Mises  produces  the  limiting  frequency  definition  of
probability. Gillies states this as follows:
Axiom of Convergence
Let A be an arbitrary attribute of a collective  C,  then limn→∞m(A)/n where  m  is the
number of times a result is obtained in n goes of a sequence.
We can know make the following definition:
The probability of A in C[PAC] is defined to be limn→∞m(A)/n
This is the limiting frequency definition of probability. So on the frequency theory we can
now take the meaning of the probability of a particular outcome event to be the limiting
frequency with which that outcome occurs as the number of events tends to infinity. In this
way, probabilities are conditional not upon the beliefs of an individual as in the subjective
theory, but on the attributes of a particular collective. One important consequence of this
definition is that we are only allowed to introduce probabilities for situations which belong
to a genuine empirical collective, i.e. ones which form part of a set of mass events or long
sequence  so  that  the  number  of  those  events  is  very  large.  We  cannot  postulate
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probabilities  for  events  which  are  repeated  only  a  few times  and we certainly  cannot
postulate probabilities for single events (Gillies 2000 118). 
So could Born hold a frequency theory of probability? We have seen that he holds an
objective  view  of  probability  and  so  fulfils  at  least  one  necessary  condition  to  be  a
frequentist.  But  does  he  identify  probabilities  with  frequencies?  Well,  he  might.  Two
comments form the Born-Einstein Letters (2005) suggest something of this sort: 
To say that ψ describes the ‘state’ of one single system is just a figure of
speech, just as one might say in everyday life: ‘My life expectation (at
67) is 4.3 years’. This too is a statement made about one single system,
but  does  not  make sense  empirically.  For  what  is  really  meant  is,  of
course, that you take all individuals of 67 and count the percentage of
those who life for a certain length of time. This has always been my
concept of how to interpret |ψ|2. (letter sent in 1950 in Born 2005 182).
Einstein admits that one can regard the ‘probabilistic’ quantum theory as
final if one assumes that the ψ-function relates to the ensemble and not to
an individual case. This has always been my assumption as well, and I
consider the frequent repetition of an experiment as the realization of an
ensemble.  This  coincides  exactly  with  the  actual  procedure  of  the
experimental  physicists,  who obtain their  data  in  the atomic and sub-
atomic  area  by  accumulating  data  from  similar  measurements.
(Commentary on a letter of Einstein’s sent in 1953, Born 2005 206). 
This certainly looks like Born thinks of probabilities as being frequencies. It’s also the case
that he seems to have read at least some of Von Mises’ work. He refers to von Mises’ book
Probability, Statistics and Truth  (von Mises 1957)   in a footnote of  On the Meaning of
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Physical Theories (Born 1928). He writes in Einstein’s Statistical Theories ‘I have seen no
definite statement of his about the question ‘What is Probability?’ [unfortunately Born also
neglects to give us his answer to this question, which would have saved a lot of work]; nor
has he taken part in the discussions going on about VON MISES’ definition and other such
endeavours.  I suppose he would have dismissed them as metaphysical speculations, or
even  joked  about  them’ (Born  1949b  90).  So  Born  might  be  alluding  to  Von  Mises’
frequencies in his letters to Einstein. On the other hand, we might ask why, if Born has
read and agrees with Von Mises, why he does not say so here? I think though, that if there
is anything that I have learned about Born it is that it he is rarely that explicit.
 
I  think that it  is far from conclusive from these points as to whether or not Born is a
frequentist. Undoubtedly he holds that probabilities are objective and that the probabilities
that  quantum  mechanics  gives  us  are  observed  as  frequencies.  However  we  should
remember, as I will discuss in detail in the following section, that we can also understand
frequencies  as  arising  from propensities.  Given  that  this  is  the  case,  in  order  to  fully
commit  Born  to  frequency  interpretation,  we  would  have  to  show  that  he  thinks
probabilities are observed frequencies and  nothing else  and I don’t think that we can. I
think that it is also the case that a lot of what would appear to commit Born to a frequency
interpretation—a belief in objective probabilities and a belief that probabilities ought not
to  be  understood  in  the  single  case—also  count  as  evidence  of  a  long-run propensity
interpretation. 
 3.2 The Propensity Theory 
The propensity  interpretation is  another objective interpretation of probability,  defining
probabilities as some kind of property of an object or system or event which gives rise to a
range of outcomes. We might think of them as being dispositional properties of a system to
produce  some particular  frequency  of  outcomes.  To distinguish  this  from a  frequency
interpretation  we  might  say  that  whereas  frequentism  identifies  probabilities  with
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frequencies, a propensity interpretation seeks to explain frequencies as having arisen from
some physical characteristic, the propensity, of a given system. They seem to have their
origin  in  some work  of  Popper’s  that  sought  to  account  for  probabilities  in  quantum
mechanics (Von Plato 1994 15). Hájek (2012) and Galvotti (2005) trace the idea back to
Peirce. 
We might wish to distinguish, as Gillies does and Hájek recommends, between single-case
and long-run propensity theories. As we have seen above, one feature of the frequency
theory  is  that  it  does  not  describe  probabilities  for  single  events,  only  for  limiting
frequencies  of  collectives.  There  are  in  quantum  mechanics,  and  indeed  otherwise,
situations that look very much like single event probabilities—consider the decay of a
single  particle.  Single-case  propensity  theories  attempt  to  explain  this  by  taking
propensities to be tendencies for some individual outcome. Single-case probabilities might
seem to be a somewhat odd idea—Hájek notes that it is ‘prima-facie’ clear that they cannot
obey the probability  calculus (Hájek 2012).  We might  thus question whether  or  not it
makes sense to talk of such things as probabilities at all. 
Gillies (2010 119) notes that there is a major problem for objective theories that wish to
admit single-case probabilities,  the reference class problem. The problem is this—if we
want to assign a probability to a single case, we need to decide what reference class that
case belongs to. Gillies uses the example of trying to assign a probability to the survival of
a forty year old man to his forty-first birthday. The probability will depend on whether we
assign him to the class of all forty year old men, or forty-year old men living in a particular
country. Still further, we might ask whether or not he belongs to the class of forty-year old
men who smoke,  who have hazardous  jobs,  who do regular  exercise,  who do regular
exercise  but  that  exercise  is  mountain  climbing  and  so  on.  The  problem  is  how  to
objectively assign our subject to the correct  reference class.  Galavotti  (2005 117) also
notes that we might also want to involve further considerations like there being relevant
qualitative  but  not  quantitative  data.  She  considers  the  reference  class  problem to  be
inescapable. Gillies considers some solutions, in particular that we might always assign
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our subject to the narrowest reference class for which there exists sufficient statistical data
but notes that there might still be subjective qualitative considerations such as personal
knowledge of the subject (2010 121).  
In any case, single-case theories are not the only sort of propensity theory. There are also
long-run  propensity  theories.  Gillies  defines  them  as  follows:  ‘A long-run  propensity
theory is one in which the propensities are associated with repeatable conditions, and are
regarded as propensities to produce, in a long series of repetitions of these conditions,
frequencies which are approximately equal to the probabilities’ (Gillies 2010 126). I think
that  we  can  understand  this  in  the  following  way:  if  we  understand  propensities  as
dispositional  properties  in  general,  we  can  understand  a  long-run  propensity  as  a
dispositional  property  that  is  associated  with  some particular  repeatable  condition,  for
example the throwing of a  balanced die  in  a windless  environment.  We might  have a
different  propensities  associated  with the  same object  for  different  conditions.  We can
make  the  differentiation  of  these  propensities  as  fine-grained  as  the  differences  in
conditions that affect the frequencies generated by their repetition. 
Interpreting probabilities with repeatable conditions rather than collectives actually sounds
almost exactly in line with how Born talks about frequencies—recall how he writes that
‘This has always been my assumption as well, and I consider the frequent repetition of an
experiment as the realization of an ensemble’ (Born 2005) in a letter to Einstein. 
So propensities interpret probabilities as being rooted in some physical or dispositional
property of a system that is carried with it throughout different situations. If we are to look
for this interpretation of probability in Born, we would look for statements which identify
probabilities with objective physical properties of (quantum) systems. I think that this is all
that is (minimally) required to define Born as a propensity theorist  about probabilities.
Given Born’s remarks criticising the interpretation of probabilities in the single-case,  I
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think if we can find evidence that he holds a propensity interpretation of probability, we
can safely say that it is a long-run propensity interpretation. I think that it is clear that Born
does hold an objective view of probability. In order to argue that this view is a propensity
theory,  as  opposed to  a  frequency theory,  I’m next  going to  examine some of  Born’s
writings on quantum mechanics. 
We  might  also  briefly  consider  a  pluralist  interpretation  of  probability.  We  could  for
example,  argue  for  a  subjective  interpretation  in  all  cases  apart  from  those  few  in
fundamental  physics,  such  as  radioactive  decay,  for  which  a  subjective  interpretation
seems implausible, and in those cases argue for a propensity interpretation. With regards to
Born, he does not really say anything about probability outside of physics, so there is no
evidence to indicate that he holds such a view. On the other hand,  since he says nothing on
it, there is no reason to think that he did not hold such a view. I’ll therefore say no more
about it. 
 4 Quantum Mechanics and Probability
The importance of probabilistic and statistical physics is a theme that runs through Born’s
career from at least his work on quantum mechanics onwards. Probabilities underpin his
arguments for how one can derive causal direction (antecedence in his terminology) from
physics (Born 1949a) and let us not forget that it was he who first introduced probabilities
into  quantum  mechanics  proper  by  proposing  a  statistical  interpretation  of  the
wavefunction.
In Born’s 1926 paper On The Quantum Mechanics of Collisions (Born 1926a), he showed
how to determine the result of an interaction between a free particle and an atom via means
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of  a  perturbation  theory  calculation.  Born  interpreted  the  resulting  superposition  of
solutions probabilistically: This is the statistical interpretation of the wave function.  
At this point in time there existed two different versions of quantum mechanics  - the
matrix mechanics developed in Göttingen by Heisenberg, Born and Jordan; and the theory
of wave mechanics developed by Erwin Schrödinger. Although they had been proven to be
formally equivalent when Born wrote  his collisions paper, it was not yet clear what the
physical meaning of this equivalence was (Rosenfeld 1971)   . Schrödinger’s theory was
something of an attempt to return to the classical concepts thrown aside by Heisenberg.
Born tried and failed to solve the problem using matrix mechanics, but succeeded with
Schrödinger’s formulation of the theory. Born notes that  ‘exactly for this reason I might
regard it as the deepest formulation of the quantum laws’ (Born 1926a).
Born’s  use  of  wave  mechanics  was  in  itself  was  something  of  a  controversial  move.
Although it had recently been proved that wave and matrix mechanics were equivalent
theories (Schrödinger 1926) it was not clear how exactly one was able to switch between
them. It was also the case that there was a social division within the scientific community
between the practitioners of the different formulations of quantum mechanics. There was
little academic exchange between them. In fact wave and matrix mechanics papers were
not even published in the same journals. Matrix papers went to Zeitschrift fur Physik and
wave papers to  Annalen der Physik. Zeitschrift was associated with more liberal ideas,
compared to Annalen’s conservative background (Kragh 1999).   The solution that Born
presented in his collision paper, which solved a problem using the wave functions of wave
mechanics and interpreted the solution in terms of the particles and transition probabilities
of matrix mechanics, was therefore quite unprecedented.
Born explains in the paper that collision processes in quantum mechanics are not easy to
calculate.  It is not possible to have a simple classical-style solution in which one simply
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picks out the states in the interacting systems that one is interested in and calculates how
one is influenced by the other. When the systems of the atom and the particle interact, all
states become coupled in a way that is too complex to allow the simple plucking out of
relevant information. However, we also know that there is a point after the collision at
which the electron has reached sufficient distance from the atom for the interaction of the
two systems (and hence the coupling of their states) will have decreased to the point where
the atom has a definite state and the electron a definite rectilinear motion (Born 1926a 23).
The question is, how do we formulate mathematically the behaviour of these particles?
Born’s solution is as follows. We treat the electron as an incoming plane wave that scatters
off an atom. Although the waves produce a complex interaction when collision occurs, a
solution should be calculable when the electron goes off to infinity (1926a 53).
So one has to solve the Schrödinger equation for a system of an atom and an electron with
the boundary condition that ‘the solution in a preselected direction of electron space goes
over asymptotically into a plane wave with exactly this direction of propagation’ (Born
1926a 53) This boundary condition represents the arriving electron coming in from infinity
to collide with the atom. In such a system the behaviour of the scattered wave at infinity
will give us a description of the motion of the electron after the collision.
We let  Ψ1
0(qk)Ψ2
0(qk ) be the eigenfunctions of the atom prior to the collision, making
the assumption that we have a discrete spectrum.
Prior to the collision we model the eigenfunctions of the electron as a continuous manifold
of plane waves.
sin(2π /λ)(α x+β y+γ z+δ)
From de Broglie we can give the energy of the electron as
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τ=h2/(2μλ2)
The state of the electron arriving from the +z direction prior to the collision can be thus
given by the eigenfunction
ψn ,t
0 (qk , z )=ψ(qk )
0 sin(2π z / λ)
Born defines the potential energy of the collision as V (x , y , z ;qk) By applying a first
order  perturbation  (which  Born  does  not  give  in  the  first  paper,  but  provides  a  more
mathematically comprehensive description of in a second (Born 1926b) the scattered wave
resulting from the perturbation as z→∞is given as
ψ(n,t )
1 (x , y , z ;qk)=∑
m
∬
α x ,β y ,γ z>0
dωϕn τ, m(α ,β , γ)sin knτ ,m(α x+β y+γ z+δ)ψm
0 (qk )
In which dω is an element of the solid angle in the direction of the unit vector, the elements
of which are α,β,γ and Ψnτm(α,β,γ)is the wave function in which the information regarding
the position of the electron is given. This is what was later called the differential cross
section (Jammer 1966 284).
Born concludes from this calculation that, if one wishes to understand this result in terms
of particles ‘only one interpretation is possible. The amplitude (or rather the square of the
amplitude, as was added in proof after  ‘more careful consideration’ (Born 1926a) of the
wave function gives the probability that the incident electron is thrown out in the angle
indicated by the coefficients α, β or γ.
So Born has produced a solution to the problem of collisions in quantum mechanics. But it
is not a definite solution. As he puts it  ‘One gets no answer to the question “what is the
state after the collision”, but only to the question, “how probable is a specified outcome of
the  collision”’ (Born  1926a  24).  We cannot  say  precisely  what  the  result  of  such  an
interaction is, but merely say how likely it is that a particular thing should occur. Born
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thinks that this sounds a death knell for determinism in quantum mechanics. ‘I myself’, he
writes ‘am inclined to give up determinism in the world of atoms.’ (Born 1926a 54)
So, the relevant question here is what, if anything, this tells us about what Born actually
thinks  probabilities  represent.  Although  Von  Mises’  first  paper  on  the  frequency
interpretation was published in 1919, there appears to be no evidence that Born was aware
of it at this point in time (or at the very least gives any thought to with regards to this
paper) and given that  the subjective theory was not  published until  the 1930s and the
propensity theory until  the 50s it  would be wrong to ascribe to Born any intention of
interpreting quantum probabilities in line with a particular probability theory. However it is
quite legitimate to ask whether or not his work on collision processes implies or expresses
a particular view of probability and whether or not such a view is in line with one of the
probability theories. 
We can try to get some idea of this by looking at Born’s argument for and interpretation of
his results, and seeing if they go beyond the minimum interpretation required and if there
are alternate interpretations available.
Born’s argument can be summarised as follows. We want to solve the problem of collision
processes between a free particle and an atom. Matrix mechanics (at this stage at least) is
suitable for solving periodic processes but unsuitable for solving asymptotic ones, such as
collision. However using wave mechanics, we can regard such collision processes as being
analogous to the diffraction of an incoming plane wave and so produce a solution. Born
then interprets the wave intensity at a particular angle as giving the probability density for
the  position  of  a  particle  and  not,  as  Schrödinger  does,  as  giving  the  density  of  a
distribution of matter (Rosenfeld 1971 50). This allows Born to preserve the notion of a
particle  albeit  at  the  cost  of  the  notion  of  a  determinate  trajectory  for  a  particle.
Importantly,  it  also  provides  a  physically  meaningful  link  between  wave  and  matrix
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mechanics—as Rosenfeld puts it ‘it established a complete harmony between the statistical
meaning of the wave intensity and the statistical character of the rules of quantum algebra
for the calculation of transition probabilities’ (Rosenfeld 1971 51).
So,  is  Born  saying  anything  more  here  than  is  minimally  required  to  solve  collision
problems? Well, he does not need to give the particle interpretation. He could just leave it
at the solution of the scattered wave from which the wave intensity at a particular angle
can be derived. However Born’s particle interpretation is only unnecessary if one assumes
that there are no particles for there to be an interpretation about. Otherwise it is simply the
answer to the question of what the solution says about particle behaviour in collisions. So
it is not clear that this says anything about Born’s views on probability; rather it tells about
Born’s  commitment  to  particles  and  to  the  physical  significance  of  the  mathematical
equivalence between matrix and wave mechanics.
In  1927  Born  published  a  paper  in  Nature  entitled  Physical  Aspects  of  Quantum
Mechanics.  The  paper  was an  extension  of  one  given to  Section  A (Mathematics  and
Physics)  of  the  British  Association  in  August  1926.  In  it  Born  made  ‘An  attempt  to
understand the physical significance of the quantum theoretical formulae.’ via considering
how quantum mechanics answers the question of ‘the course of phenomena’ in a system
when the equilibrium of that system is disturbed (Born 1927). This, he says, is the question
with which classical mechanics deals almost exclusively and is the one which quantum
mechanics  mostly  ignores.   Quantum  mechanics,  of  course,  answers  that  question
statistically. But, as Born points out in a theme that runs through Natural Philosophy of
Cause and Chance (Born 1949a), so can classical mechanics. Born notes that ‘it always
made  use  of  certain  statistical  considerations.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  occurrence  of
probabilities was justified by the fact that the initial state was never exactly known; so long
as this was the case,  statistical  methods might be,  more or less provisionally, adopted’
(Born 1927 7).
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First  Born  considers  how  classical  physics  deals  with  probabilities.  Derivations  of
probabilities in classical mechanics, Born says, start if possible with the assumption that
we can consider certain cases equally possible. An initial distribution is produced from this
assumption. It is then attempted to prove that the final distribution—that which is to be
predicted and observed—is independent of the initial distribution. He says something very
interesting about  the assumption of  an initial  equiprobable distribution—that  it  is  only
justifiable in an a posteriori way from the success of the assumption in explaining some
observable phenomenon (Born 1927 7). My point here is to emphasise that Born does not
think that the principle of equally probable distributions can be an a priori one.
Born notes that the situation is similar for all cases in which statistical theories are used in
physics.   Consider,  he  says,  the  case  of  a  collision  between an  atom and  an  electron
described using the rules of classical mechanics. We know that the collision will be elastic
and that the electron will lose no energy in (at least) the following case: when the kinetic
energy of the electron is less than the first excitation potential of the atom. Once we know
this, we can try to calculate the direction of deflection for our electron. On the classical
model such collisions are causally determined: if one knew the position and velocity of all
the  electrons  in  the  atom and  that  of  the  incoming  electron  then  one  could  calculate
precisely  the  angle  of  deflection  prior  to  the  collision.  However,  the  physicist  cannot
practically obtain all of this information and so we instead have to use average positions
and  velocities  and  in  order  to  obtain  these  averages  we  once  again  must  make  the
assumption of an initial distribution of equally probable states. He writes that the fact that
this assumption must be made is ‘usually forgotten’ (Born 1927 8) (Born gives a more
detailed examination of the implications of precise information being unobtainable in a
later paper—for a discussion see Chapter 5 on determinism). Born says that we do this by
describing the initial path of the incoming electron using a coordinate system of ‘angle
variables and phases, and by treating equal phase intervals as equally probable’ (1927 8).
But this assumption is just that— an assumption made so that the averages are calculable.
For Born, the only justification for it can be through the success of the technique (1927 8).
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Born notes that  there is  something peculiar about  this  set-up:  practically  speaking, the
microscopic coordinates ‘do not exist’ (Born 1927 8). They are introduced purely ‘to keep
the individual phenomena at least theoretically determinate’ (Born 1927 8). The only thing
that is observed is the number of particles deflected in a particular direction. The part of
the path in which the collision occurs is not observable. BUT, Born says, we can gain
knowledge about how the collision behaves from the observed statistical distribution. Born
gives  the  example  of  how  Rutherford  could  prove  that  Coulomb’s  law  held  for  the
interaction between α particles and an atomic nucleus from the statistics of the dispersion
of the α particles after collision (Born 1927 8). The microscopic coordinates, which in this
case describe the distance of the nucleus from the original path of the alpha particle, are
eliminated in the final formula of the distribution by averaging over all of their values.
In this  way,  we can actually  analyse mechanical  concepts  like force statistically.  Born
writes that 'these considerations lead us to the idea that we could replace the Newtonian
definition of force by a statistical one...The magnitude of a force, classically measured by
the  acceleration  of  a  particle,  would  here  be  measured  by  the  inhomogeneity  of  an
assembly of particles' (Born 1927 9). The problem for Born here is that we now have two
definitions of force that need to be unified and the problem for the statistical theory is the
necessity of assuming an initially equiprobable distribution, which for the aforementioned
reasons Born finds problematic.
Born's point here is that the situation in quantum mechanics, epistemically speaking, in
terms  that  the  experimentalist  can  measure,  is  not  so  different  from  the  situation  in
classical mechanics. What makes the quantum formulation distinct is that whereas classical
physics introduces microphysical coordinates only to eliminate them from the final result
by averaging over all of their values, quantum mechanics achieves its results without ever
introducing them at all. This is an early statement of an idea that Born discusses again in
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Natural  Philosophy  of  Cause  and  Chance,  that  in  some significant  respects,  quantum
mechanics is more satisfying than classical mechanics despite, or perhaps even because of,
its banishment of determinism from the microscopic. He goes on to say:
The  quantum  theoretical  description  of  the  system  contains  certain
declarations about the energy, the momenta, the angular momenta of the
system; but it does not answer, or at least only answers in the limiting
case of classical mechanics, the question of where a certain particle is at
a given time. In this respect quantum theory is in agreement with the
experimentalists,  for  whom  microscopic  coordinates  are  also  out  of
reach, and who therefore only count instances and indulge in statistics.
This suggests that quantum mechanics similarly only answers properly-
put statistical questions and says nothing about the course of individual
phenomena.  It  would  then  be  a  singular  fusion  of  mechanics  and
statistics. (Born 1927 9)
So this would actually seem to be quite in line with the frequency theory. Although we
may  talk  about  ‘the  electron’ in  the  formalism  of  the  theory  this  is  not  physically
meaningful because the theory never actually deals with single events. However, this by no
means uniquely ties Born to a frequency interpretation—it is perfectly compatible with
long-run propensity  theories  as  long-run propensity  theories  also reject  the  validity  of
single-case probabilities.
Einstein’s Statistical Theories (Born 1949b) was published as part of the Library of Living
Philosophers volume on Albert Einstein, Albert Einstein: Philosopher Scientist. In it, Born
tries to present a coherent account of Einstein’s views on statistics and to demonstrate (in a
friendly  way)  that  it  was  his  work  on  probabilities  that  laid  the  foundations  for  the
indeterminism in quantum mechanics,  presumably much to the annoyance of the great
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man. We should note that Born is not the only person who thinks this: Martin J. Klein
(1979)  argues  similarly  that  Einstein’s  work  in  the  1900s  laid  the  ground  for  the
development  of  quantum  mechanics  in  the  1920s.  Born  starts  with  Einstein’s  early
contributions to classical statistical mechanics in 1905. Born regards the ‘fundamental’
step that Einstein made in his Brownian motion paper to be showing that the statistical
character  of  molecular  motion  has  observable  consequences.  He  notes  that  ‘these
investigations of EINSTEIN have done more than any other work to convince physicists
of…the fundamental part of probability in natural laws’ (Born 1949b 82).  With regards to
quantum  mechanics  Born  similarly  notes  that  ‘This  statistical  reasoning  is  very
characteristic  of  EINSTEIN,  and  produces  the  impression  that  for  him  the  laws  of
probability are central and more important by far than any other law’ (Born 1949b 83).
So what  would  indicate  Born  holding  a  particular  interpretation  of  probability?  He is
certainly not giving an account of probability in general. What I’m interested is whether or
not Born has a particular understanding of probabilities in quantum mechanics.  So are
there particular hallmarks of the various interpretations of probability that would indicate
that Born’s thoughts are in line with it. 
It seems quite clear that Born regards quantum mechanics, and by extension physics, as
being fundamentally indeterministic. He writes in his 1926 collisions paper that ‘I myself
am inclined to give up determinism in the world of atoms’ (Born 1926a p54). We can see it
again his discussion of determinism in classical mechanics, in which he rails against a
return to such a deterministic world view (Born 1953 and see also Chapter 5). We can also
find this view in Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance (Born 1949a).  He writes that
although it would be ‘silly and arrogant to deny any possibility of a return to determinism’
as any theory will undergo change and modification due to encountering new problems he
would  ‘never  expect  that  these  difficulties  could  be  resolved  by  a  return  to  classical
concepts [i.e. determinism]’ (Born 1949a 108-9). He also refers to Von Neumann’s (as it
turns out erroneous—see Bell 1966) proof that hidden variable theories are inadmissible
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into quantum mechanics as ‘a more concrete contribution’ to the question of whether or not
physics could return to determinism. The implication of Von Neumann’s proof was that
quantum mechanics as it was was not consistent with hidden variables—one would have to
replace the  theory with  something completely  different.  Von Neumann concludes  after
giving  his  proof  that ‘d  is  therefore  not  a  question  of  a  reinterpretation  of  quantum
mechanics, - the present system of quantum mechanics would have to be objectively false,
in order that another description of the elementary processes than the statistical one be
possible’ (von Neumann 1932 325) Of course, it turns out that Von Neumann was incorrect
about this as John Bell states ‘On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox’ (Bell 1964) and
proves in (Bell 1966) but Born would not have been aware of Bell’s result in 1948. Born
concludes  by  noting  that  he  thinks  that  the  ‘indeterministic  foundations  [of  quantum
mechanics] will be permanent’ (Born 1949a 109). 
This fairly strongly suggests that Born has an objective view of probability. If one believes
that the physical world is fundamentally indeterministic and that probabilistic calculations
and predictions can be made, it is hard to see how one could think otherwise. This point is
backed  up  by  some  remarks  of  Born’s  in  the  ‘Metaphysical  Conclusions’ of  Natural
Philosophy…. In this section Born notes that ‘even an exact science like physics is based
on fundamental beliefs’ (Born 1949a 123).  These are ‘fundamental assumptions which
cannot be further reduced but have to be accepted by an act of faith’ (Born 1949a 123).
These are things that Born thinks we must simply accept. Amongst them is ‘the belief that
the predictions of statistical calculations are more than an exercise of the brain, that they
can be trusted in the real world’ (Born 1949a 124). Again this leads towards an objective
view of probability. 
I think that we have a clear argument that Born holds probabilities to be objective—he is
committed  to  the  fundamental  indeterminism of  quantum mechanics  and believes  that
statistical  predictions  are  not  just  in  the  mind.  Hence,  he  must  have  some  kind  of
propensity or frequency interpretation. We’ve already seen that Born rejects probabilities
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in the single case, so if he holds a propensity interpretation, in must of the long run variety.
What then is the difference between a frequency theory and a long-run propensity theory?
A frequency theory takes probabilities to be properties of collectives. Long-run propensity
theories regards probabilities as properties associated with repeatable conditions that to
give rise to frequencies. 
These two can be distinguished by where they locate the probability. In a frequency theory,
the probability simply is the frequency of an event, or the limiting frequency of the event
over an infinite run. The two are identified. This is why Gillies thinks that (2000 100-101),
even in the infinite group version, the frequency theory is still operationalist—it defines a
theoretical concept (probability) in terms of an observable one (frequency). Indeed, von
Mises writes in Probability Statistics and Truth ‘a quantitative probability concept must be
defined in terms of potentially unlimited sequences of observations or experiments. The
relative  frequency of  the repetition  is  the ‘measure’ of  probability,  just  as  length of  a
column of mercury is the ‘measure’ of temperature’ (1957 vi). Now there, is a question
about whether or not a long-run frequency is really observable, but with regards to Born I
think we can let this go—he is not at all motivated by operationalism.  In the long-run
propensity  theory,  the  probabilities  are  properties  of  states  that  give  rise  to  those
frequencies. 
I’m now going to give an argument  by Cartwright (1987) that Born holds a propensity
view of probabilities in quantum mechanics. 
 4.1 Cartwright on Born
We’ve seen in the preceding section that Born clearly holds the indeterminism of quantum
mechanics to be fundamental. This, on its own, is not enough to indicate that Born believes
in  propensities.  Belief  that  quantum  mechanics  is  fundamentally  statistical  probably
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indicates a belief in objective, rather than epistemic, probabilities but it could just as easily
indicate a propensity for a frequency interpretation on Born’s part. This is because Born
might simply hold the laws of physics to be fundamentally probabilistic in nature. If we
are to argue that Born believes in something like propensities, we need to argue that he
thinks of probabilities as being properties of systems, even if they are properties to give
rise to frequencies. 
In her 1987 paper, Max Born and the Reality of Quantum Probabilities, Nancy Cartwright
argues that Born holds a propensity view of quantum probabilities that is rooted in his
realism  regarding  particles  and  his  rejection  of  the  reduction  of  the  wave  packet.
Cartwright notes what Born says of quantum mechanics in his (1926a) ‘We free forces of
their classical duty of determining directly the motion of particles and allow them instead
to determine the probabilities of states’. This might simply be a manner of speaking—a
way of saying that the trajectory of the particles is determined by probabilistic, and not
deterministic laws. Indeed, Cartwright says that this was her initial thought (Cartwright
1987 409). But it could also indicate something else—that the probabilities themselves are
real things—properties of the system that could be acted on by forces.  It is this propensity
interpretation that Cartwright argues for. She writes  ‘For Born, probabilities are real in a
special way’ (Cartwright 1987 410). 
Here I’m going to give an overview of Cartwright’s argument, which is both plausible and
is not contradicted by Born’s other work. The thrust of her argument is that that Born is not
a realist about the superposition of the wavefunction but is a realist about probabilities in
quantum mechanics. Hence he does not believe in the collapse of such superpositions due
to  measurement.  Instead,  Born  believes  in  particles  and ontologically  significant  state
probabilities.  I’m going  to  further  suggest  that  its  conclusion  can  be  strengthened  by
examining an exchange of letters between Born and Einstein. 
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Consider, she says, Born’s views on the superposition of the wavefunction as given in his
two papers on the quantum mechanics of collision processes (Zur Quantenmechanik der
Stossvorgange and  Quantenmechanik  Der  Stossvorgange  (Born  1926a  and  1927a,
respectively). Crucial to this view, Cartwright argues, is that Born solves problems in terms
of particles—for him, these represent the reality of the situation, rather than superpositions.
She draws three relevant points from Born’s 1926 papers (Cartwright 410-11). The first is
that although Born uses Schrödinger’s wave mechanics to solve the problem of collisions
in  quantum mechanics,  he  interprets  the  solution  in  terms  of  matrix  mechanics.   The
second is that Born understands both the initial set-up and the solution to the problem in
terms  of  particles,  and  that  this  is  crucial  to  the  probabilistic  interpretation  of  the
wavefunction that he gives. The third is that Born uses a perturbation theory to construct a
quantum-mechanical theory of collisions.  
For Cartwright the importance of the first point is that the probabilities that Born interprets
|ψ|2  as giving are transition probabilities. Born does not have to interpret them in this
way. Cartwright points out that an alternative would be to view them as simply giving
distributions of the values of the dynamical variables, as in classical statistical mechanics.
We know  that  he  views  them like  this  because  their  status  as  transition  probabilities
between  different  quantum states  is  made  clear  in  Born’s  Nobel  prize  lecture.  In  this
lecture he states this explicitly:  ‘Instead of describing the motion by giving a co-ordinate
as a function of time, x(t),an array of transition amplitudes xmn should be determined’ (Born
1954 259).
Importantly,  Cartwright  thinks,  the  probabilities  to  which  Born  refers  are  transition
probabilities, i.e.  the probability for the system to move from one state to another. Not
only are they transition probabilities, but they are the probabilities for the transition from
one eigenstate to another, not for the transition of a superposition to an eigenfunction. Why
is this? Because Born thinks that the eigenfunctions that represent the physical states of the
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system, but superpositions do not. We should note that this implies that Born rejects the
standard formulation of quantum mechanics in which if A and B are states of the system,
then so is any linear combination of them. i.e. he rejects the principle of superposition.
Cartwright here quotes Physical Aspects of Quantum Mechanics to make this point clear: 
Every state  of  the system corresponds to  a  particular  characteristic
solution, an  Eigenfunktion, of the differential equation; for example,
the normal state of the function ψ1, the next state ψ2 etc. For simplicity
we assume that the system was originally in the normal state; after the
occurrence  of  an  elementary  process  the  solution  has  been
transformed  into  one  of  the  form ψ=c1ψ1+c2ψ2+c3ψ3.... , which
represents a superposition of a number of eigenfunctions with definite
amplitudes c1, c2, c3 …Then the squares of these amplitudes c12,  c22,…,
give the probability that after the jump the system is in the 1,2,3, state.
Thus c12  is the probability that in spite of the perturbation the system
remains in the normal state,  c22 the probability that is has jumped to
the second and so on (Born 1927 10). 
This makes it fairly clear that does Born does indeed consider transitions as being between
eigenstates. Cartwright also notes that Born only refers to the superposition as a ‘solution’.
She  does  not  think  that  he  takes  it  to  be  ‘a  representation  of  a  real  physical  state’.
(Cartwright 1987 413). 
She quotes Born again, this time from  The Adiabatic Principle in Quantum Mechanics
‘...It also will not do to speak of the simultaneous existence of more states of one does not
want  to  give  up  the  natural  significant  of  Wilson  cloud  chamber  streaks  and  related
occurrences  as  the  passing  of  corpuscles’ (Born  1926c  169).  This,  for  Cartwright,  is
important. She tells us: ‘Born’s view about superpositions is intimately connected with his
252
knowledge that there are particles, and that we observe their trajectories’ (Cartwright 1987
413). 
Cartwright does, though, point out a potential problem with this view, drawing on Max
Jammer: if he does not think that superpositions are real, how does Born account for things
like the two-slit  experiment,  in which interference between wavefunctions of electrons
affects their distribution post-diffraction? Jammer takes the interference of wavefunctions
to imply that the wavefunction must be real and not simply some mathematical artefact or
a mere reflection of our ignorance. But how can we understand the result of the two-slit
experiment if superpositions are not real things? How does Born account for the fact that,
as  Cartwright  puts  it  ‘the  superposition  is  required  to  predict  the  correct  probabilistic
behaviour of the system’? (Cartwright 1987 414). 
She explains it thus: ‘There is a state that is the actual physical state of the system (recall
that this is not a classical state with well-defined rules, but is itself a quantum state obeying
the uncertainty rule) and there is a different state that describes the probabilistic behaviour
of the system’ (Cartwright 1987 414). Given that Born believes that superpositions are not
physically real, he must take the probabilities that govern the behaviour of the system to be
real instead. Cartwright also notes that Born’s position seems be aligned with the modal
interpretation of quantum mechanics (Cartwright 1987 414). 
She thinks that Born’s view can be expressed as follows ‘particles not only have their
physical quantum state, but they also have physically real propensities over and above this
state’ (Cartwright 1987 414). This is cashed out in two important ways. The first is is that
‘Two  systems  in  the  same  eigenstates  may  nevertheless  be  correctly  represented  by
different Schrödinger superpositions. That means that systems can be in identical states
and subject to identical forces and yet have different probabilistic behaviour’ (Cartwright
1987 414-5). The implication of this is is that the propensity is a separate property of the
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system  from  that  represented  by  the  quantum  state.  The  second  point  is  that  as  the
Schrödinger equation evolves in time, so do the probabilities that it gives (Cartwright 1987
415). As Born does not believe in superpositions and hence cannot believe in their collapse
either, he must also hold that it is the probabilities themselves that evolve in time as the
system is subject to forces—this is  precisely what he says when he talks about forces
determining the probability of states. It is not simply a metaphor. Cartwright puts it thus:
‘The forces act directly on the probabilities at one time to give probabilities at other times;
they do not evolve the probabilities by acting on the actual state of the system’ (Cartwright
1987 p415). 
So  this  is  Cartwright’s  argument  for  Born  having  a  propensity  interpretation  of
probabilities  in  quantum  mechanics:  Born  talks  about  things  like  forces  acting  on
probabilities, and probabilities acting upon one another. We might write this of as just a
manner  of  speaking—what he really means is  how wavefunctions  are  acted  upon and
interfere. But Born does not actually believe that superpositions are real. He only thinks
that  particles  are.  For  this  reason,  we  ought  to  take  what  he  says  at  face  value—
probabilities are real. 
It’s crucial to all of this that Born does not believe in the reality of the superposition of the
wavefunction. It’s an apparent disbelief in the wavefunction that indicates Born thinks of
probabilities as properties of the quantum system itself, rather than simply thinking that
quantum mechanics obeys probabilistic laws.  What I want to do next is to look at some
other evidence for this position, particularly with regards to the work in the 1940s and
1950s that is the primary focus of this thesis. I then want to examine a few points from
Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance (Born 1949a) and argue that they give extra
support for this position. We also ought to examine Cartwright’s claim that Born’s view
has commonalities with model interpretations of quantum mechanics. This seems quite
plausible and gives us a bit more of a framework for his position. 
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 4.2 Born, Einstein and the Reality of the Wavefunction
Something that gives more support to the claim that Born really does not believe in the
superposition  of  the  wavefunction  (and  I  think  also  helps  to  resolve  some  potential
problems  for  his  ideas  about  contiguity,  the  principle  that  cause  and  effect  must  be
spatially  connected   -  See  Chapter  3—Born  on  Causation)  is  an  exchange  of  letters
between  Einstein  and  him in  April  and  May of  1948 concerning  ‘spooky action  at  a
distance’. These are collected as numbers 88 and 89 in the Born-Einstein Letters (Born
2005 pp165-173).  
Einstein  wrote  a  letter  to  Born  in  April  1948  in  which  he  argues  that  a  non-hidden
variables  interpretation  of  quantum mechanics  must  violate  a  principle  concerning the
independence  of  objects.  He  describes  this  as:  ‘The  following  idea  characterises  the
relative independence of objects far apart in space (A and B): external influence on A has
no direct influence on B; this is known as the principle of contiguity’ (Einstein in Born
2005 p 168). By ‘far apart in space’ I think we are entitled to presume that Einstein means
‘space-like’  separated.  Einstein  thinks  that  the  standard  interpretation  of  quantum
mechanics violates this principle. Thus we are forced either to accept a violation of the
contiguity principle and retain our current interpretation of quantum mechanics or to reject
the violation and accept a hidden variables interpretation. Einstein takes this dilemma to
indicate that quantum mechanics, as usually understood at least, is incomplete. 
It’s interesting to note that Einstein had at this point read Born’s  Natural Philosophy of
Cause and Chance—Born had sent him a copy of the manuscript in 1948 which Einstein
had (affectionately, I take it) appended with some ‘caustic’ comments (Born 2005 159).
Thus  the  fact  that  Einstein  claims  that  quantum  mechanics  violates  ‘the  principle  of
contiguity’  might  not  unreasonably  be  taken  to  be  a  direct  appeal  to  Born’s  own
philosophical sensibilities. 
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First Einstein sets out two possible interpretations of what is represented, in a physically
real  sense,  by  a  particle  described  by  a  ‘spatially  restricted  ψ-function  (completely
described   -  in  [the  wavefunction,  presumably]  the  sense  of  quantum  mechanics).
According to this, the particle possesses neither a sharply defined momentum nor a sharply
defined position’ (Einstein in Born 2005 166). These two interpretations are (a) that the
particle  does  have  a  definite  position  and  momentum  even  if  these  cannot  both  be
measured, and consequently the wavefunction is not a complete description of the physical
state of the system; and (b) that the particle really does not have a definite position and
momentum, and as  a  consequence  of  this  ‘two  ψ-functions  which differ  in  more  than
trivialities always describe two different real situations’ (Einstein in Born 2005 19). 
Einstein asks us to consider the following situation: Take a system S12 which consists of
two parts, S1 and S2. They may have interacted in the past, but are no longer doing so. The
system is completely described (in the ‘quantum mechanical sense’ as Einstein puts it) by
the wavefunction Ψ12 of coordinates q1, … and q2, … of the two parts.  At some time t the
two part-systems are separated (Einstein does not specify, but I suspect we are meant to
take this be space-like separation) in space in such a way that Ψ12  only differs from 0
(presumably the initial state) when q1,… belong only to some part of space R1 and q2, ….
belong to some part of space R2 that is separated from R1. The individual wavefunctions
for  the  two parts  are  then unknown and indeed,  Einstein tells  us  ‘do not  exist  at  all’
(Einstein in Born 2005 168). We can, however determine the wavefunction of one part-
system from a complete (as far as is allowed, at least) measurement of the other. ‘Instead
of  the  original  Ψ12 of  S12, one  thus  obtains  the  Ψ-function  Ψ2 of  the  part-system S2.’,
Einstein  writes.  So  we  have  a  wavefunction  (Ψ12)  consisting  of  the  sum  of  two
components, Ψ1 and Ψ2. Initially, the two part-systems are represented not by individual
wavefunctions, only by an entangled state and so we can gain no information about either.
However, by measuring one component of the system, we can gain information about the
wavefunction of the other. 
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Einstein’s criticism concerns how measurement works in the interpretation of quantum
mechanics that he is arguing against. He writes ‘if S1 consists of a single particle, then we
have  the  choice  of  measuring  either  its  position  or  its  momentum  components.  The
resulting  Ψ2 depends  on  this  choice,  so  that  different  kinds  of  (statistical)  predictions
regarding measurements to be carried out on S2 are obtained, according to the choice of
measurement carried out on S1’ (Einstein in Born 2005 169). Crucially this means that in
this  interpretation we end up with  a  different  wavefunction for  S2 depending on what
measurement we carry out in S1, and thus if one accepts interpretation (b) (which Einstein
thinks that most physicists do) a ‘different real situation’ depending on how we measure
S1.
This,  Einstein thinks, is not a problem from the perspective of quantum mechanics by
itself. Because a different measurement on S2 creates a different wavefunction and hence a
different real physical state ‘the necessity of having to attach two or more different  ψ-
functions  ψ2  ψ2, … to one and the same system S2 cannot arise’ (Einstein in Born 2005
p169). 
It is, however, a problem from the perspective of those who wish to respect the both the
principle of contiguity and quantum mechanics. This is because a measurement on the
part-system S1 ought to only affect the region of space it is in, R1 because the principle of
contiguity guarantees the ‘independent existence of the real state of affairs existing in two
separate parts of space R1 and R2’ (Einstein in Born 2005 169).  Such a measurement ought
not have any physical effect on S2 which is all the way over in R2. Presumably, although
Einstein does not state it,  the two part-systems are meant to be space-like separated in
order  to  guarantee  that  there  can  be  no  local  interaction  between them.  He writes  ‘It
follows that every statement about S2 which we arrive at as a complete measurement of S1
has to be valid for the system S2, even if no measurement whatsoever is carried out on S1.’
Einstein does not precisely say why but it is implicit—because it is what is required if we
want to account for both contiguity (i.e. that a measurement of S1 cannot physically affect
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S2) and for the interpretation of quantum mechanics that gives us different wavefunctions
for S2 as the result of different measurements being carried out on S1. 
This leads to bizarre and unacceptable consequences for those that value the principle of
contiguity:  ‘all  statements which can be deduced from the settlement  of Ψ2 or  Ψ2 [the
different wavefunctions that we end up with as a result of taking different measurements of
S2]  must  simultaneously  be  valid  for  S2’ (Einstein  in  Born  2005  169)—i.e.  multiple
different physically real wavefunctions and their solutions (not just a superposition) must
all apply at the same time to a single particle. This can’t be the case and so Einstein thinks
that,  rather  than  rejecting  the  principle  of  contiguity,  we  ought  to  reject  the  standard
interpretation of quantum mechanics (b) that leads us to it in favour of a hidden variables
approach (a). He admits, however, that most physicists are likely to do the reverse and
reject  contiguity  (which  he  acknowledges  is  nowhere  enshrined  in  the  principles  of
quantum mechanics) as the price retaining interpretation (b). 
OK, so far so Einstein. What’s interesting here is how Born responds to this problem. I’m
now going to examine that response, point out some oddities in it and propose that one
explanation of  them is  that  Born’s interpretation of  quantum mechanics  does not  treat
superpositions as real. 
Born’s  reply  to  Einstein’s  argument  starts  with  what  is  intended  to  be  an  illustrative
example: Consider a beam of light which passes through a double refracting crystal and
splits into two beams. We can measure the direction of polarisation for one of the beams
and from this deduce the direction for the other. Born writes ‘In this way one has been able
to make a statement about a system in a certain part of space as a result of a measurement
carried out on a system in another part of space’ (Born 2005 171). We can do this, Born
explains, because we know that the split beams had a single origin and can thus said to be
coherent. This example is meant to be analogous to Einstein’s ‘abstract’ one—Born writes
that  it  ‘shows  that  such  things  happen  within  the  framework  of  ordinary  optics.  All
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quantum mechanics has done is to generalise it’. What strikes me as odd about the idea
that  this  example is  analogous to  Einstein’s  is  that  it  is  about  information,  not  effect.
Nothing in the classical optics model suggests that we in any way change beam two by
measuring beam one. We simply gain some information about it. We don’t affect it any
way. This is not the problem that Einstein presents with quantum mechanics. Einstein’s
problem arises from the fact that when we have a system of two parts in superposition,
carrying out measurements on one part of the system affects the wavefunction of the other;
and because, in the interpretation of quantum mechanics that he is criticising, different
wavefunctions represent physically real differences, such measurement physically affects
the other part of the system. 
Born  next  critically  examines  Einstein’s  ‘axiom  of  the  independence  of  of  spatially
separated objects A and B’. He doesn’t find it to be as convincing as Einstein ‘makes it out
to be’ because it leaves out the idea of coherence—that things far apart with a common
origin are not necessarily independent. This is simply a fact as far as Born is concerned: ‘I
believe that this cannot be denied and simply has to be accepted’ (Born 2005 171). But
what does Born understand here by independence? He frames Einstein’s position in the
following way: 
‘You say: the methods of quantum mechanics enable one to determine ψ1
from S2 from ψ12 provided  a  complete  measurement,  in  the  quantum
mechanical sense, of the spatial system S1 exists as well. You evidently
assume that ψ12 is already known. Therefore a measurement in S1 does
not really give any information about events occurring in far distant S2,
but only in association with the information about ψ12 that is, with the
help of additional earlier measurements. In the optical example, we have
the  information  that  both  partial  beams  are  produced  from the  same
crystal’ (Born 2005 171)
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Note that again Born does not talk about distant action, but only about information. In his
framing we do not affect S2 by measuring S1. We only gain information about it. He again
refers to the optical example, seemingly as an analogy, with reference to the information
we have about that system. It genuinely looks as if Born is missing the point of Einstein’s
argument. The difference seems to be this: Einstein interprets the act of determining the
wavefunction ψ2 of S2 by measuring S1 as physically acting upon S2 by measuring S1. Born
seems to interpret this act as merely giving us  information about S2. This, he thinks, is
unproblematic in this case because S1 and S2 have a common origin. 
He then goes on to argue that Einstein’s example is ‘too abstract’ to be of much use and
that in any actual example of finding information out about some system by measuring
another involves those systems not actually being independent—i.e.  that those systems
have interacted in the past and we have information about that interaction. He does offer
some sympathy to Einstein’s position a paragraph later, writing 
‘But I feel that I am not expressing my opinion as lucidly as I would like
to do. Basically I am coming back again to the fact of coherence, which
cannot be denied. But as the usefulness of mechanical analogues cannot
be denied either,  one must be content with a formalism which covers
both. I am therefore inclined to make use of the formalism, even even to
‘believe’ in it in a certain sense, until something better turns up’ (Born
2005 172)
He makes reference to having ‘expounded’ on this in his ‘Oxford lectures’. It’s not explicit
here, but the ‘Oxford’ lectures probably refers to Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance
(Born 1949a), which in its initial form was the 1948 Waynflete lecture series, delivered at
Magdalen College. The ‘formalism’ I think refers to superpositions of the wavefunction—
they are waves, and so coherent and can be interpreted in terms of particles (as Born did in
his 1926 paper) giving us a mechanical analogue. Note the scare quotes around ‘believe’  -
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if  this  implies  a  realism about  the  wavefunction  then  it  does  not  seem to  be  a  very
committed one. Perhaps it indicates what Arthur Fine might refer to as ‘realism without the
table-thumping’ (Fine 1996).  It is a useful place-holder until something better appears. 
I think that a passage from Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance makes Born’s stance
a bit clearer. Born speaks highly a number of times of Heisenberg (and indeed Einstein’s)
principle that theory should not contain things which are in principle unobservable (note
again that this is not really an indication of anti-realism—Born means not observable in
way  at  all,  not  merely  not  directly  observable.  It  is  indicative  of  a  species  of  weak
empiricism,  but  I  think  nothing  more).  Here  he  talks  about  it  with  regard  to  the
wavefunction: 
Now quantum mechanics itself is not free from unobservable quantities.
(The wave-function of Schrödinger, for instance, is not observable, only
the square of its modulus.) To rid a theory of all traces of such redundant
concepts would lead to unbearable clumsiness. I think though there is
much  to  be  said  for  cleaning  a  theory  in  the  way  recommended  by
Heisenberg,  the  success  depends  entirely  on  scientific  experience,
intuition, and tact (Born 1948 89). 
So  Born  thinks  that  the  wavefunction  is  an  unobservable  quantity.  It’s  a  ‘redundant’
concept, but not one we necessarily want to cleanse the theory of because it serves a useful
purpose. Still, it doesn’t have the character of physical reality and I think this goes some
way in  explaining  Born’s  response to  Einstein.  We might  think  it  odd that  Born only
considers the square of the modulus of the wave-function to be observable if we think that
phase of the wave-function might be observable via interference effects. I think that we
can explain this in the following way—for Born the phase of the wave-function is still part
of the mathematical formalism. Although it’s true that the phase of a wave can affect the
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observed intensity (i.e. the square of the modulus of the wave-function) via interference
with  other  waves,  it’s  only  the  intensity  that  we  actually  observe,  via  measuring  the
probability of finding a particle in a particular volume of space, at least in the quantum-
mechanical sense.  We can see this in  Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance, (again)
where he writes, in reference to the wave-function, ‘One must remember that only фф*=|
ф|2 has a physical meaning (as a probability)’ (Born 1949a 102).  
 4.2.1 Why Does Born Appear to Misinterpret Einstein?
Born,  as  we have  seen,  seems to  miss  the  point  of  Einstein’s  argument  in  his  initial
response. He does it again in the later commentary, appended to the letter written when it
was  published.  There  he  characterises  Einstein’s  principle  of  independence  (which  he
describes as the ‘root of the disagreement between Einstein and me’ (Born 2005 173)) as
saying that ‘an observation of the state of affairs at B cannot tell us anything about the
state of affairs at A’ (2005 173). Again, Born talks about gaining information—the state of
B ‘cannot tell’ us anything about A. He doesn’t talk about the problem of distant action—
the idea that  an observation of B cannot  physically  alter  A.  In the commentary,  he is
mystified as to why Einstein did not accept his argument. Born sees it as a simple matter of
(Optical-style) coherence that cannot be denied and seems to presume that any objections
Einstein had would be on the grounds that coherence only applies to optics. 
So  why  is  this?  One  option,  which  shouldn’t  be  discounted,  is  that  Born  simply
misunderstands or misreads Einstein and there is nothing else to it. But, given Cartwright’s
argument, and also what Born writes in  Natural Philosophy…, I think we that we might
suggest that the reason that Born’s response appears to misunderstand Einstein is because
Born does not really believe in the physical reality of the wavefunction. Einstein worries
that  quantum  mechanics  forces  us  to  conclude  that  a  measurement  on  system A can
physically affect a different system B that is spatially separated from it by affecting B’s
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wavefunction. Because Born doesn’t believe in the physical reality of wavefunctions this
isn’t a worry for him—one cannot affect something that isn’t real—so he translates it into a
problem  about  information,  not  about  action  at  a  distance.  It’s  Born’s  disbelief  in
wavefunctions  that  leads  him to  think  that  the  optical  beam splitting  analogy  that  he
supplies really is analogous with the situation that Einstein describes. It’s worth noting that
this  isn’t  necessarily  a  satisfying  solution  to  the  problem  that  Einstein  raises,  but
suggesting that Born doesn’t believe in wavefunctions goes some way to explaining why
he  responds  to  Einstein  in  the  way  that  he  does.  It  can  still  be  the  case  that  Born
misunderstands  Einstein’s  point,  but  that  misunderstanding  is  motivated  by  how Born
thinks about quantum mechanics. 
So can we connect Born’s writings in this period  - the exchange of letters between him
and Einstein and  Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance—with a propensity view of
probability?  I  think  we can  do so  by  looking at  what  he  writes  on  invariant  realism.
Invariant realism (discussed in more detail in chapter 4—Born on Realism) is the thesis
that we ought to be realists regarding the characteristics of our physical theories which are
invariant under transformation (for instance, relative velocity under Galiean transformation
and rest mass, proper length and proper time under Lorentz transformation). When writing
about the issue of realism with regards to whether or not one should consider the ‘wave’
part of wave-particle duality as real, Born writes ‘I personally like to regard a probability
wave, even in 3N-dimensional space, as a real thing, certainly as more than a tool for
mathematical  calculations’ (Born  1949a  106).  Why  is  this?  Because  it  has  invariant
features: ‘it predicts the results of counting experiments, and we expect to find the same
average numbers, the same mean deviations, etc., if we actually perform the experiment
many times under the same experimental conditions’. Now there are a few things to note
here.  The first  is  that  Born specifically  refers  to   a  probability wave as  opposed to  a
wavefunction. The second is that, although Born does not explicitly say this, it is clear that
the invariant features of said waves are not the wavefunction itself or the superposition, but
the probability distributions. He goes on to say ‘Quite generally, how could we rely on
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probability predictions if by this notion we do not refer to something real and objective?’
(1949a 106).  
We might try to explain Born’s position in the following way.  Suppose you have a system
in an eigenstate of an operator A^ . That system must be in a superposition of eigenstates
of some none-commuting operator B^ .  A^ and B^ might be components of spin in a
mutually orthogonal direction, such as  S^x∣S^ y∣S^z  . Born doesn’t want to interpret  this
superposition in a realist manner qua superposition of B^ . He only wants to interpret it
as an eigenfunction. This is what explains the probabilistic behaviour of, say, electrons in
an eigenstate of S^z  when we measure the spin in the y- or z- direction. 
Born also connects probabilities in quantum mechanics with causation.  He asks,  when
discussing indeterministic physics, ‘Can we be content with accepting chance, not cause,
as the supreme law of the physical world?’ (Born 1948 101). His reply is that to ask such a
question is a misunderstanding—it is not causation that has been eliminated from physics,
only determinism. He goes on to say ‘Causality in my definition is the postulate that one
physical situation depends on the other, and causal research means the discovery of such
dependence. This is still true in quantum mechanics, though the objects of observation for
which  a  dependence  is  claimed  are  different:  they  are  the  probabilities  of  elementary
events, not those single events themselves’ (1949a 102). What I think Born is saying here
is that the objects of causal dependence in quantum mechanics are the probabilities for
events, i.e. that probabilities causally depend on each other. The question then, if we take
Born at face value, is what sort of things are probabilities such that they can be the objects
(and subjects) of causal dependence?
This, I think, all combined gives us good reason to think that Born believes in the quantum
probabilities of a system as a real physical feature of that system. Since they are also
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properties that determine the statistical behaviour of a system, it is safe to say that they are
propensities. 
We can also use this to motivate the argument for the propensity interpretation in another
way.  Born might be making an argument in for the reality of the probability waves in
virtue of the fact that they possess invariant properties, in the same way that he makes an
argument  for  the  reality  of  particles.  He  writes  ‘We believe  in  the  ‘existence’ of  the
electron because it has a definite mass  m and a definite spin  s’ (Born 1949a 104). Born
here is trying to motivate belief in the existence of electrons from the fact that they possess
certain  invariant  properties.  Now,  I  don’t  think  that  he  is  making  precisely  the  same
argument for probability waves—part of the point of the electron argument is all electrons
have the same mass and spin—but even if he is trying argue that ‘probability waves’ are
real because they have invariant properties (in a slightly different way from electrons) we
still must acknowledge that if this is indeed the case, then Born must treat the quantum
probability as being a property that is, in virtue of the fact that it is invariant, importantly
like  such properties  as  charge,  mass  and spin.  i.e.,  they are  real  properties  and hence
something like propensities. 
One  of  the  standard  criticisms  of  a  propensity  account  of  probability  is  to  do  with
probabilities in a single case, so it’s worth examining this and asking if Born thinks that
quantum mechanics  deals  with  single-case  propensities  or  whether  he  thinks  they  are
physical properties that produce frequencies. I think that it’s actually quite clear from a
comment of Born’s that he does not think that quantum mechanics deals with probabilities
in the single case. In The Born-Einstein Letters he writes in a comment added to a letter in
September 1950 ‘To say that ψ describes the ‘state’ of one single system us just a figure of
speech, just as one might say in everyday life: ‘My life expectation (at 67) is 4.3 years’.
This too is a statement made about one single system, but does not make sense empirically.
For what is really meant is, of course, that you take all individuals of 67 and count the
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percentage of those who live for a certain length of time. This has always been my concept
of how to interpret |ψ|2’(Born 2005 182). He says again in a commentary on a letter that
Einstein had written to him in December 1953 ‘Einstein admits that one can regard the
‘probabilistic’ quantum theory as final if one assumes that the  ψ-function relates to the
ensemble and not to an individual case. This has always been my assumption as well, and I
consider the frequent repetition of an experiment as the realization of an ensemble. This
coincides exactly with the actual  procedure of the experimental physicists,  who obtain
their  data  in  the  atomic  and  sub-atomic  area  by  accumulating  data  from  similar
measurements’ (Born 2005 206). 
From these  passages  we  get  a  quite  explicit  statement  that  Born  does  not  think  that
probabilities  in  quantum  mechanics  deal  with  single  cases  and  instead  deal  with
frequencies or repeated conditions. 
To sum up the  argument,  Born  has  a  propensity  interpretation  because  he  talks  about
probabilities in quantum mechanics as though they are physical properties of systems—
they are the sorts of things that forces act on and are the objects of causal dependence. We
can be confident that this sort of talk is not just a shorthand for a belief that it is merely the
laws of physics  that are statistical  because Born does not  believe in the reality of the
superposition  of  the  wavefunction  in  quantum  mechanics—it  is  the  probabilities
themselves that are physical properties of the system which will  give rise to the same
distribution of outcomes under the repetition of the same experimental condition. We can
also be confident that he holds a long-run propensity  interpretation,  as opposed to the
single case variety: Born explicitly rejects probabilities in the single case.
 4.2.2 A Potential Inconsistency 
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We might worry that I have introduced a problem for my claim that Born is a realist here.
Is there some tension in Born being a realist about electrons in virtue of their possessing
invariant quantities, but not about superpositions? I’ve suggested in this section that his
non-realism about superpositions arises because he takes them to fall into the category as
electron orbits, that of the unobservable even in principle (i.e. it is the theory that tells us
they are not observable, not merely some technological limitation), and holds strongly to
Heisenberg’s maxim that such things have no place in physics. There might be a worry that
this implies an inconsistency on the part of Born. After all, if we can infer the existence of
an electron from our identification of a bundle of invariant properties, then surely we can
do  the  same  for  a  superposition,  inferring  its  existence  from  the  identification  of  a
particular probability distribution, something that I’ve argued Born takes to be an invariant
property. There are two options here. One is that there is indeed an inconsistency in Born’s
position. The other is that Born is not a realist about superpositions, but for reasons other
than them being unobservable even in principle. 
Let’s examine what we know: Born is committed to the existence of invariant properties
and  quantities.  He  is  committed  to  the  existence  of  electrons  as  bundles  of  invariant
properties,  although not necessarily as  mere bundles of properties. He is committed to
realism  about  the  probability  density  given  by  superpositions,  as  I’ve  argued  above,
viewing them as invariants of experiment. If he is already committed to the reality of the
probabilities, then the superposition itself adds nothing more to our ability to predict and
explain the evolution of a quantum system. The probability amplitudes exhaust what is
observable about a superposition. If he is a realist about the probabilities themselves, then
Born is free to write off the rest of the superposition is merely part of the formalism of the
theory, as I’ve argued he appears to do in the above discussion of his letters with Einstein. 
On the other hand, as noted above, Born does seem to be fairly explicit about regarding
superpositions as unobservable even in principle. We might, however, be able to use the
same  argument  to  explain  why  Born  takes  this  position:  for  him,  probabilities  and
‘probability waves’ are real, but there is nothing observable about superpositions over and
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above these probabilities. Now it might be that Born is misapplying this principle, i.e. he
really means the former option even if he implies it’s the latter, or he takes it do a job that
it can’t but even in this case this doesn’t seem to imply an anti-realism on his part.
 5 Does Born Have a Modal Interpretation of 
Quantum Mechanics?
We ought to try and make sense of what Born thinks is real in quantum mechanics. I’ve
argued  that  he  does  not  think  that  superpositions  are  real,  but  does  think  that  |Ψ|2
probabilities are. One thing to quickly ask is whether or not a propensity interpretation of
probabilities in quantum mechanics is a realist one.
Redhead (1987) thinks that it is. He notes that some have argued that long-run propensities
are not in fact properties of physical systems, but rather of microsystems combined with
repeatable conditions. Because of this it is claimed that a propensity interpretation is not a
realist one as the relevant microsystems do not possess the relevant properties outside of
experimental  testing,  i.e.  the  repeatable  conditions  (Redhead  1987  48-49).  Redhead
disagrees with this view for two reasons. The first is that although it is indeed the cases
that propensities are only manifested in the context of the repeated experimental, this is no
reason not  to  regard them as dispositional properties  that  are  always possessed by the
microsystems,  even  if  they  are  not  always  being  manifested  (1987  49).  We don’t,  in
general, regard dispositional properties as antithetical to realism. Propensities ought to be
no different  in  this  regard.  The second is  that  although we might  label  the repeatable
conditions as experimental set-ups, they are not dependent on human minds performing
them  or  observing  them  in  anyway.  Such  set-ups  can  quite  happily  exist  and  the
propensities quite happily manifest without any human interactions whatsoever (Redhead
1987 49). 
268
As  previously  mentioned,  Cartwright  suggests  that  Born’s  interpretation  of  quantum
mechanics belongs to the class known as model interpretations of quantum mechanics and
I now want to examine this in some more detail. 
 5.1 What is a Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics?
In  Quantum Mechanics: An Empiricist View, van Fraassen (1992) discusses a particular
conceptual problem for quantum mechanics: how can we reconcile the fact that quantum
mechanics  is  indeterministic  with  the  deterministic  evolution  of  an  isolated  quantum
system?  Between  measurements,  a  quantum  system  evolves  deterministically  in
accordance  with  the  time  dependent  Schrödinger  equation.  Immediately  after  a
measurement  is  made  on  the  system,   the  wavefunction  will  be  described  by  the
eigenfunction corresponding to the eigenvalue given by the measurement (Rae 2005 67).
The probability of obtaining some particular result is given by the square of the modulus of
the wavefunction. This is is known as the projection or collapse postulate—we say that the
eigenfunction is  projected onto the system or  that  the wavefunction  collapses into the
measured state. 
Van Fraassen suggests that there are three (broad) solutions to this problem (Van Fraassen
1992  273).  The  first  is  Von  Neumann’s,  in  which  isolated  systems  do  not  develop
deterministically. The second says that quantum mechanics is not in fact deterministic. The
third option accepts both the indeterministic and deterministic elements of the theory  - this
is the modal interpretation. 
Van Fraassen splits the concept of a state into two—the value state and the dynamic state: 
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Value State:    fully specified by stating which observables have values
and what they are.
Dynamic state: fully specified by stating how the system will develop
if isolated, and how if acted upon in any definite, given fashion. (Van
Fraassen 1992 275)
Lombardi and Dieks (2017) argue that modal interpretations have their origins in attempts
to solve problems arising from the projection postulate. There are a number of different
varieties, but they all have the following five attributes in common: (a) The formalism of
quantum mechanics is  the same as that of the standard version except that the project
postulate is excluded. (b) It takes quantum mechanical systems to always possess a number
of definite values—in this way it is ‘realist’ in a semantic sense. (c) Quantum mechanics is
taken to be fundamental in that it is not taken to be in some way an incomplete theory or
underlaid by a more fundamental theory. (d) The dynamical state of the system completely
specifies what possible properties a system may have and what the probabilities of those
properties are. (e) Measurement is an ordinary physical interaction—it does not collapse
the wavefunction—the dynamical state is  always described by the evolution of the time-
dependent Schrödinger equation (Lombardi and Dieks 2017). 
 
Cartwright certainly thinks that Born separates the quantum mechanical state into value-
and dynamical-  parts. She notes that Born’s views have much in common with modal
interpretations such as van Fraassen’s and goes on to say that ‘there is a state that is the
actual physical state of the system (recall that this is not a classical state with well-defined
values,  but  is  itself  a  quantum state  obeying the  uncertainty  relations);  and there  is  a
different state that describes the probabilistic behaviour of the system’ (Cartwright 1987
414). This would account for attributes (b) and (d).  The question is, does Born subscribe
to all five attributes?
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(a) Does Born reject the projection postulate? There aren’t many specific discussions of
quantum mechanical measurement in Born’s writings, but there are a few mentions. It’s
worth stating that in 1926, the projection postulate had not really been formulated—its
precise origin lies in the work of Dirac and of von Neumann in the 1930s (Myrvold 2017).
We would hence not expect Born to be thinking of quantum mechanics in terms of the
projection postulate in the 1920s. We should therefore at least consider that it would be a
consistent possibility for Born to have both held something like a modal view when he
developed his work on collisions, as Cartwright argues, and to have rejected a model view
when quantum mechanics was axiomatised later on. 
Unfortunately, I have found little discussion of this in his later work. The closest that I can
find is a mention of what Born calls the ‘reduction of probabilities’: a state represented as
a wave function in configuration space (more generally: a vector in Hilbert space) is turned
into another one by experimental interference’ in his paper  In Memory of Einstein (Born
1965 162) in reference to his disagreements with Einstein. Born says that Einstein wrote to
him in December 1947 (according to the Born-Einstein letters it was March of that year) in
which he says that he cannot believe in quantum mechanics because of ‘spooky action at a
distance’ (Einstein in Born 2005 155). Born writes that ‘What the [sic] was alluding to was
presumably the situations arising from the interference of probability amplitudes …; and
what is usually called  “reduction of probabilities”: a state represented as a wave function
in configuration space (more generally: a vector in Hilbert space) is turned into another
one by experimental interference’ (Born 1965 162). 
He does mention Von Neumann’s work on quantum mechanics in Natural Philosophy of
Cause and Chance, writing ‘He puts the theory on an axiomatic basis by deriving it from a
few  postulates  of  a  very  plausible  and  general  nature,  about  the  properties  of  of
‘expectation values’ (averages) and their representation by mathematical symbols’ (Born
1949a 109). Born doesn’t comment on Von Neumann’s work further except to say that it
proves (unknown to Born erroneously) that quantum mechanics cannot be simply modified
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to include hidden variables: any such addition would have be in terms of a new theory. The
point  here  is  that  the  projection  postulate  is  part  of  Von  Neumann’s  formulation  of
quantum mechanics and there is no indication here that Born rejects it. Indeed he states
that Von Neumann’s axioms are all ‘plausible’. It could be the case that he considers Von
Neumann’s  work to  be of formal  but  not  physical  significance,  but again it  is  at  best
ambiguous as to whether he rejects the projection postulate in the way that modern modal
interpretations  do.  I  think  we can  also  take  this  to  indicate  that  Born  does  think  that
quantum mechanics is fundamental (see also Chapter 4—Born on Realism). 
Now, it is true to say, I think, that Born subscribes to a position that is
at least similar to (e) in that he does not take measurement to be some
special interaction. He says a number of times that measurement in
quantum mechanics is not a fundamentally different activity from that
in classical mechanics. In  Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance
he  writes  that  ‘one  cannot  even  make  a  measurement  without
interfering  with  the  state  of  the  system.  In  classical  physics  it  is
supposed that we have to do with an objective and always observable
situation; the process of measuring is assumed to have no influence on
the object of observation. I have, however, drawn your attention to the
point that even in classical physics this postulate is practically never
fulfilled  because  of  the  Brownian  motion  which  affects  the
instruments. We are therefore quite prepared to find the assumption of
‘harmless’ observations is impossible’ (Born 1949a 99). 
As to whether or not he thinks that measurement collapses the wave-function, I think the
answer is probably this—we have ample evidence that Born does not believe in the reality
of superpositions and it would obviously follow from this that there is no collapse either.
There can be no collapse if nothing exists to collapse. As to whether or not this entirely
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fulfils (e), I think that it  is again little ambiguous with regards to whether or not Born
thinks that the dynamical state is always described by the evolution of the wave-function.
Born, I think is probably not a realist with regards to   superpositions, but he perhaps could
still hold that it accurately describes a system as part of the formalism without interpreting
it as physically real. 
In general, I think that it is unclear as to whether or not Born holds something that aligns
with the  one of  the  full-blown contemporary  programmes for  modal  interpretations  of
quantum mechanics. I don’t think that this is a problem. One thing that philosophers and
historians who engage in this kind of project—that of trying to interpret the positions of
historical scientists in terms of contemporary categories—must bear in mind when doing
so is that we are not always going to be able to put the objects of our study into some
particular intellectual box, whether due to lack of evidence or to the fact that they simply
were not thinking about things in a way that allows us to categorise their positions easily. 
However we may still be able to attribute a view to Born which is modal in the same sense
that van Fraassen’s view is modal, even if it is at best ambiguous as to whether or not his
view is consistent with the contemporary programme for modal interpretations of quantum
mechanics. Van Fraassen’s view is modal because the dynamic state tells us what is merely
possible (Lombardi and Dieks 2017). The way that Born seems to think about probabilities
in quantum mechanics gives us something similar. 
 5.1.1 Realism and Modal Interpretations
We  should  pause  for  a  moment  to  address  the  following  concern:  I’ve  attributed
(something like)  a modal  interpretation of  quantum mechanics  to  Born,  who I’ve also
argued is  a  realist.  As  noted  previously,  modals  interpretations  of  quantum mechanics
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originate with Van Fraassen, a constructive empiricist. Might we worry that there is some
conflict  or  tension  in  attributing  a  position  developed  by  a  well-known anti-realist  to
someone who I am arguing is a realist? Am I attributing an anti-realist interpretation of
quantum mechanics to someone that I elsewhere argue is a realist? There are two responses
to this point. The first is that, in proposing the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics,
Van  Fraassen  is  not  attempting  to  provide  an  interpretation  of  quantum  of  quantum
mechanics  that  is  uniquely  constructive  empiricist  in  nature,  and  therefore  hostile  to
realism. The second is that modal interpretations in general are realist in a semantic sense,
and that that it is not clear from the evidence that Born holds a view akin to one of the full-
blown contemporary realist programs is not reason in and of itself to take him to be an
anti-realist or for holding such an interpretation to entail some significant inconsistency in
his views.
The first response is made as follows: Van Fraassen’s Modal Interpretation is obviously
intended to be compatible with constructive empiricism, but it does not follow from this
that  it  is  incompatible  with  any  realist  view  of  science.  Constructive  empiricism  is
agnostic, rather than atheistic, towards the question of the reality of scientific theories. In
Quantum Mechanics An Empiricist View (1991) Van Fraassen makes an explicit point that
the  analysis  and  interpretation  of  scientific  theories  is  separate  matter  from questions
regarding whether or not we ought to be realists about those theories. i.e. the question of
interpretation - how the world could be the way a theory says it is is a question regarding
what the content of a theory is, not whether or not that content is true or false or whether or
not we have some mandate to believe in it. He notes that asking questions regarding what a
theory is like does not presuppose realism (Fraassen 1991 3). By the same token, he writes
'When we come to a specific theory the question: how could the world be the way a theory
says it is? concerns the content alone. This is the foundational question par excellence, and
it makes equal sense to the realist and empiricist alike' (van Fraassen 1991 4). 
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The  point  is  this:  When  Van  Fraassen  proposes  the  modal  interpretation  of  quantum
mechanics  he  is  in  no  way trying  to  provide  an  anti-realist  interpretation  of  quantum
mechanics.  He is  trying  to  solve  a  conceptual  problem with  regard  to  the  content  of
quantum mechanics, and the realist ought to be able to get on board with the proposed
solution as much as the constructive empiricist. 
With regards to the second point, we might note that the SEP points out that all modal
interpretations agree on the following point (amongst others) ‘The interpretation should be
“realist”  in  the  precise  sense  that  it  assumes  that  quantum systems  always  possess  a
number of definite properties, which may change with time. It should be noted, however,
that  this  semantic  realism is  compatible  with  agnosticism or  van  Fraassen’s  brand  of
empiricism (van Fraassen 1991, Bueno 2014), and does not presuppose epistemological
realism’ (Lombardi and Dieks 2017). i.e., modal interpretations of quantum mechanics are
both compatible with realism and with constructive empiricism. Constructive empiricists
and realists  will  obviously differ with regards to their  epistemic commitments, but the
interpretation  is  neutral  on  this  ground.  It  is,  however,  uncontroversially  realist  in  a
semantic  sense.  We might  further  note  that  modal  interpretations  are  compatible  with
propensity interpretations of probability, although not every modal interpretation is also
necessarily a propensity interpretation (Lombardi and Dieks 2017). 
So it seems that there is little worry that there is some inconsistency in attributing to Born
both  realism and  an  interpretation  of  quantum mechanics  that  is  continuous  with  one
developed by Van Fraassen. 
 6 Conclusion
275
I’ve argued in this chapter that Born holds a propensity view of probabilities in quantum
mechanics. It seems unlikely that Born holds anything like a classical, logical or subjective
view  because  it  seems  to  quite  explicit  that  he  takes  quantum  mechanics  to  be
fundamentally  indeterministic,  and the  probabilities  that  it  involves  to  be  objective  in
nature.  Furthermore,  as  I’ve  argued  earlier  in  this  thesis  (see  Chapter  4—Born  on
Realism), Born is not a positivist and for this reason his views are misaligned with de
Finetti’s. 
It might be possible that Born is a frequentist—he certainly holds probabilities in quantum
mechanics to be objective and does not seem to think that the theory deals with single
cases. However, I’ve argued that it is more plausible to view him as holding some kind of
long-run  propensity  theory  in  which  he  views  probabilities  in  quantum mechanics  as
physical properties of a system that give rise to frequencies under repeatable conditions.
This is because Born talks about probabilities as being the sorts of things that can be acted
on by forces,  are  the  objects  and  subjects  of  relations  of  causal  dependence,  and  are
invariants  of  observation,  which puts  them into  a  class  of  property  about  which Born
thinks we ought to be realists. We’ve got good reason to take Born at face value when he
says this kind of thing because he believes in particles, does not believe in superpositions,
and so we have good reason to think that he does not just think that the laws of physics are
statistical. It might well be the case that thinks that the laws of physics are statistical but in
addition to that he thinks that probabilities in quantum mechanics are properties carried by
quantum systems that give rise to something like frequencies. This kind of view might
indicate that Born holds some variety of modal interpretation about quantum mechanics,
but I’ve argued that this is unclear, at least with regards to the contemporary programme.
Still,  I  think it  is  most  likely that  Born holds  a long-run propensity  view of  quantum
mechanical probabilities. 
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have examined the philosophy of Max Born. I’ve argued that he holds that
there  exist  principles  regarding  causal  relations  that  have  guided  the  development  of
physics and have, in its modern formulation, been confirmed as empiricalan empirically-
supported status; that he is a selective realist, initially with regards to invariant properties
and, later on, an epistemic structural realist; that he has produced an argument, compatible
with  modern  philosophical  definitions  of  determinism,  that  we  were  never  entitled  to
conclude from the success of classical mechanics that the world was deterministic; and that
Born holds an objective interpretation of probabilities in quantum mechanics which, due to
his  strong  belief  in  the  physical  reality  of  quantum-mechanical  probabilities  and  his
apparent  disbelief  in  the  superposition  of  the wave-function,  is  most  likely  a  long-run
propensity theory. I have also I have also used a presentist methodology to examine Born’s
work in science and philosophy. The purpose of this was to add to our understanding of
Born in a way that a purely contextual account could not by looking at how his views
aligned with positions in contemporary philosophy.
In Chapter 1, I started out by giving a defence of presentist historiography of science. I
gave a survey of the various worries that historians have with regards to presentism—
Whiggism, the assumption of a linearly progressive course of history;, triumphalism, the
writing off of unsuccessful theories as a worthy object of study in the history of science in
favour  the  successful;  and  the  assumption  of  identifiable  causal  links  across  different
historical contexts—and argued that we need not think that presentism must necessarily
fall prey to them. Indeed, they can be largely avoided by being careful. I have also given
my own analysis of a disagreement in the history of alchemy between William R Newman
and Ursula, showing that a number of problems that presentism is accused of having are
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not unique to it. Neither Newman nor Klein are presentists but each accuse the other of
historiography that is problematic in ways associated with presentism. Finally, I gave a
comparative examination of three biographies of Newton, drawing out some problems to
be avoided in scientific biography. 
In Chapter 2,  I  gave a biographical overview of Born’s life.  This part  of the thesis  is
largely scholarly in nature and serves to inform the reader about Born’s life, and to try to
set  his  work  in  context.  It  concentrates  in  particular  on  his  education  andand  on  his
scientific work.
In Chapter 3, I gave an detailed examination of Born’s book Natural Philosophy of Cause
and Chance (Born 1949a). I gave a detailed overview of Born’s argument in it, that the
development of physics has been guided by two principles regarding causal relations: that
cause and effect must be spatially connected, and that cause must be prior to, or at least
simultaneous with, effect. This was followed by a survey of the various sorts of statuses
that principles in science can have. I concluded that they have a status similar to Zahar’s
metaphysically serious heuristic principles, although Born regards his as being empirically
confirmed in a  way that  I  think Zahar’s  would not  be,  although some confirmation is
available to a Zaharian principle due to its place in the hard core of a research programme..
I  concluded  by  arguing  that  Born  had  good  reasons  to  not  to  not  worry  about  those
elements of modern physics—spooky action at a distance and relativistic time travel—that
might appear to cause problems for his view, or at least that these issues do not provide
insurmountable reasons to reject his views. The presentist methodology in this instance
was  deployed  by  using  Zahar’s  work  to  try  and  understand  what  metaphysical  status
Born’s principles of causation had. There was also a need to use physics after Born to
evaluate the issued due to relativistic time travel. 
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In Chapter 4, I examined Born’s position on scientific realism. I gave an account of how he
deals  with  the  topic  by  arguing  against  positivism and  for  a  position  called  invariant
realism. I followed this with an overview of definitions of realism, settling on a fourfold
one: a metaphysical commitment, a semantic commitment, an epistemic commitment, and
a  commitment  to  progress  and  continuity  of  reference.  I  argued  that  Born’s  invariant
realism, which argues that we ought to be realists about only those physical quantities that
are invariant under transformation and the entities that bear those quantities, meets all of
these criteria and is a variety of selective realism, albeit one that is not free of tensions
particularly with regards to the individuality of particles in quantum mechanics. I offered a
rebuttal to Galavotti’s (2005) claim that Born is not a realist. I have also argued that Born’s
position  changes  later  on  into  ais  fairly  clearly  a  variety  of  epistemic,  but  not  ontic,
structural realism. Again, the presentist methodology has been used here by drawing on
contemporary notions and varieties of scientific realism in order to explore Born’s views.
In Chapter  5,  I  dealt  with  Born’s  argument  that  we ought  not  to  have  considered the
success of classical mechanics ought never to have been taken as to have been good reason
to  hold  that  the  world  is  deterministic.  I  gave  an  examination  and  explication  of  his
argument—that due to the inevitability of experimental error precise predictions are not
achievable for any classical system, and hence that we are therefore unable to find any
measurable  distinction  between  a  deterministic  and  an  indeterministic  system.  The
presentist methodology was used here to discuss Born’s position in relation to Earman’s
more precise definition of determinism, which draws a distinction not made explicitly in
Born’s day between determinism and predictability. Drawing on more modern work on
deterministic chaos, I gave a reconstruction of Born’s argument that is compatible with
contemporary  philosophical  definitions  of  determinism.  I  have  shown  that  Born’s
argument can be revised to apply to determinism as it has more recently been formulated,
for instance by Earman. 
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In Chapter 6, I examined Born’s position with regards to the interpretation of probability. I
gave a survey of the standard interpretations—classical/logical, subjective, frequency and
propensity—along with looking at what sort of evidence would indicate that Born held one
of  them.  By examining  Born’s  scientific  and  philosophical  writings  that  connect  with
probability, it was shown that Born clearly holds an objective interpretation. Drawing on
an  argument  of  Cartwright’s  and  adding  my  own  analysis  of  an  exchange  of  letters
between Born and Einstein, I argued that Born believes quantum-mechanical probabilities
to be real but rejects a realist interpretation superpositions. Consequently, he holds a long-
run  propensity  interpretation  of  probabilities  in  quantum  mechanics.  I  concluded  by
examining  Cartwright’s  argument  that  Born  holds  one  of  the  modal  interpretations  of
quantum mechanics, arguing that, although there is insufficient evidence to support him
holding one of the full-blown contemporary programs, it does appear that his position is at
least  continuous with van Fraassen’s  original  version.  The presentist  methodology was
used  here  in  drawing  on  contemporary  philosophy  of  quantum  mechanics  (modal
interpretations) to explain Born’s position, which is distinct from the standard Copenhagen
one. It was also used in the assessment of what sort of interpretation of probability Born
holds – the propensity interpretation was not explicitly formulated when he was writing,
although his views clearly correspond to it. 
These chapters largely stand on their own, but I would like to highlight a common thread
running through them: that Born cleaves strongly to (his version of) the maxim of Einstein
and Heisenberg that elements of a theory which are unobservable even in principle, or are
indistinguishable via measurement from some other element of theory, ought not to be the
subject of realist physical interpretation, although it is not quite clear that he is always
consistent in his application of it. 
This thesis does not represent the totality of work that could be done on Born. It has not
dealt  in any detail with the work he did on crystal lattice dynamics prior to becoming
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involved in the development of quantum mechanics.  As mentioned towards the end of
Chapter 4, I suspect that there may be some links between Born and the philosophy of
Ernst  Cassirer.  An  examination  of  Born’s  thoughts  with  respect  to  Cassirer’s  may  be
fruitful.  Another,   more  substantial  project  would  be  a  fully  integrated  intellectual
biography of him—none currently exists in the literature. 
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